To: firoz.mohamed@gov.ab.ca ; laurie.beveridge@gov.ab.ca
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 4:09:44 PM
Subject: Religious beliefs, intimidation , obstruction, and nuisance
To: Firose Mohamed....
++Transportation Alberta January 24 of the 2008th year of our Lord Jesus Christ
Dear private man known as Firose Mohamed .
Thank you Firoz for our productive conversation yesterday....You seemed to have taken training on how to control the conversation....It worked!
Now to the matters at hand.
Simply put the department seems to somehow believe they own my Daughters name...
If that is so then certainly they have a law that allows them to alter it for a financial purpose.....One thing though they do need her informed consent to do that and removing her "all rights reserved under God's law" written on her application if altering a security document with intent.....A very serious criminal breach.
I am wishing to see the law that allows you to intimidate my daughter and by the way I think common sense dictates if she says she is intimidated can you or the government lawyers disprove it?
If she says you altered her name without her permission can you prove you had authority to do it.?
Now either I receive a warm logical conceding letter that no such law or authority exists or you will attempt to stall by asking redundant questions...
Answer mine first and then we can further our calm logical disourse with respect for my daughters Christian faith.
You who are innocent , speak out in support of the integrity that the country and it's history has founded itself upon..
Any other response will be seen as further intimidation and will be used to prove it...
I do not mean to be aggressive but have noticed their are certain lawyers who work for the department of Justice who are in conflict to deal with this matter in an unbiased manner. They are Jewish like I am Christian and according to their own text called Talmud , http://www.come-and-hear.com, regard non Jews, Christians, as animals....I am not being Anti Semetic just observational and providing facts that make it unethical for a Jewish lawyer to decide issues related to the Ability of the Christian faith and it's followers to not be intimidated by de facto legislation that Jewish lawyers wrote that only applies to corporate entities..
Go ask the writer of the Alberta Highway Traffic Act. Wes Dunfield, He's Jewish and admitted it only applied to commercial entities. Corporations can only make law that applies to corporate entities..Dead in law legal fictions
The whole of the Alberta government takes a false oath and that is not an opinion but fact, to get their job,but then to add further insult to injury have no idea about what the true allegiance means that they promised to provide.. Simple logic tells you that if the one promising to provide it if not aware of what they are promising to provide does not know what that promised item is then they irrefutably cannot provide it....They lied to get their job....You work for those who lied to get your Job...
I would say logically that puts you in a compromised position..I feel for your dilemna.
Here is proof of the false oath giving credense as to why we need to have our correct names on that license or admit we as ministers do not need one. You will see words used in definitions that lead us to the definitions of those word so please follow closely so you will see the deliberate deception utilizing the average man or woman's lack of knowledge as to what the words mean by their own definitions. .If we are not diligent in reviewing definitions then in reality we have no idea what we are reading but rely usually upon a false premise based upon an assumption which as you will see is also false.
This is not new, we are being sucked up my multinational corporate vested interests that have no respect for God as money is their God and this is a visible arena that the G8 has built.
All the complication and deceit is to be held in check by that oath of allegiance but as no one has ever asked for the meaning of it before to my knowledge. It is violated more out of tradition arrogance and ignorance than, as it is to be, in all seriousness , held up as a high ideal that all must and shall adhere to if they are to gain true sanction of her majesty. All other attempts at using her authority are fraudulent and must be resisted and avoided.
These are the words are in Alberta from the Oath of office Act.
I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , swear that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the
Second, her heirs and successors, according to law.
These are the words from the federal Oath of allegiance Act for Canada ,..... it is very clear as to how the oath is to be worded in Canada, it is
(1) Every person who, either of his own accord or in compliance with any lawful requirement made of the person, or in obedience to the directions of any Act or law in force in Canada, except the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Citizenship Act, desires to take an oath of allegiance shall have administered and take the oath in the following form, and no other:
I, ...................., do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors. So help me God.
And then the Alberta Version again,
I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and successors, according to law.?
See the difference? If they are different only one is valid. Guess which one!
Evidently Alberta is behind the times in it's respect for federal law and has not included the Queen of Canada in the oath. That according to federal law shows and proves that Alberta Judges politicians police and all who took that oath are without true sanction or authority as you will notice the federal act ,of precedent regarding oaths to her majesty, is quite explicit and uses the word shall which is an imperative and the words "no other" in reference as to the formation of the oath! The word "Do" is missing from the Alberta oath folks! That makes it grammatically incorrect and an incomplete sentence. Jibberish!
This puts those men and women that have taken that oath in a position of no sanction or authority from the Queen at all and are bogus according to the federal law ! Schedule 5 from the BNAA
That died in 1901along with Dominion of Canada subsequent to the 1893 repeal of the inheritance section 2. It was incorporated as a for profit Business the day after Victoria 's death!
We also have proof the government of Canada is a false illegitimate god..
This from the Governor Generals website'''
http://web.archive.org/web/20070206002725/http://www.gg.ca/gg/rr/index_e.asp
What is the Governor General's position in Government?
"Canada is a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. This means Canadians recognize The Queen as our Head of State. Canada's Governor General carries out Her Majesty's duties in Canada on a daily basis and is Canada's de facto Head of State."
It's only one word but lets see what the Creditor for Canada has to say.. They own all the assets registered with all the registries reporting to the corporation of Canada as we are in debt close to 1 trillion dollars to that private family owned business... The heritage of those families is not secret the lawyers who are prejudiced against Christians are probably related to them....Islam Christian and Jews all follow the same Ten Commandments....The eleventh is in Deuteronomy 4:2;12:32......do not add to my law!
I cant find the provinces de facto legislation in my Bible but do see Exodus 20:3-5 commanding me to not bow to false gods or serve them..
http://web.archive.org/web/20060628094219/http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/whatnewvirt/5CE3BA026987F1C78525672C007D07E0?OpenDocument
July 2001
These policies were prepared for use by World Bank staff and are not necessarily a complete treatment of the subject.
Dealings with De Facto Governments
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note:This OP 7.30 replaces OP 7.30, dated November 1994. Questions may be addressed to the Chief Counsel, Operations Policy.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1. A "de facto government" comes into, or remains in, power by means not provided for in the country's constitution, such as a coup d'état, revolution, usurpation, abrogation or suspension of the constitution.
So now lets go to the law dictionaries the legal staff for the province uses...
De Facto
De facto. [L.] actually; in fact; existing; as a king de facto, distinguished from a king de jure, or by right.
American Dictionary of the English Language, Noah Webster 1828, Vol. I, page 56.
DE FACTO. Actually; in fact; in deed. A term used to denote a thing actually done.
A government de facto signifies one completely, through only temporarily, established in the place of the lawful government; Thomas v. Taylor, 42 Miss. 651, 2 Am. Rep. 625, Chisholm v. Coleman, 43 Ala. 204, 94 Am. Dec. 677, See De Jure Austin, Jur. Lect. vi. p. 336.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Revision (8th Edition)(1914), Volume 1, page 761.
de facto (dë fak'tö). In fact, as distinguished from "de jure," by right.
Law Dictionary, James A. Ballentine, Second Edition, 1948, page 344.
de facto government. A government wherein all the attributes of sovereignty have, by usurpation, been transferred from those who had been legally invested with them to others, who, sustained by a power above the forms of law, claim to act and do act in their stead. 30 Am Jur 181.
Law Dictionary, James A. Ballentine, Second Edition, 1948, page 345.
De facto. In fact; actually; indeed; in reality. Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d 255, 257, 71 A.L.R. 830. (like rape)
Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition (1951) page 504.
De facto government. One that maintains itself by a display of force against the will of the rightful legal government and is successful, at least temporarily, in overturning the institutions of the rightful legal government by setting up its own in lieu thereof. Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1145.
Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition (1951) page 504.
de facto (dë fak'tö, da-, de-). [[L]] existing or being such in actual fact though not by legal establishment, official recognition, etc. [de facto government]: cf. de jure.
Webster's New World Dictionary, 3rd College Ed. (1988), page 360.
now you may ask how does all this relate to my Daughters ability to ride in her car rather than Drive..
Lets find out what Drive really means,
This from the original statute regarding drivers needing a license in North America.
Origin Of Driver's Licenses
________________________________________
A 1925 Act Creating Driver's Licenses for those Engaged in Transportation for Hire.
STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA
Passed At The
REGULAR SESSION OF THE
FORTY-SIXTH LEGISLATURE
1925
CHAPTER 412
An act to impose a license fee for the transportation of persons or
property for hire or compensation upon public streets, roadways and
highways in the State of California by motor vehicle; to provide for
certain exemptions; to provide for the enforcement of the provisions
hereof and for the disposition of the amounts collected on account
of such licenses; to make an appropriation for the purpose of this
act; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith.
[ Approved by the Governor May 28, 1925. ]
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 1.**** The words and phrases used in this act
shall for the purposes of this act, unless the same be
contrary to or inconsistent with the context, be
construed as follows:
(a)* The phrase "railroad commission certificate" shall
be construed to mean a certificate of public convenience
and necessity granted or issued by the railroad
commission of the State of California, authorizing a
common carrier by motor vehicle to operate under the
conditions prescribed by said commission, and shall
include all amendments to or changes in such certificate
which may be made by said commission.
(b)* The word "operator" shall include all persons,
firms, associations and corporations who operate motor
vehicles upon any public highway in this state and
thereby engage in the transportation of persons or
property for hire or compensation, but shall not include
any person, firm, association or corporation who solely
transports by motor vehicle persons to and from or to or
from attendance upon any public school or who solely
transports his or its own property, or employees, or
both, and who transports no persons or property for hire
or compensation, but all persons operating freight
carrying so exempted shall be required to obtain from the
state board of equalization and to display exempt emblems
in the manner herein
an old definition from Bouviers Law Dictionary then a newer one...
DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.
2. Frequent accidents occur in consequence of the neglect or want of skill of drivers of public stage coaches, for which the employers are responsible.
3. The law requires that a driver should possess reasonable skill and be of good habits for the journey; if, therefore, he is not acquainted with the road he undertakes to drive; 3 Bingh. Rep. 314, 321; drives with reins so loose that he cannot govern his horses; 2 Esp. R. 533; does not give notice of any serious danger on the road; 1 Camp. R. 67; takes the wrong side of the road; 4 Esp. R. 273; incautiously comes in collision with another carriage; 1 Stark. R. 423; 1 Campb. R. 167; or does not exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in travelling on the road, to avoid dangers and difficulties, and any accident happens by which any passenger is injured, both the driver and his employers will be responsible. 2 Stark. R. 37; 3 Engl. C. L. Rep. 233; 2 Esp. R. 533; 11. Mass. 57; 6 T. R. 659; 1 East, R. 106; 4 B. & A. 590; 6 Eng. C. L. R. 528; 2 Mc Lean, R. 157. Vide Common carriers Negligence; Quasi Offence.
"Jurisdiction" comes from the Latin "juris" which is the law, and "diction" which means speak. What law is speaking to you? Most people are unknowingly under a corporate statutory jurisdiction because they voluntarily got a drivers license. This comes under maritime/admiralty law, equity law, and/or statutory law and you are presumed guilty until proven innocent. Some people refuse to get a "drivers license" to avoid voluntarily relinquishing their fundamental Constitutional Right to Travel.
Some definitions from Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd edition. 1933. Though old, these are current with vehicle codes, revised in 1959.
"Driver" "One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car." So a driver is someone who makes their living driving on roads, such as a chauffeur, taxicab driver, or trucker. The state does have the right to regulate commerce on the roads.
"License" "A permission, accorded by a competent authority, conferring the right to do some act which without such authorization would be illegal, or would be a trespass or a tort." A license allows you to do something illegal. James Bond Style
"Traffic" (as in court) " Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandize, bills, money, and the like."
Without a doubt, a "drivers license" is a privilege, regulating commerce on our thoroughfares, and not a right. Christians must refuse to get a drivers license to retain their rights.
This from the highway traffic Act of Alberta
"driver" or "operator" means a
person who drives or is in
actual physical control of a vehicle;
"vehicle" means a device in, on or by which a person or
thing may be transported or drawn on a highway.
now back to Bouviers and Blacks law dictionaries so we can have no argument or foolish intimidating rebuttal to the already accepted definitions in law
Transport,,, Blacks Law first Edition.
"The removal of goods or
persons from one place to another by carrier"
CARRIERS, contracts. There are two kinds of carriers, namely, common carriers, (q. v.) who have been considered under another head; and private carriers. These latter are persons who, although they do not undertake to transport the goods of such as choose to employ them, yet agree to carry the goods of some particular person for hire, from one place to another.
2. In such case the carrier incurs no responsibility beyond that of any other ordinary bailee for hire, that is to say, the responsibility of ordinary diligence. 2 Bos. & Pull. 417; 4 Taunt. 787; Selw. N. P. 382 n.; 1 Wend. R. 272; 1 Hayw. R. 14; 2 Dana, R. 430; 6 Taunt. 577; Jones, Bailm. 121; Story on Bailm, 495. But in Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 Watts & Serg. 285, it was holden that a Wagoner Who carries goods for hire, contracts,the responsibility of a common carrier, whether transportation be his principal and direct business, or only an occasional and incidental employment.
3. To bring a person within the description of a common carrier, he must exercise his business as a public employment; he must undertake to carry goods for persons generally; and he must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire, as a business; not as a casual occupation pro hac vice. 1 Salk. 249; 1 Bell's Com. 467; 1 Hayw. R. 14; 1 Wend. 272; 2, Dana, R. 430. See Bouv. Inst. Index, b. t.
d) "commercial vehicle"
(i) means a truck, trailer or semi-trailer, except
(A) a truck, trailer or semi-trailer that is a public
service vehicle, or
(B) a truck, trailer or semi-trailer or any class of
vehicle that by the regulations or by an order of
the Alberta Motor Transport Board
is exempted
from being classified as a commercial vehicle,
and
(ii) includes
(A) a motor vehicle from which sales are made of
goods, wares, merchandise or commodity, and
(B) a motor vehicle by means of which delivery is
made of goods, wares, merchandise or
commodity to a purchaser or consignee of them;
(q.1) "public service vehicle"
(i) means a motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer
operated on a highway by or on behalf of a person
for compensation, whether that operation is regular
or only occasional or for a single trip, and
(ii) includes a motor vehicle kept by a person for the
purpose, subject to the regulations, of being rented
without a driver, but
(iii) does not include a motor vehicle used solely as an
ambulance or hearse or for the transportation of the
Royal Mail;
So to be definitive you need to see the lawful definition of person and the scriptures that guide me and
command me to not show respect to persons as they are
fictions of law..A player on a stage wearing a mask.
PERSON. This word is applied to men, women and children, who are called natural persons. In law, man and person are not exactly-synonymous terms. Any human being is a man, whether he be a member of society or not, whatever may be the rank he holds, or whatever may be his age, sex, &c. A person is a man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 137..
2. It is also used to denote a corporation which is an artificial person. 1 Bl. Com. 123; 4 Bing. 669; C. 33 Eng. C. L R. 488; Wooddes. Lect. 116; Bac. Us. 57; 1 Mod. 164.
3. But when the word "Persons" is spoken of in legislative acts, natural persons will be intended, unless something appear in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons. 1 Scam. R. 178.
4.. Natural persons are divided into males, or men; and females or women. Men are capable of all kinds of engagements and functions, unless by reasons applying to particular individuals. Women cannot be appointed to any public office, nor perform any civil functions, except those which the law specially declares them capable of exercising. Civ. Code of Louis. art. 25.
5. They are also sometimes divided into free persons and slaves. Freemen are those who have preserved their natural liberty, that is to say, who have the right of doing what is not forbidden by the law. A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. Slaves are sometimes ranked not with persons but things. But sometimes they are considered as persons for example, a negro is in contemplation of law a person, so as to be capable of committing a riot in conjunction with white men. 1 Bay, 358. Vide Man.
6. Persons are also divided into citizens, (q. v.) and aliens, (q. v.) when viewed with regard to their political rights. When they are considered in relation to their civil rights, they are living or civilly dead; vide Civil Death; outlaws; and infamous persons.
7. Persons are divided into legitimates and bastards, when examined as to their rights by birth.
TO PERSONATE, crim. law. The act of assuming the character of another without lawful authority, and, in such character, doing something to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of another, without his will or consent.
2. The bare fact of personating another for the purpose of fraud, is no more than a cheat or misdemeanour at common law, and punishable as such. 2 East, P. C. 1010; 2 Russ. on Cr. 479.
3. By the act of congress of the 30th April, 1790, s. 15, 1 Story's Laws U. S. 86, it is enacted, that " if any person shall acknowledge, or procure to be acknowledged in any court of the United States, any recognizance, bail or judgment, in the name or names of any other person or persons not privy or consenting to the same, every such person or persons, on conviction thereof, shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not exceeding seven years, and whipped not exceeding thirty-nine stripes, Provided nevertheless. that this act shall not extend to the acknowledgment of any judgment or judgments by any attorney or attorneys, duly admitted, for any person or persons against whom any such judgment or judgments shall be bad or given." Vide, generally, 2 John. Cas. 293; 16 Vin. Ab. 336; Com. Dig. Action on the case for a deceit, A 3.
Jam 2:9
But if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors.
Jam 2:10
For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one [point], he is guilty of all.
Here are a list of more succinct definitions so no one gets lost.
I am not a Person, or an Individual, or even a human
I am not a person, or an individual, or a Human, and although some humans look similar to me, I am not a human.
Some would say that I am a 'natural' person, but as I will show you, I am not one of those either. Who then or what then am I?
To understand who I am, you must first understand the definitions which have been placed on the words I have quoted above, words that are commonly used, but do not describe me anymore. For example, the word 'person'.
Person - The Revised Code of Washington, RCW 1.16.080, (I live in Washington State) defines a person as follows: "The term 'person' may be construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or territory, or any public or private corporation, as well as an individual."
Person - Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, pg. 791, defines 'person' as follows: "In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."
Person - Oran's Dictionary of the Law, West Group 1999, defines Person as: 1. A human being (a "natural" person). 2. A corporation (an "artificial" person). Corporations are treated as persons in many legal situations. Also, the word "person" includes corporations in most definitions in this dictionary. 3. Any other "being" entitled to sue as a legal entity (a government, an association, a group of Trustees, etc.). 4.. The plural of person is persons, not people (see that word). -
Person - Duhaime's Law Dictionary. An entity with legal rights and existence including the ability to sue and be sued, to sign contracts, to receive gifts, to appear in court either by themselves or by lawyer and, generally, other powers incidental to the full expression of the entity in law. Individuals are "persons" in law unless they are minors or under some kind of other incapacity such as a court finding of mental incapacity. Many laws give certain powers to "persons" which, in almost all instances, includes business organizations that have been formally registered such as partnerships, corporations or associations. -
Person, noun. per'sn. - Webster's 1828 Dictionary. Defines person as: [Latin persona; said to be compounded of per, through or by, and sonus, sound; a Latin word signifying primarily a mask used by actors on the stage.]
legal person - Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law 1996, defines a legal person as : a body of persons or an entity (as a corporation) considered as having many of the rights and responsibilities of a natural person and esp. the capacity to sue and be sued.
A person according to these definitions, is basically an entity - legal fiction - of some kind that has been legally created and has the legal capacity to be sued. Isn't it odd that the word lawful is not used within these definitions?
Well….. I am not "the United States, this state, or any territory, or any public or private corporation". I am not "labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." So, I cannot be a 'person' under this part of the definition.
The RCW quoted above also states that a person could also be an "individual". Black's Law Dictionary also defines a person as a "human being," which they define by stating "(i.e. natural person)". So let's first check to see if I am an "individual".
Individual - Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, pg. 533, defines "individual" as follows: "As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons."
Well now, I have already been shown that I am not a 'person', and since 'individual' denotes a single 'person' as distinguished from a group or class, I can't be an 'individual' under this definition either. But I see the term 'natural person' used in the definition of the RCW, and also in the definition of some of the Law Dictionaries. Maybe I am a 'natural' person, since I know I am not an 'artificial' one.
I could not find the term 'Natural person' defined anywhere, so I had to look up the word 'natural' for a definition to see if that word would fit with the word person...
Natural - Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, pg. 712, defines 'Natural' as follows: "Untouched by man or by influences of civilization; wild; untutored, and is the opposite of the word "artificial". The juristic meaning of this term does not differ from the vernacular, except in the cases where it is used in opposition to the term "legal"; and then it means proceeding from or determined by physical causes or conditions, as distinguished from positive enactments of law, or attributable to the nature of man rather than the commands of law, or based upon moral rather than legal considerations or sanctions."
Wow, what do they mean by this definition? Am I untouched by man (depends on what the word 'man' means), or by influences of civilization? I don't think so. Am I 'wild', or 'untutored'? nope, not me. Even though the definition states that this word is the opposite of the word 'artificial', it still does not describe who I believe I am. So I must conclude that I am not a 'natural' person, under this definition of the word 'natural'. So the term 'natural person' cannot apply to me.
Black's Law Dictionary also used the term 'human being', and although Black's defined it as a 'natural person', maybe they made a mistake, maybe I am a 'human being'. 'Human' or 'human being' does not appear to have a 'legal' definition, so I went to my old standby 1888 Noah Webster's Dictionary for a vernacular definition of this word. Maybe Noah would know who I am.
Human - Webster's 1888 Dictionary defines 'human' as follows: n. A human being; one of the race of man. [Rare and inelegant.] "Sprung of humans that inhabit earth." ...To me, the etymology of the word Hu-man, suggests that it is a marriage of two separate words 'Hue' (defined as the property of color), and man. But this cannot of course be correct, at least not politically correct, so I can't go there, because the word would then mean 'colored man'!
Am I of the race of man? Rare and inelegant? Sprung of humans that inhabit earth (ground)? (I'm not colored either). Well, it looks like I have to define the word 'man' through Webster's because there appears to be no legal definition for 'man'.
Man - Webster's 1888 Dictionary defines 'man' as follows: An individual of the human race; a human being; a person.
Oh! Oh! Well, it looks like we are back to the beginning of our study of definitions, yup, back to the start, completed the circle. I am not an 'individual', so I cannot be considered 'of the human race'; and since I'm not of the human race, I can't be 'a human being', and I've also been shown that I'm not 'a person' either.
When I was younger, I remember filling out forms, which had the word 'Caucasian', listed for race (they don't seem to use that definition any more for some reason). I was always told that this was the word for me to use since I had white skin. (It is actually pinkish, and some is tanned, with mostly white next to the tanned, but I was still told I was a 'Caucasian'). So back to the definitions of 'Caucasian".
Caucasian - Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, defines 'Caucasian' as follows: Of or pertaining to the white race.
Well, I guess that makes some sense, since I have always held myself to be 'white', but this is really not a very descriptive definition, so let's see what an 'older' Black's Law Dictionary has to say, if anything (they have a tendency to change the meaning of words in the new dictionaries for some reason).
Caucasian - Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition, defines "Caucasian' As follows: Pertaining to the white race, to which belong the greater part of European nations and those of western Asia. The term is inapplicable to denote families or stocks inhabiting Europe and speaking either the so-called Aryan or Semitic languages.
That's interesting, it appears that 'white racist Aryan' groups, like 'Aryan Nations' types, or those speaking Aryan, are not even 'Caucasians' under this definition, so they can't be from the 'White' Race (I wonder if they know that). Neither are the people who call themselves Jews, and speak a form of Hebrew (which appears to be derived from the older 'Semitic' language referred to in Black's Law Dictionary).
Back to Noah's Dictionary to see if he has a vernacular definition of the word 'Caucasian'.
Caucasian - Webster's 1888 Dictionary defines 'Caucasian' as follows: Anyone belonging to the Indo-European race, and the white races originating near Mount Caucasus.
OK, here is my Conclusion: There may be some beings that are 'persons' and some of them are 'individuals', and some 'Natural persons' do exist, of this I have no doubt, I've met some of them. There are also many that I believe are 'Humans', or 'Human beings', these beings seem to exist all over this globe. However...
My kinfolk came from Western Europe, so I must have come from one of the European Nations. I am also white (I use the term loosely), so by definition I must be a 'Caucasian'. Since I am a Caucasian, I must have come from, or be a member of one of the white races originating near Mount Caucasus. I am a male of my race, so I must conclude that I am a 'Caucasian male'. I am also a follower of the Scriptural Messiah, commonly called a Christian. I am a living breathing being, on the soil. Therefore I must conclude that I am a living breathing Christian Caucasian (White) male, in other words, I should be called a 'Living Breathing Caucasian Christian Male'……. or an 'LBCCM' - Cool - Ok, now where is that Mount Caucasus, and why would my Christian 'White' Race be originating from the area near that mountain called Mount Caucasus..
Now lets see what the word Human really means......I am going into detail so you can see we have been deceived by the misuse of our own language.
Definition of Human Being
Are you a 'person', an 'individual', or a 'human being'? These words, at law, define you as being spiritually 'dead.' This is how the world makes its attachment to you.
The terms, 'person', 'individual', 'human being', etc., are not in Christ.
Words like "individual," and "human being" do not even appear in Scripture! These are 'created' terms by the natural man (1 Cor 2:14). These words describe the 'old man', but not the 'new man' in Christ (Col 3:9-10).
In Balantine's Self Pronouncing Law Dictionary, 1948, page 389, Human Being is defined as "See Monster." On page 540 of this same Law Dictionary, Monster is defined as "a human being by birth, but in some part resembling a lower animal."
In Webster's New World Dictionary , Third College Edition, 1988, pages 879-880, a Monster is defined as "a person so cruel, wicked, depraved, etc., as to horrify others."
From the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd Edition, page 901, Human Being is defined as a "Natural man: unenlightened or unregenerate," and on page 1461, Unregenerate means "not regenerate; unrepentant; an unregenerate sinner; not convinced by or unconverted to a particular religion; wicked, sinful, dissolute."
In Webster's New World Dictionary , Third College Edition, 1988, page 657, Humanitarianism is defined as "the doctrine that humankind may become perfect without divine aid."
In Colliers New Dictionary of the English Language, 1928, Humanitarian is defined as "a philanthropist; an anti-Trinitarian who rejects the doctrine of Christ's divinity; a perfectionist."
And in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 1990, page 653, Humanism is defined as "any system or mode of thought or action in which human interests, values and dignity predominate, especially an ethical theory that often rejects the importance of a belief in God."
Therefore, when anyone calls himself or herself a 'human being', or a 'humanitarian,' they are saying (according to every definition of these words, and according to the law), "I'm an animal; I'm a monster; I'm not saved; I'm unrepentant; I'm an unregenerate sinner; I'm not converted; I'm wicked, sinful, and dissolute; I'm cruel, depraved, unenlightened; and I reject Christ's divinity and the importance of a belief in God."
"Men [Bondman] rely for protection of their right on God's law, and not upon regulations and proclamations of departments of government, or officers who have been designated to carry laws into effect." Baty v. Sale, 43 Ill. 351." [Codes, edicts, proclamations, and decisions are not Law, which define or regulate the Good and Lawful Bondman. Therefore, title 42 "law" suits are ungodly, and are the redress for and of human beings, i.e., non-believers.]
The Septuagint uses the term "human beings" only one time, and its meaning is identical to the above definitions. Let's look at the last verse of the book of Jonah, where Nineva was full of men who were unrepentant, unregenerate, unconverted, wicked, sinful, dissolute, cruel, depraved, unenlightened, rejected the importance of a belief in God. Or, in other words, "human beings."
"and shall not I spare Nineve, the great city, in which dwell more than twelve myriads of human beings, who do not know their right hand or their left hand...?" [Jonah 4:11 (Septuagint)]
The "human beings" of Nineve did not know their right hand from their left because they did not know the Truth and were lost. They did not know God, they were separated from God. However, those human beings were willing to turn from their ways and learn the things of God, so He spared that city from destruction.
The term "human being" is also synonymous with the term 'natural man.'
"The natural man is a spiritual monster. His heart is where his feet should be, fixed upon the earth; his heels are lifted up against heaven, which his heart should be set on. His face is towards hell; his back towards heaven. He loves what he should hate, and hates what he should love; joys in what he ought to mourn for, and mourns for what he ought to rejoice in; glories in his shame, and is ashamed of his glory; abhors what he should desire, and desires what he should abhor." [Thomas Boston, quoted in Augustus Toplady, Complete Works (1794, reprinted by Sprinkle Publications 1987), page 584].
And the Word confirms:
"But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." [1 Corinthians 2:14,]
The above verse witnesses to us that the natural man is spiritually dead. The 'natural man' in Scripture is synonymous with the 'natural person' as defined in man's laws.
"Natural Person means human being, and not an artificial or juristic person." Shawmut Bank, N.A.. v. Valley Farms, 610 A. 2d. 652, 654; 222 Conn. 361.
"Natural Person: Any human being who as such is a legal entity as distinguished from an artificial person, like a corporation, which derives its status as a legal entity from being recognized so in law. Natural Child: The ordinary euphemism for 'bastard' or illegitimate." [Amon v. Moreschi, 296 N.Y . 395, 73 N.E.2d 716." Max Radin, Radin's Law Dictionary (1955), p. 216.]
Those that are spiritually dead belong to the prince of this world because he's dead himself. Satan has dominion over the natural man, for he is the prince of this world [John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11]; and, as a consequence of this, he has dominion over those of the world, i.e., human beings, the natural man – those who receive not the things of the Spirit of God and reject Christ. Because the bondman in Christ is sanctified from the world, he is separated from the adversary's dominion over him–sin [John 8:34].. This is the cause for Christ having sanctified Himself in the Truth of the Word of God – to provide the entrance to the refuge in and through Himself for us.
So I could provide you more but I think you already overwhelmed as I destroyed your belief system and now you are aware you are working for a massivr criminal organization founded upon a false oath. Can you know see why my Daughter wants her name corrected and her proviso "All rights Reserved in God's law" under her signature? This destroys any assumptions she has submitted to the false gods running the Alberta Legislature...Remember everyone of them has a false oath....What kind of authority swears an oath that is bogus??? A false authority.
So you have seen the proof irrefutable and you can watch the intimidating comments from Lauries office as her illegitimate false oathed lawyers intentionally violate 176 180 and 423 of the criminal code...Oh and violating an act of Parliament to..126 of the criminal code.. The act? the Oaths of Allegiance Act
So either you can see your way to treating us as you did the Hutterites or your back in court only this time with proof your institution is based upon a fraud..
Not opinion factual evidence that makes every lawyer with a Jewish heritage cringe...Did you know that those of that faith take an oath once a year called the KOL NIDRE.....It is so they can disavow any other oaths they have taken during the year in order to deceive others and so God will condone their actions.
Yes it is true. That truth is not, I repeat not, antiSemetic but it is anti Fraud and Lies!
Do you think we all have the ability to complain about such abuse of power ,or should we be shut up as antisemites cause we tell the factual provable truth?
I appreciate your intellectual comments which do not originate from some drone like dialogue you have been trained to say. Do not be played like a puppet as they will attempt to do so...Ask how in law you get to intimidate a man or woman to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs...
If you want next email I will send you all the de facto legal precedentslike the Samur case in Quebec where the civil law of the province lost to 176 of the criminal code and 180 applied as well as 423..Civil law,yours cannot trump criminal code....Tell that one to Jim Leitch.
Blessings upon your willingness to not let our brain be washed in dirty water......
Thankyou for your time....
Friday, October 10, 2008
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Poetry to die for.....Taxed to death and beyond!
The Tax Poem
Tax his land, Tax his bed,
Tax the table, At which he's fed.
Tax his tractor, Tax his mule,
Teach him taxes, Are the rule.
Tax his work, Tax his pay,
He works for peanuts, Anyway!
Tax his cow, Tax his goat,
Tax his pants, Tax his coat.
Tax his ties, Tax his shirt,
Tax his work, Tax his dirt.
Tax his tobacco, Tax his drink,
Tax him if he tries to think.
Tax his cigars, Tax his beers,
If he cries, Tax his tears.
Tax his car, Tax his gas,
Find other ways to tax his ass.
Tax all he has, Then let him know,
That you won't be done, Till he has no dough.
When he screams and hollers, then tax him more,
Tax him till he's good and sore.
Then tax his coffin, Tax his grave,
Tax the sod in which he's laid.
Put these words, Upon his tomb,
'Taxes drove me to my doom...'
When he's gone, Do not relax,
Its time to apply.....
The Inheritance Tax
Accounts Receivable Tax
Airline Surcharge tax
Airline Fuel Tax
Airport Maintenance Tax
Building Permit Tax
Cigarette Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Death Tax
Dog License Tax
Driving Permit Tax
Employee Tax
Excise Taxes
Federal Income Tax
Federal Unemployment (UI)
Fishing License Tax
Food License Tax
GST
Gasoline Tax ( too much per litre)
Gross Receipts Tax
Health Tax
Hunting License Tax
Hydro Tax
Inheritance Tax
Interest Tax
Liquor Tax
Luxury Taxes
Marriage License Tax
Medicare Tax
Mortgage Tax
Personal Income Tax
Poverty Tax
Prescription Drug Tax
Property Tax
Provincial Income Tax
PST
Real Estate Tax
Recreational Vehicle Tax
Retail Sales Tax
Service Charge Tax
School Tax
Telephone Federal Tax
Telephone Federal, Provincial and Local Surcharge Taxes
Telephone Minimum Usage Surcharge Tax
Vehicle License Registration Tax
Vehicle Sales Tax
Water Tax
Watercraft Registration Tax
Well Permit Tax
Workers Compensation Tax ......
STILL THINK THIS IS FUNNY?
* Not one of these taxes existed 100 years ago,
* our nation was one of the most prosperous in the world.
* We had absolutely no national debt,
* had a large middle class,
* and Mom stayed home to raise the kids.
What in the hell happened????
Can you spell 'politicians'????
I hope this goes around CANADA at least 100 times!!!!!
YOU can help it get there!!!!
GO AHEAD - - - be a CANADIAN !!!!!!!!!!
SEND IT AROUND TO EVERYONE AND CHANGE IT !!!!
Tax his land, Tax his bed,
Tax the table, At which he's fed.
Tax his tractor, Tax his mule,
Teach him taxes, Are the rule.
Tax his work, Tax his pay,
He works for peanuts, Anyway!
Tax his cow, Tax his goat,
Tax his pants, Tax his coat.
Tax his ties, Tax his shirt,
Tax his work, Tax his dirt.
Tax his tobacco, Tax his drink,
Tax him if he tries to think.
Tax his cigars, Tax his beers,
If he cries, Tax his tears.
Tax his car, Tax his gas,
Find other ways to tax his ass.
Tax all he has, Then let him know,
That you won't be done, Till he has no dough.
When he screams and hollers, then tax him more,
Tax him till he's good and sore.
Then tax his coffin, Tax his grave,
Tax the sod in which he's laid.
Put these words, Upon his tomb,
'Taxes drove me to my doom...'
When he's gone, Do not relax,
Its time to apply.....
The Inheritance Tax
Accounts Receivable Tax
Airline Surcharge tax
Airline Fuel Tax
Airport Maintenance Tax
Building Permit Tax
Cigarette Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Death Tax
Dog License Tax
Driving Permit Tax
Employee Tax
Excise Taxes
Federal Income Tax
Federal Unemployment (UI)
Fishing License Tax
Food License Tax
GST
Gasoline Tax ( too much per litre)
Gross Receipts Tax
Health Tax
Hunting License Tax
Hydro Tax
Inheritance Tax
Interest Tax
Liquor Tax
Luxury Taxes
Marriage License Tax
Medicare Tax
Mortgage Tax
Personal Income Tax
Poverty Tax
Prescription Drug Tax
Property Tax
Provincial Income Tax
PST
Real Estate Tax
Recreational Vehicle Tax
Retail Sales Tax
Service Charge Tax
School Tax
Telephone Federal Tax
Telephone Federal, Provincial and Local Surcharge Taxes
Telephone Minimum Usage Surcharge Tax
Vehicle License Registration Tax
Vehicle Sales Tax
Water Tax
Watercraft Registration Tax
Well Permit Tax
Workers Compensation Tax ......
STILL THINK THIS IS FUNNY?
* Not one of these taxes existed 100 years ago,
* our nation was one of the most prosperous in the world.
* We had absolutely no national debt,
* had a large middle class,
* and Mom stayed home to raise the kids.
What in the hell happened????
Can you spell 'politicians'????
I hope this goes around CANADA at least 100 times!!!!!
YOU can help it get there!!!!
GO AHEAD - - - be a CANADIAN !!!!!!!!!!
SEND IT AROUND TO EVERYONE AND CHANGE IT !!!!
Friday, September 26, 2008
The Sikh's faith prevails again in Dallas!!
Dallas County changes policy to settle turban case
WSN Network
DALLAS: Dallas County has revised its security screening procedures to settle a lawsuit filed on behalf of a Sikh man who was ordered out of a courtroom for refusing to remove his turban, a civil rights group said Wednesday.
The new policy revealed by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas calls for security personnel at all county buildings to allow people wearing religious head coverings or other religious garments to walk through a metal detector without removing the item. If the detector beeps, security personnel will use a hand-held detector or conduct a private search.
The policy was developed by the county based on models provided by the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund. It led to the dismissal last week of a case brought by the ACLU on behalf of Amardeep Singh.
According to the suit filed last year, Singh was ordered out of a Justice of the Peace courtroom under threat of arrest in June 2006. Singh had gone to defend himself from a traffic ticket when he was told by court personnel and Judge Albert Bernard Cercone to remove his "hat." When Singh tried to explain that wearing a turban is a required religious practice for members of the Sikh faith, the judge and court officials refused to hear his explanation.
"The Constitution protects the right of Mr. Singh and every citizen to access their government without compromising their religious beliefs," said Lisa Graybill, legal director of the ACLU Foundation of Texas. "By applying this new policy, the county and Judge Cercone will help ensure that right is respected in Dallas County."
Last year, officials in Lawrenceville, Ga. revised their policy after a Sikh man was kept from entering the court because of his turban, according to documents in the lawsuit.
A federal guideline also revised last year allows air passengers to keep on headwear such as turbans at screening checkpoints. It gives airport screeners the option to pat down headwear at the metal detector if a passenger does not want to remove it for personal reasons.
WSN Network
DALLAS: Dallas County has revised its security screening procedures to settle a lawsuit filed on behalf of a Sikh man who was ordered out of a courtroom for refusing to remove his turban, a civil rights group said Wednesday.
The new policy revealed by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas calls for security personnel at all county buildings to allow people wearing religious head coverings or other religious garments to walk through a metal detector without removing the item. If the detector beeps, security personnel will use a hand-held detector or conduct a private search.
The policy was developed by the county based on models provided by the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund. It led to the dismissal last week of a case brought by the ACLU on behalf of Amardeep Singh.
According to the suit filed last year, Singh was ordered out of a Justice of the Peace courtroom under threat of arrest in June 2006. Singh had gone to defend himself from a traffic ticket when he was told by court personnel and Judge Albert Bernard Cercone to remove his "hat." When Singh tried to explain that wearing a turban is a required religious practice for members of the Sikh faith, the judge and court officials refused to hear his explanation.
"The Constitution protects the right of Mr. Singh and every citizen to access their government without compromising their religious beliefs," said Lisa Graybill, legal director of the ACLU Foundation of Texas. "By applying this new policy, the county and Judge Cercone will help ensure that right is respected in Dallas County."
Last year, officials in Lawrenceville, Ga. revised their policy after a Sikh man was kept from entering the court because of his turban, according to documents in the lawsuit.
A federal guideline also revised last year allows air passengers to keep on headwear such as turbans at screening checkpoints. It gives airport screeners the option to pat down headwear at the metal detector if a passenger does not want to remove it for personal reasons.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Definition of Human Being....you will be surprised!
Definition of Human Being
Are you a 'person', an 'individual', or a 'human being'? These words, at law, define you as being spiritually 'dead.' This is how the world makes its attachment to you.
The terms, 'person', 'individual', 'human being', etc., are not in Christ.
Words like "individual," and "human being" do not even appear in Scripture! These are 'created' terms by the natural man (1 Cor 2:14). These words describe the 'old man', but not the 'new man' in Christ (Col 3:9-10).
In Balantine's Self Pronouncing Law Dictionary, 1948, page 389, Human Being is defined as "See Monster." On page 540 of this same Law Dictionary, Monster is defined as "a human being by birth, but in some part resembling a lower animal."
In Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988, pages 879-880, a Monster is defined as "a person so cruel, wicked, depraved, etc., as to horrify others."
From the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd Edition, page 901, Human Being is defined as a "Natural man: unenlightened or unregenerate," and on page 1461, Unregenerate means "not regenerate; unrepentant; an unregenerate sinner; not convinced by or unconverted to a particular religion; wicked, sinful, dissolute."
In Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988, page 657, Humanitarianism is defined as "the doctrine that humankind may become perfect without divine aid."
In Colliers New Dictionary of the English Language, 1928, Humanitarian is defined as "a philanthropist; an anti-Trinitarian who rejects the doctrine of Christ's divinity; a perfectionist."
And in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 1990, page 653, Humanism is defined as "any system or mode of thought or action in which human interests, values and dignity predominate, especially an ethical theory that often rejects the importance of a belief in God."
Therefore, when anyone calls himself or herself a 'human being', or a 'humanitarian,' they are saying (according to every definition of these words, and according to the law), "I'm an animal; I'm a monster; I'm not saved; I'm unrepentant; I'm an unregenerate sinner; I'm not converted; I'm wicked, sinful, and dissolute; I'm cruel, depraved, unenlightened; and I reject Christ's divinity and the importance of a belief in God."
"Individuals [Bondman] rely for protection of their right on God's law, and not upon regulations and proclamations of departments of government, or officers who have been designated to carry laws into effect." Baty v. Sale, 43 Ill. 351.” [Codes, edicts, proclamations, and decisions are not Law, which define or regulate the Good and Lawful Bondman. Therefore, title 42 "law" suits are ungodly, and are the redress for and of human beings, i.e., non-believers.]
The Septuagint uses the term "human beings" only one time, and its meaning is identical to the above definitions. Let's look at the last verse of the book of Jonah, where Nineva was full of men who were unrepentant, unregenerate, unconverted, wicked, sinful, dissolute, cruel, depraved, unenlightened, rejected the importance of a belief in God. Or, in other words, "human beings."
"and shall not I spare Nineve, the great city, in which dwell more than twelve myriads of human beings, who do not know their right hand or their left hand...?" [Jonah 4:11 (Septuagint)]
The "human beings" of Nineve did not know their right hand from their left because they did not know the Truth and were lost. They did not know God, they were separated from God. However, those human beings were willing to turn from their ways and learn the things of God, so He spared that city from destruction.
The term "human being" is also synonymous with the term 'natural man.'
"The natural man is a spiritual monster. His heart is where his feet should be, fixed upon the earth; his heels are lifted up against heaven, which his heart should be set on. His face is towards hell; his back towards heaven. He loves what he should hate, and hates what he should love; joys in what he ought to mourn for, and mourns for what he ought to rejoice in; glories in his shame, and is ashamed of his glory; abhors what he should desire, and desires what he should abhor." [Thomas Boston, quoted in Augustus Toplady, Complete Works (1794, reprinted by Sprinkle Publications 1987), page 584].
And the Word confirms:
"But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." [1 Corinthians 2:14,]
The above verse witnesses to us that the natural man is spiritually dead. The ‘natural man’ in Scripture is synonymous with the ‘natural person’ as defined in man’s laws.
"Natural Person means human being, and not an artificial or juristic person." Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 610 A. 2d. 652, 654; 222 Conn. 361.
"Natural Person: Any human being who as such is a legal entity as distinguished from an artificial person, like a corporation, which derives its status as a legal entity from being recognized so in law. Natural Child: The ordinary euphemism for ‘bastard’ or illegitimate." [Amon v. Moreschi, 296 N.Y. 395, 73 N.E.2d 716." Max Radin, Radin’s Law Dictionary (1955), p. 216.]
Those that are spiritually dead belong to the prince of this world because he's dead himself. Satan has dominion over the natural man, for he is the prince of this world [John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11]; and, as a consequence of this, he has dominion over those of the world, i.e., human beings, the natural man – those who receive not the things of the Spirit of God and reject Christ. Because the bondman in Christ is sanctified from the world, he is separated from the adversary's dominion over him–sin [John 8:34]. This is the cause for Christ having sanctified Himself in the Truth of the Word of God – to provide the entrance to the refuge in and through Himself for us.
Are you a 'person', an 'individual', or a 'human being'? These words, at law, define you as being spiritually 'dead.' This is how the world makes its attachment to you.
The terms, 'person', 'individual', 'human being', etc., are not in Christ.
Words like "individual," and "human being" do not even appear in Scripture! These are 'created' terms by the natural man (1 Cor 2:14). These words describe the 'old man', but not the 'new man' in Christ (Col 3:9-10).
In Balantine's Self Pronouncing Law Dictionary, 1948, page 389, Human Being is defined as "See Monster." On page 540 of this same Law Dictionary, Monster is defined as "a human being by birth, but in some part resembling a lower animal."
In Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988, pages 879-880, a Monster is defined as "a person so cruel, wicked, depraved, etc., as to horrify others."
From the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd Edition, page 901, Human Being is defined as a "Natural man: unenlightened or unregenerate," and on page 1461, Unregenerate means "not regenerate; unrepentant; an unregenerate sinner; not convinced by or unconverted to a particular religion; wicked, sinful, dissolute."
In Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988, page 657, Humanitarianism is defined as "the doctrine that humankind may become perfect without divine aid."
In Colliers New Dictionary of the English Language, 1928, Humanitarian is defined as "a philanthropist; an anti-Trinitarian who rejects the doctrine of Christ's divinity; a perfectionist."
And in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 1990, page 653, Humanism is defined as "any system or mode of thought or action in which human interests, values and dignity predominate, especially an ethical theory that often rejects the importance of a belief in God."
Therefore, when anyone calls himself or herself a 'human being', or a 'humanitarian,' they are saying (according to every definition of these words, and according to the law), "I'm an animal; I'm a monster; I'm not saved; I'm unrepentant; I'm an unregenerate sinner; I'm not converted; I'm wicked, sinful, and dissolute; I'm cruel, depraved, unenlightened; and I reject Christ's divinity and the importance of a belief in God."
"Individuals [Bondman] rely for protection of their right on God's law, and not upon regulations and proclamations of departments of government, or officers who have been designated to carry laws into effect." Baty v. Sale, 43 Ill. 351.” [Codes, edicts, proclamations, and decisions are not Law, which define or regulate the Good and Lawful Bondman. Therefore, title 42 "law" suits are ungodly, and are the redress for and of human beings, i.e., non-believers.]
The Septuagint uses the term "human beings" only one time, and its meaning is identical to the above definitions. Let's look at the last verse of the book of Jonah, where Nineva was full of men who were unrepentant, unregenerate, unconverted, wicked, sinful, dissolute, cruel, depraved, unenlightened, rejected the importance of a belief in God. Or, in other words, "human beings."
"and shall not I spare Nineve, the great city, in which dwell more than twelve myriads of human beings, who do not know their right hand or their left hand...?" [Jonah 4:11 (Septuagint)]
The "human beings" of Nineve did not know their right hand from their left because they did not know the Truth and were lost. They did not know God, they were separated from God. However, those human beings were willing to turn from their ways and learn the things of God, so He spared that city from destruction.
The term "human being" is also synonymous with the term 'natural man.'
"The natural man is a spiritual monster. His heart is where his feet should be, fixed upon the earth; his heels are lifted up against heaven, which his heart should be set on. His face is towards hell; his back towards heaven. He loves what he should hate, and hates what he should love; joys in what he ought to mourn for, and mourns for what he ought to rejoice in; glories in his shame, and is ashamed of his glory; abhors what he should desire, and desires what he should abhor." [Thomas Boston, quoted in Augustus Toplady, Complete Works (1794, reprinted by Sprinkle Publications 1987), page 584].
And the Word confirms:
"But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." [1 Corinthians 2:14,]
The above verse witnesses to us that the natural man is spiritually dead. The ‘natural man’ in Scripture is synonymous with the ‘natural person’ as defined in man’s laws.
"Natural Person means human being, and not an artificial or juristic person." Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 610 A. 2d. 652, 654; 222 Conn. 361.
"Natural Person: Any human being who as such is a legal entity as distinguished from an artificial person, like a corporation, which derives its status as a legal entity from being recognized so in law. Natural Child: The ordinary euphemism for ‘bastard’ or illegitimate." [Amon v. Moreschi, 296 N.Y. 395, 73 N.E.2d 716." Max Radin, Radin’s Law Dictionary (1955), p. 216.]
Those that are spiritually dead belong to the prince of this world because he's dead himself. Satan has dominion over the natural man, for he is the prince of this world [John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11]; and, as a consequence of this, he has dominion over those of the world, i.e., human beings, the natural man – those who receive not the things of the Spirit of God and reject Christ. Because the bondman in Christ is sanctified from the world, he is separated from the adversary's dominion over him–sin [John 8:34]. This is the cause for Christ having sanctified Himself in the Truth of the Word of God – to provide the entrance to the refuge in and through Himself for us.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
God's ministers do not need a licence to ride in their cars.
Certificate validating the authority of the Sovereign’s Right of Way.
Declaration of the Right of Travel
My date of natural birth and address is irrelevant, as I can not remember the date or time I was born of the Spirit, nor
have I been given authority from my Masters to supply you with an address. I am presently sojourning in my right of
way.
Since being born of the Spirit, my name is new, as it was prophecied, “Isaiah 62:2 And the Gentiles shall see thy
righteousness, and all kings thy glory: and thou shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the LORD shall
name.”,. Similarly, Revelation 2:17 “…To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him
a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it.” So it is
You do not know my new name? If not please pray for wisdom that it may come to you, for spiritual things are
spiritually discerned.
I have forsaken my old name and was renamed at my spiritual re-birth with a new name which only my Father may
reveal to you. Have you received it?
As it is written, “I have surnamed thee” (Isa. 45:4); Similarly, “I have called thee by thy name, thou art Mine” (Isa.
43:1), so it is.
My sacred name is greater than the price of pearls; as it is written, (Proverbs 22:1) “A good name is rather to be
chosen than great riches, and loving favour rather than silver and gold”, so it is
I have been commanded not to give that which is holy or precious to certain kinds of people for the very reason given
in Matthew 7:6; “Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample
them under their feet, and turn again and rend you”.
I have been pre-warned that certain identities shall seek to convert my name into a commercial entity. 2 Peter 2:3
“And through covetousness shall they with feigned words make merchandise of you….”
I am an Ambassador and bondservant for King YHWH, and belong to the Kingdom of Heaven, under the reign of
King YHWH, the Creator and under His mono genes Son, Prince Yehowshua, our Saviour, the Messiah. As it is
written, “2 Corinthians 5:20 Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we pray
you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God”, so it is.
Ambassadors and bondservants of YHWH and Yehowshua are not of this world, even though we are living in it, and
therefore if you are claiming authority over me, you must prove this authority from the Bible. As it is written, “(John
15:19) If ye were of the world, the world would love his own: but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen
you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.” Similarly, John 17:11-16 “And now I am no more in the world, but
these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me,
that they may be one, as we are. While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest
me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled. And now come I
to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves. I have given them thy
word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world. I pray not that
thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil. They are not of the world,
even as I am not of the world”. As it is written, so it is.
BE WARNED
Any attempt to coerce or persuade me from my allegiance to my Masters’ Theocratic laws and commandments may be
taken as a national threat against their kingdom. My inactions, actions, words and reaction may be seen as an act of
willful failure to comply with your own perception of your authority. This is not my intention. Your claims of authority
likewise are not seen to be authentic by this ambassador and bond servant of our Saviour. Your words, acts, requests
Page 2
2
and claims of requirements under threats, force, coercion are perceived to be alien to the Kingdom of Heaven
rendering you as an enemy of my Masters’ kingdom and authority.
It is not my intention to provoke aggression, anger, violence, adversity or animosity in your carnal person. I must not
however, allow my conscience to be trammeled. Please respect and honour my sacred rights.
Failure to do so will culminate in the risk of eternal loss to your person unless forgiveness and repentance is sought
and secured only through my Governor, our Saviour.
As it is written, “Our warfare is not carnal.” ( 2 Cor. 2:4.) “We fight not against flesh and blood”, ( Eph 6:12) ; so it is.
The word “registration”
( GIST, pleading. Gist of the action is the essential ground or object of it, in point of law, and without which there is no cause of action. Gould on Pl. c. 4, §12. But it is observable that the substance or gist of the action is not always the principal cause of the plaintiff Is complaint in point of fact, nor that on which he recovers all or the greatest part of his damages.
2. It frequently happens that upon that part of his declaration which contains the substance or gist of the, action, he only recovers nominal damages, and he gets his principal satisfaction on account of matter altogether collateral thereto. A familiar instance of this is the case where a father sues the defendant for a trespass for the seduction of his daughter. The gist of the action is the trespass, and the loss of his daughter's services, but the collateral cause is the injury done to his feelings, for which the principal damages are given. In stating the substance or gist of the action, every thing must be averred which is necessary to be proved at the trial. Vide 1 Vin. Ab. 598; 2 Phil. Ev. 1, note. See Bac. Abr. Pleas, B; Doct. P. 85. See Damages, special, in pleading; 1 Vin. At. 598; 2 Phil. Ev. 1, n.
GIVER, contracts. He who makes a gift. (q. v.) By his gift, the giver always impliedly agrees with the donee that he will not revoke the gift.)
(
when employed by the carnal man means that I would transfer my allegance to YHWH and
Yehowshua over to the authority of an earthly potentate, king or alien crown. However, today is the following scripture
fulfilled in your ears.
1 Timothy 6:15 Which in his times he shall shew, who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of
lords.
All property in my possession, both real and personal belongs to my King’s crown and His Prince’s crown. All property,
both visible and invisible has registration in their Kingdom and I can not without sin and guilt of treason have dual
registration. As it is written, “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin”. (Rom.14:23)
As it is written, “The world is Mine, and the fullness thereof” “But ye are come…to the General Assembly and Church
of the Firstborn which are written in Heaven…”, (Heb. 12:22-23) “No servant can serve two masters”, (Luke 16:13),
so it is.
I shall traverse the world under the license, command and authority of my Masters. As it is written,
“Go ye into all the world”, (1 John 4:4), so it is.
This includes the land of my carnal nativity which is under the ownership of my Masters. As it is written, “The world is
Mine, and the fullness thereof” (Ps.50:12); similarly, “the earth is the lord’s and the fullness thereof” (1 Cor.10’26
& 28) so it is.
All highways therefore belong to YHWH, as it is written, “…My highways shall be exalted” (Isa 49:8 & 11), so it is.
Yehowshua has commanded me, “Go ye therefore into the highways”, Matt 22: 9, as it is written, so it shall be.
I shall travel on the King’s highways and attempts to prevent, hinder, burden or discourage me shall be taken as acts of
disobedience, lawlessness, defiance, faithlessness and treason against the Kingdom of Heaven and an attempt to lead
me into sin. As it is written, “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin” (Rom.14:23)
Do not seek to force me to worship a false god in your government by coercing me to obey man-made laws, or expect
me to follow your directives, as it is written, “there is one Lawgiver” (Js. 4:12), so it is.
When commanded to obey a demonic statute our Commander and Prince answered, (Luke 4:8) “ And Jesus answered
and said unto him, Get thee behind me, Satan: for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only
shalt thou serve”.
I am authorized to follow his example. I am not authorized to go beyond His example
Affirmed by YHWH Himself, as He spake, “Ye shall not add to the word which I command you, neither shall ye
diminish ought from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the LORD your God which I command you”,
(Deut. 4:1 & 2)
All human laws have been formally renounced and made void by my Governor, Prince Yehowshua, as it is written, “In
vain do they worship Me teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men”,(Mk. 7:7)
Affirmed by the Apostle, Paul, “Wherefore if ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as living in
the world, are ye subject to ordinances, ( dogmatizo, prescribed statutes, dogma, civil law) (touch not, taste not,
handle not: which are all to perish with the using;) after the commandments and doctrines of men.
Page 3
3
Affirmed by the Apostle Peter and the other apostles, “We ought to obey God rather than men.”
My insurance/assurance policy is Philippians 4:19 But my God shall supply all your need according to his riches in
glory by Christ Jesus.
Isaiah 32:17 And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance
for ever.
Galatians 6:4-5 ….For every man shall bear his own burden.
Yehowshua is now the only Governor to be obeyed
As it was prophecied, (Isaiah 9:6) “For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be
upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The
Prince of Peace”. So it has been fulfilled.
At His resurrection from the dead, Yehowshua came forth as our example, Saviour, Prince and our Theocratic
Governor.
When Yehowshua pronounced the end of Satan’s kingdom, He then became the Prince of this world under a
Theocracy.
Revelation 12:10 And I heard a loud voice saying in heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, and the
kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ: for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them
before our God day and night.
John 12:31 Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out.
Satan has been judged and dethroned from position in authority over YHWH’s people. As it is written,
(John 16:11) Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged.
I do not come under the laws and authority of the dark kingdom you represent, I am under the Theocracy of YHWH
and Yehowshua.
Forgive me if I do not conform to your carnal laws, orders or directives. I am sojourning in
my right of way on the King’s highway, going about the King’s business under strict
commandments and orders.
YHWH has the final word in this matter-
Deuteronomy 5:32 Ye shall observe to do therefore as the LORD your God hath commanded you: ye shall not
turn aside to the right hand or to the left.
Your failure to recognize this is irrelevant to me, as it is written, 1 Corinthians 2:14 “But the natural man receiveth
not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are
spiritually discerned”
.
So it is.
Ecclesiastes 12:13 Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for
this is the whole duty of man.
Declaration of the Right of Travel
My date of natural birth and address is irrelevant, as I can not remember the date or time I was born of the Spirit, nor
have I been given authority from my Masters to supply you with an address. I am presently sojourning in my right of
way.
Since being born of the Spirit, my name is new, as it was prophecied, “Isaiah 62:2 And the Gentiles shall see thy
righteousness, and all kings thy glory: and thou shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the LORD shall
name.”,. Similarly, Revelation 2:17 “…To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him
a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it.” So it is
You do not know my new name? If not please pray for wisdom that it may come to you, for spiritual things are
spiritually discerned.
I have forsaken my old name and was renamed at my spiritual re-birth with a new name which only my Father may
reveal to you. Have you received it?
As it is written, “I have surnamed thee” (Isa. 45:4); Similarly, “I have called thee by thy name, thou art Mine” (Isa.
43:1), so it is.
My sacred name is greater than the price of pearls; as it is written, (Proverbs 22:1) “A good name is rather to be
chosen than great riches, and loving favour rather than silver and gold”, so it is
I have been commanded not to give that which is holy or precious to certain kinds of people for the very reason given
in Matthew 7:6; “Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample
them under their feet, and turn again and rend you”.
I have been pre-warned that certain identities shall seek to convert my name into a commercial entity. 2 Peter 2:3
“And through covetousness shall they with feigned words make merchandise of you….”
I am an Ambassador and bondservant for King YHWH, and belong to the Kingdom of Heaven, under the reign of
King YHWH, the Creator and under His mono genes Son, Prince Yehowshua, our Saviour, the Messiah. As it is
written, “2 Corinthians 5:20 Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we pray
you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God”, so it is.
Ambassadors and bondservants of YHWH and Yehowshua are not of this world, even though we are living in it, and
therefore if you are claiming authority over me, you must prove this authority from the Bible. As it is written, “(John
15:19) If ye were of the world, the world would love his own: but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen
you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.” Similarly, John 17:11-16 “And now I am no more in the world, but
these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me,
that they may be one, as we are. While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest
me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled. And now come I
to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves. I have given them thy
word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world. I pray not that
thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil. They are not of the world,
even as I am not of the world”. As it is written, so it is.
BE WARNED
Any attempt to coerce or persuade me from my allegiance to my Masters’ Theocratic laws and commandments may be
taken as a national threat against their kingdom. My inactions, actions, words and reaction may be seen as an act of
willful failure to comply with your own perception of your authority. This is not my intention. Your claims of authority
likewise are not seen to be authentic by this ambassador and bond servant of our Saviour. Your words, acts, requests
Page 2
2
and claims of requirements under threats, force, coercion are perceived to be alien to the Kingdom of Heaven
rendering you as an enemy of my Masters’ kingdom and authority.
It is not my intention to provoke aggression, anger, violence, adversity or animosity in your carnal person. I must not
however, allow my conscience to be trammeled. Please respect and honour my sacred rights.
Failure to do so will culminate in the risk of eternal loss to your person unless forgiveness and repentance is sought
and secured only through my Governor, our Saviour.
As it is written, “Our warfare is not carnal.” ( 2 Cor. 2:4.) “We fight not against flesh and blood”, ( Eph 6:12) ; so it is.
The word “registration”
( GIST, pleading. Gist of the action is the essential ground or object of it, in point of law, and without which there is no cause of action. Gould on Pl. c. 4, §12. But it is observable that the substance or gist of the action is not always the principal cause of the plaintiff Is complaint in point of fact, nor that on which he recovers all or the greatest part of his damages.
2. It frequently happens that upon that part of his declaration which contains the substance or gist of the, action, he only recovers nominal damages, and he gets his principal satisfaction on account of matter altogether collateral thereto. A familiar instance of this is the case where a father sues the defendant for a trespass for the seduction of his daughter. The gist of the action is the trespass, and the loss of his daughter's services, but the collateral cause is the injury done to his feelings, for which the principal damages are given. In stating the substance or gist of the action, every thing must be averred which is necessary to be proved at the trial. Vide 1 Vin. Ab. 598; 2 Phil. Ev. 1, note. See Bac. Abr. Pleas, B; Doct. P. 85. See Damages, special, in pleading; 1 Vin. At. 598; 2 Phil. Ev. 1, n.
GIVER, contracts. He who makes a gift. (q. v.) By his gift, the giver always impliedly agrees with the donee that he will not revoke the gift.)
(
when employed by the carnal man means that I would transfer my allegance to YHWH and
Yehowshua over to the authority of an earthly potentate, king or alien crown. However, today is the following scripture
fulfilled in your ears.
1 Timothy 6:15 Which in his times he shall shew, who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of
lords.
All property in my possession, both real and personal belongs to my King’s crown and His Prince’s crown. All property,
both visible and invisible has registration in their Kingdom and I can not without sin and guilt of treason have dual
registration. As it is written, “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin”. (Rom.14:23)
As it is written, “The world is Mine, and the fullness thereof” “But ye are come…to the General Assembly and Church
of the Firstborn which are written in Heaven…”, (Heb. 12:22-23) “No servant can serve two masters”, (Luke 16:13),
so it is.
I shall traverse the world under the license, command and authority of my Masters. As it is written,
“Go ye into all the world”, (1 John 4:4), so it is.
This includes the land of my carnal nativity which is under the ownership of my Masters. As it is written, “The world is
Mine, and the fullness thereof” (Ps.50:12); similarly, “the earth is the lord’s and the fullness thereof” (1 Cor.10’26
& 28) so it is.
All highways therefore belong to YHWH, as it is written, “…My highways shall be exalted” (Isa 49:8 & 11), so it is.
Yehowshua has commanded me, “Go ye therefore into the highways”, Matt 22: 9, as it is written, so it shall be.
I shall travel on the King’s highways and attempts to prevent, hinder, burden or discourage me shall be taken as acts of
disobedience, lawlessness, defiance, faithlessness and treason against the Kingdom of Heaven and an attempt to lead
me into sin. As it is written, “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin” (Rom.14:23)
Do not seek to force me to worship a false god in your government by coercing me to obey man-made laws, or expect
me to follow your directives, as it is written, “there is one Lawgiver” (Js. 4:12), so it is.
When commanded to obey a demonic statute our Commander and Prince answered, (Luke 4:8) “ And Jesus answered
and said unto him, Get thee behind me, Satan: for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only
shalt thou serve”.
I am authorized to follow his example. I am not authorized to go beyond His example
Affirmed by YHWH Himself, as He spake, “Ye shall not add to the word which I command you, neither shall ye
diminish ought from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the LORD your God which I command you”,
(Deut. 4:1 & 2)
All human laws have been formally renounced and made void by my Governor, Prince Yehowshua, as it is written, “In
vain do they worship Me teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men”,(Mk. 7:7)
Affirmed by the Apostle, Paul, “Wherefore if ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as living in
the world, are ye subject to ordinances, ( dogmatizo, prescribed statutes, dogma, civil law) (touch not, taste not,
handle not: which are all to perish with the using;) after the commandments and doctrines of men.
Page 3
3
Affirmed by the Apostle Peter and the other apostles, “We ought to obey God rather than men.”
My insurance/assurance policy is Philippians 4:19 But my God shall supply all your need according to his riches in
glory by Christ Jesus.
Isaiah 32:17 And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance
for ever.
Galatians 6:4-5 ….For every man shall bear his own burden.
Yehowshua is now the only Governor to be obeyed
As it was prophecied, (Isaiah 9:6) “For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be
upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The
Prince of Peace”. So it has been fulfilled.
At His resurrection from the dead, Yehowshua came forth as our example, Saviour, Prince and our Theocratic
Governor.
When Yehowshua pronounced the end of Satan’s kingdom, He then became the Prince of this world under a
Theocracy.
Revelation 12:10 And I heard a loud voice saying in heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, and the
kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ: for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them
before our God day and night.
John 12:31 Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out.
Satan has been judged and dethroned from position in authority over YHWH’s people. As it is written,
(John 16:11) Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged.
I do not come under the laws and authority of the dark kingdom you represent, I am under the Theocracy of YHWH
and Yehowshua.
Forgive me if I do not conform to your carnal laws, orders or directives. I am sojourning in
my right of way on the King’s highway, going about the King’s business under strict
commandments and orders.
YHWH has the final word in this matter-
Deuteronomy 5:32 Ye shall observe to do therefore as the LORD your God hath commanded you: ye shall not
turn aside to the right hand or to the left.
Your failure to recognize this is irrelevant to me, as it is written, 1 Corinthians 2:14 “But the natural man receiveth
not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are
spiritually discerned”
.
So it is.
Ecclesiastes 12:13 Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for
this is the whole duty of man.
Wow both Candidates for President lied about their birth!
LAWSUIT DATE: SEPT. 15, 2008
---------------------------------------------------------
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
Fax: (619) 232-2011 (use cover sheet)
All Rights Reserved
Without Prejudice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PHILIP J. BERG, ESQUIRE [sic], ) Case No. 2:08-CV-04083 (RBS)
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA et al., )
)
Defendants. )
-----------------------------------)
)
United States ) APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
ex relatione ) TO INTERVENE AND FOR
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) A WRIT IN THE NATURE
) OF A PROHIBITION:
Applicant. ) All Writs Statute,
___________________________________) 28 U.S.C. 1651(a).
COMES NOW the United States (“Applicant”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”) to apply formally for leave to intervene in the instant case, to petition this honorable Court for a Writ in the nature of a Prohibition if leave is granted, and to provide timely written Notice to all interested Party(s) of same.
It has now come to the attention of Applicant United States (Federal government) that United States Senator John Sidney McCain III (“McCain”) was born on the Coco Solo Naval Air Station situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Panama Canal Zone. At the time of his birth on that United States military base, Panama was not a State of the Union. Accordingly, the facts currently available to Applicant now appear to call for the conclusion that Mr. McCain was not a natural born Citizen of the United States at the moment of his birth.
Relator has done arguably more research and litigation on the correct construction of the various Qualifications Clauses in the Constitution for the United States of America (“U.S. Constitution”), than any other lawyer currently practicing Law in America at the present time. The Clause at issue in the instant case is the Qualification Clause which defines eligibility for the Office of President of the United States of America. See Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 (“2:1:5”), to wit:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President, neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
[emphasis added]
Please take careful note of the UPPER-CASE “C” in “Citizen”.
See also Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, which identifies that Office as the “President of the United States of America” [sic].
Applicant has previously filed and served a timely NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE. In said NOTICE, pertinent cases were cited and quoted by way of introducing the legally and historically correct construction of said Qualification Clause.
In particular, Relator has had frequent occasion to cite the correct holding in Pannill v. Roanoke, in which a Federal court held that federal citizens aka “citizens of the United States” were not even contemplated when the organic Constitution was first drafted, and then ratified on June 21, 1788 A.D. Cf. “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. Relator was born on June 21.
Please take careful note of the lower-case “c” in “citizen”.
Applicant hereby notoriously objects to the Seventh and Eighth Editions of Black’s Law Dictionary, because there is no definition of “United States” in either Edition! Applicant assures the entire world that it still exists, all allegations to the contrary notwithstanding.
For similar reasons, it also appears to Applicant now that Named Defendant Barack Hussein Obama is likewise not eligible to serve in the Office of President of the United States of America, because he also was not a natural born Citizen of the United States at the moment of his birth. Relator is eligible to serve in that Office, however!
“United States” in the latter context means “States united”.
In the event that this honorable Court should grant timely leave to Applicant United States to intervene ex rel. in the instant case, the United States ex rel. hereby notifies all interested Party(s) of its intent to seek a prompt Writ in the nature of a Prohibition, forever barring both Messrs. Barack Hussein Obama and John Sidney McCain III from ever serving in the Office of President of the United States of America, for reasons summarized succinctly above.
See 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 132, to wit:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. [emphasis added]
INCORPORATION OF RELATED LITIGATION
Due chiefly to the far-reaching legal and historical implications of the instant case, Applicant has reason to expect that this case will be appealed, sooner or later, to the Supreme Court of the United States, regardless of any interlocutory or final judgment(s) which this honorable United States District Court may issue on the merits.
Because the questions of Law in the case of Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board are substantially identical, Applicant wishes hereby to incorporate by reference the pleading filed by Relator on behalf of the People of the United States of America in the latter case.
For the convenience of all, their APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT in Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board is archived here on the Internet, for the benefit of those People:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/palmbeach/index.htm
Applicant hereby requests mandatory judicial notice by this Court of the latter APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and also pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution, and incorporates same by reference as if set forth fully here.
To minimize unnecessary paperwork and postage expenses, Relator now offers to provide any interested Party(s) with a verified hard copy of said APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE and all Exhibits incorporated therein, upon receipt of a written request for same and a blank U.S. Postal Money in the amount of ten ($10.00) United States Dollars. The latter fee is required to cover printing, postage and handling, and to encourage all to access instead the electronic copies archived in the Supreme Law Library on the Internet. (See URL above.)
REMEDIES REQUESTED
All premises having been duly considered, the United States now appearing ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General, hereby petitions this honorable Court for formal leave to intervene in the instant case for the purpose of formally requesting a Writ in the nature of a Prohibition forever barring Messrs. Barack Hussein Obama and John Sidney McCain III from ever occupying the Office of President of the United States of America.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (Federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: September 15, 2008 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (Federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND
FOR A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A PROHIBITION:
All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Clerk of the Court (3x) Federal Election Commission (1x)
Attn: R. Barclay Surrick 999 “E” Street, N.W.
U.S. Courthouse Washington 20463
601 Market Street DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Philadelphia 19106-1797
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Barack Hussein Obama (1x) John Sidney McCain III (1x)
United States Senate United States Senate
713 Hart Senate Office Building 241 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington 20510 Washington 20510
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Democratic National Committee (1x) Republican National Committee (1x)
430 S. Capitol Street, S.E. 310 First Street
Washington 20003 Washington 20003
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Philip J. Berg, Esquire [sic] (1x) Clerk of Court (1x)
555 Andorra Glen Court, Suite 12 Supreme Court of the United States
Lafayette Hill 19444-2531 One First Street, N.E.
PENNSYLVANIA, USA Washington 20543-0001
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Dated: September 15, 2008 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
Fax: (619) 232-2011 (use cover sheet)
All Rights Reserved
Without Prejudice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PHILIP J. BERG, ESQUIRE [sic], ) Case No. 2:08-CV-04083 (RBS)
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA et al., )
)
Defendants. )
-----------------------------------)
)
United States ) APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
ex relatione ) TO INTERVENE AND FOR
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) A WRIT IN THE NATURE
) OF A PROHIBITION:
Applicant. ) All Writs Statute,
___________________________________) 28 U.S.C. 1651(a).
COMES NOW the United States (“Applicant”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”) to apply formally for leave to intervene in the instant case, to petition this honorable Court for a Writ in the nature of a Prohibition if leave is granted, and to provide timely written Notice to all interested Party(s) of same.
It has now come to the attention of Applicant United States (Federal government) that United States Senator John Sidney McCain III (“McCain”) was born on the Coco Solo Naval Air Station situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Panama Canal Zone. At the time of his birth on that United States military base, Panama was not a State of the Union. Accordingly, the facts currently available to Applicant now appear to call for the conclusion that Mr. McCain was not a natural born Citizen of the United States at the moment of his birth.
Relator has done arguably more research and litigation on the correct construction of the various Qualifications Clauses in the Constitution for the United States of America (“U.S. Constitution”), than any other lawyer currently practicing Law in America at the present time. The Clause at issue in the instant case is the Qualification Clause which defines eligibility for the Office of President of the United States of America. See Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 (“2:1:5”), to wit:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President, neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
[emphasis added]
Please take careful note of the UPPER-CASE “C” in “Citizen”.
See also Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, which identifies that Office as the “President of the United States of America” [sic].
Applicant has previously filed and served a timely NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPLY FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE. In said NOTICE, pertinent cases were cited and quoted by way of introducing the legally and historically correct construction of said Qualification Clause.
In particular, Relator has had frequent occasion to cite the correct holding in Pannill v. Roanoke, in which a Federal court held that federal citizens aka “citizens of the United States” were not even contemplated when the organic Constitution was first drafted, and then ratified on June 21, 1788 A.D. Cf. “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. Relator was born on June 21.
Please take careful note of the lower-case “c” in “citizen”.
Applicant hereby notoriously objects to the Seventh and Eighth Editions of Black’s Law Dictionary, because there is no definition of “United States” in either Edition! Applicant assures the entire world that it still exists, all allegations to the contrary notwithstanding.
For similar reasons, it also appears to Applicant now that Named Defendant Barack Hussein Obama is likewise not eligible to serve in the Office of President of the United States of America, because he also was not a natural born Citizen of the United States at the moment of his birth. Relator is eligible to serve in that Office, however!
“United States” in the latter context means “States united”.
In the event that this honorable Court should grant timely leave to Applicant United States to intervene ex rel. in the instant case, the United States ex rel. hereby notifies all interested Party(s) of its intent to seek a prompt Writ in the nature of a Prohibition, forever barring both Messrs. Barack Hussein Obama and John Sidney McCain III from ever serving in the Office of President of the United States of America, for reasons summarized succinctly above.
See 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 132, to wit:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. [emphasis added]
INCORPORATION OF RELATED LITIGATION
Due chiefly to the far-reaching legal and historical implications of the instant case, Applicant has reason to expect that this case will be appealed, sooner or later, to the Supreme Court of the United States, regardless of any interlocutory or final judgment(s) which this honorable United States District Court may issue on the merits.
Because the questions of Law in the case of Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board are substantially identical, Applicant wishes hereby to incorporate by reference the pleading filed by Relator on behalf of the People of the United States of America in the latter case.
For the convenience of all, their APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT in Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board is archived here on the Internet, for the benefit of those People:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/palmbeach/index.htm
Applicant hereby requests mandatory judicial notice by this Court of the latter APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE BY RIGHT, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and also pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution, and incorporates same by reference as if set forth fully here.
To minimize unnecessary paperwork and postage expenses, Relator now offers to provide any interested Party(s) with a verified hard copy of said APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE and all Exhibits incorporated therein, upon receipt of a written request for same and a blank U.S. Postal Money in the amount of ten ($10.00) United States Dollars. The latter fee is required to cover printing, postage and handling, and to encourage all to access instead the electronic copies archived in the Supreme Law Library on the Internet. (See URL above.)
REMEDIES REQUESTED
All premises having been duly considered, the United States now appearing ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General, hereby petitions this honorable Court for formal leave to intervene in the instant case for the purpose of formally requesting a Writ in the nature of a Prohibition forever barring Messrs. Barack Hussein Obama and John Sidney McCain III from ever occupying the Office of President of the United States of America.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (Federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: September 15, 2008 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (Federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND
FOR A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A PROHIBITION:
All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Clerk of the Court (3x) Federal Election Commission (1x)
Attn: R. Barclay Surrick 999 “E” Street, N.W.
U.S. Courthouse Washington 20463
601 Market Street DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Philadelphia 19106-1797
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Barack Hussein Obama (1x) John Sidney McCain III (1x)
United States Senate United States Senate
713 Hart Senate Office Building 241 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington 20510 Washington 20510
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Democratic National Committee (1x) Republican National Committee (1x)
430 S. Capitol Street, S.E. 310 First Street
Washington 20003 Washington 20003
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Philip J. Berg, Esquire [sic] (1x) Clerk of Court (1x)
555 Andorra Glen Court, Suite 12 Supreme Court of the United States
Lafayette Hill 19444-2531 One First Street, N.E.
PENNSYLVANIA, USA Washington 20543-0001
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Dated: September 15, 2008 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Sunday, September 14, 2008
United States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 case law on war and religion
Link to the Case Preview: http://supreme.justia.com/us/380/163/
Link to the Full Text of Case: http://supreme.justia.com/us/380/163/case.html
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
United States v. Seeger
No. 50
Argued November 16-17, 1964
Decided March 8, 1965*
380 U.S. 163
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Syllabus
These three cases involve the exemption claims under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of conscientious objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. Section 6(j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of their "religious training and belief," i.e., belief in an individual's relation to a Supreme Being involving duties beyond a human relationship but not essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. In all the cases, convictions were obtained in the District Courts for refusal to submit to induction in the armed forces; in Nos. 50 and 51 the Court of Appeals reversed, and in No. 29, the conviction was affirmed.
Held:
1. The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 173-180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief. P. 380 U. S. 173.
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question. Pp. 380 U. S. 173-174.
(c) This test accords with long established legislative policy of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is based on religious beliefs. Pp. 380 U. S. 177-180.
2. Local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious; they are not to require proof of the religious
Page 380 U. S. 164
doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not comprehensible. Pp. 380 U. S. 184-185.
3. Under the broad construction applicable to § 6(j), the applications involved in these cases, none of which was based on merely personal moral codes, qualified for exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 185-188.
326 F.2d 846 and 325 F.2d 409 affirmed; 324 F.2d 173 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who, by
Page 380 U. S. 165
reason of their religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The cases were consolidated for argument, and we consider them together although each involves different facts and circumstances. The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the section which defines the term "religious training and belief," as used in the Act, as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) the section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson (No. 51) and Peter (No. 29) also claim that their beliefs come within the meaning of the section. Jakobson claims that he meets the standards of § 6(j) because his opposition to war is based on belief in a Supreme Reality, and is therefore an obligation superior to one resulting from man's relationship to his fellow man. Peter contends that his opposition to war derives from his acceptance of the existence of a universal power beyond that of man, and that this acceptance, in fact, constitutes belief in a Supreme Being, qualifying him for exemption. We granted certiorari in each of the cases because of their importance in the administration of the Act. 377 U.S. 922.
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being," rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that, under this construction, the test of belief
Page 380 U. S. 166
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders, we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in No. 29.
THE FACTS IN THE CASES
No. 50: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S (student), and he remained in this status until 1958, when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957, after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his "religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than answer yes' or `no'"; that his "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God" did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever"; that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." R. 69-70, 73. He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere, honest,
Page 380 U. S. 167
and made in good faith, and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger's claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j) of the Act. At trial, Seeger's counsel admitted that Seeger's belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because, "under the present law, Mr. Seeger's position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently," R. 49, and could be "accommodated" under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished "between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs," and was therefore an "impermissible classification" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 326 F.2d 846.
No. 51: Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, as required by § 6(j). 325 F.2d 409.
Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953, and intermittently enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was not until April, 1958, that he made claim to noncombatant classification (1-A-O) as a conscientious objector. He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who was "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately responsible for the existence of" man, and who was "the Supreme Reality" of which "the existence of man is the result." R. 44. (Emphasis in the original.) He explained that his religious
Page 380 U. S. 168
and social thinking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be "partly spiritual," and, therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality," and that his "most important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end. . . ." R. 45-46. In December, 1958, he requested a 1-O classification, since he felt that participation in any form of military service would involve him in "too many situations and relationships that would be a strain on [his] conscience that [he felt he] must avoid." R. 70. He submitted a long memorandum of "notes on religion" in which he defined religion as the "sum and essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence," R. 72 (emphasis in the original); he said that he believed in "Godness," which was "the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being of the Universe"; that to deny its existence would but deny the existence of the universe, because "anything that Is, has an Ultimate Cause for its Being." R. 73. There was a relationship to Godness, he stated, in two directions, i.e., "vertically, towards Godness directly," and "horizontally, towards Godness through Mankind and the World." R. 74. He accepted the latter one. The Board classified him 1-A-O, and Jakobson appealed. The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon a personal moral code, and that he was not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It did not indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i.e., insincerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a personal moral code. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of § 6(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.
Page 380 U. S. 169
No. 29: Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form, he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to execute section VII of the questionnaire, but attached to it a quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred. In a later form, he hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition, and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life, and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his conviction was religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John Haynes Holmes' definition of religion as
"the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands . . . ; [it] is the supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling his deepest, and living his best."
R. 27. The source of his conviction he attributed to reading and meditation "in our democratic American culture, with its values derived from the western religious and philosophical tradition." Ibid. As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he supposed "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." R. 11. In 1959, he was classified 1-A, although there was no evidence in the record that he was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction for failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals, assuming arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed, 324 F.2d 173.
BACKGROUND OF § 6(j)
Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931), enunciated the rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection
Page 380 U. S. 170
to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various conscription laws when he declared that, "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been maintained." At 283 U. S. 633 (dissenting opinion). In a similar vein, Harlan Fiske Stone, later Chief Justice, drew from the Nation's past when he declared that
"both morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process."
"Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Col.Univ.Q. 253, 269 (1919)."
Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons of certain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the history of this country. Various methods of ameliorating their difficulty were adopted by the Colonies, and were later perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions. Thus, by the time of the Civil War, there existed a state pattern of exempting conscientious objectors on religious grounds. In the Federal Militia Act of 1862, control of conscription was left primarily in the States. However, General Order No. 99, issued by the Adjutant General pursuant to that Act, provided for striking from the conscription list those who were exempted by the States; it also established a commutation or substitution system fashioned from earlier state enactments. With the Federal Conscription Act of 1863,
Page 380 U. S. 171
which enacted the commutation and substitution provisions of General Order No. 99, the Federal Government occupied the field entirely, and, in the 1864 Draft Act, 13 Stat. 9, it extended exemptions to those conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations opposed to the bearing of arms and who were prohibited from doing so by the articles of faith of their denominations. Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 40-41 (1950). In that same year, the Confederacy exempted certain pacifist sects from military duty. Id. at 46.
The need for conscription did not again arise until World War I. The Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 78, afforded exemptions to conscientious objectors who were affiliated with a
"well recognized religious sect or organization [then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its members to participate in war in any form. . . ."
The Act required that all persons be inducted into the armed services, but allowed the conscientious objectors to perform noncombatant service in capacities designated by the President of the United States. Although the 1917 Act excused religious objectors only, in December, 1917, the Secretary of War instructed that "personal scruples against war" be considered as constituting "conscientious objection." Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection at 54-55 (1950). This Act, including its conscientious objector provisions, was upheld against constitutional attack in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 245 U. S. 389-390 (1918).
In adopting the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act, Congress broadened the exemption afforded in the 1917 Act by making it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious sect if the claimant's own opposition to war was based on "religious training and belief." 54 Stat. 889. Those found to be within the exemption were
Page 380 U. S. 172
not inducted into the armed services, but were assigned to noncombatant service under the supervision of the Selective Service System. The Congress recognized that one might be religious without belonging to an organized church just as surely as minority members of a faith not opposed to war might, through religious reading, reach a conviction against participation in war. Congress Looks at the Conscientious Objector (National Service Board for Religious Objectors, 1943) 71, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89. Indeed, the consensus of the witnesses appearing before the congressional committees was that individual belief -- rather than membership in a church or sect -- determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct, and that "there is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God." Id. at 29-31. See also the proposals which were made to the House Military Affairs Committee but rejected. Id. at 21-23, 82-83, 85. Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to one's individual belief, the Congress nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing from armed service those who believed that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of not participating in war in any form.
Between 1940 and 1948, two courts of appeals [Footnote 1] held that the phrase "religious training and belief" did not include philosophical, social or political policy. Then, in 1948, the Congress amended the language of the statute and declared that "religious training and belief" was to be defined as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The only significant mention of
Page 380 U. S. 173
this change in the provision appears in the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee recommending adoption. It said simply this:
"This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. (See United States v. Berman (sic), 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795)."
S.Rep.No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 14; U.S.Code Cong. Service 1948, p. 2002.
I
NTERPRETATION OF § 6(j)
1. The crux of the problem lies in the phrase "religious training and belief," which Congress has defined as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." In assigning meaning to this statutory language, we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government, and, in matters which can be said to fall within these areas, the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the state. United States v. Macintosh, supra (dissenting opinion). The statute further excludes those whose opposition to war stems from a "merely personal moral code," a phrase to which we shall have occasion to turn later in discussing the application of § 6(j) to these cases. We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist, or attacks the statute on this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with
Page 380 U. S. 174
or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases. Nor do the parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger, who bases his position here not on factual, but on purely constitutional, grounds) is that they adhere to theism, which is the "Belief in the existence of a god or gods; . . . Belief in superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods," as opposed to atheism. [Footnote 2] Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: does the term "Supreme Being," as used in § 6(j), mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent"? Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition). In considering this question, we resolve it solely in relation to the language of § 6(j), and not otherwise.
2. Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man's predicament in life, in death, or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase "Supreme Being" a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country. Over 250 sects inhabit our land. Some believe in a purely personal God, some in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life envisioning, as its ultimate goal, the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace. There are those who think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being is
Page 380 U. S. 175
the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss. Even those religious groups which have traditionally opposed war in every form have splintered into various denominations: from 1940 to 1947, there were four denominations using the name "Friends," Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 13 (1950); the "Church of the Brethren" was the official name of the oldest and largest church body of four denominations composed of those commonly called Brethren, id. at 11; and the "Mennonite Church" was the largest of 17 denominations, including the Amish and Hutterites, grouped as "Mennonite bodies" in the 1936 report on the Census of Religious Bodies, id. at 9. This vast panoply of beliefs reveals the magnitude of the problem which faced the Congress when it set about providing an exemption from armed service. It also emphasizes the care that Congress realized was necessary in the fashioning of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs.
In spite of the elusive nature of the inquiry, we are not without certain guidelines. In amending the 1940 Act, Congress adopted almost intact the language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, supra:
"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
At 283 U. S. 633-634. (Emphasis supplied.)
By comparing the statutory definition with those words, however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase "Supreme Being" for the appellation "God." And, in so doing, it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as "Supreme Being." By so refraining, it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief
Page 380 U. S. 176
Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word "God" had myriad meanings for men of faith:
"[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of conscience within its proper field."
At 283 U. S. 634.
Moreover, the Senate Report on the bill specifically states that § 6(j) was intended to reenact "substantially the same provisions as were found" in the 1940 Act. That statute, of course, refers to "religious training and belief," without more. Admittedly, all of the parties here purport to base their objection on religious belief. It appears, therefore, that we need only look to this clear statement of congressional intent as set out in the report. Under the 1940 Act, it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.
Page 380 U. S. 177
3. The Government takes the position that, since Berman v. United States, supra, was cited in the Senate Report on the 1948 Act, Congress must have desired to adopt the Berman interpretation of what constitutes "religious belief." Such a claim, however, will not bear scrutiny. First, we think it clear that an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more weight than the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number of things. Congress specifically stated that it intended to reenact substantially the same provisions as were found in the 1940 Act. Moreover, the history of that Act reveals no evidence of a desire to restrict the concept of religious belief. On the contrary, the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, which reported out the 1940 exemption provisions, stated:
"We heard the conscientious objectors and all of their representatives that we could possible hear, and, summing it all up, their whole objection to the bill, aside from their objection to compulsory military training, was based upon the right of conscientious objection and, in most instances, to the right of the ministerial students to continue in their studies, and we have provided ample protection for those classes and those groups."
86 Cong.Rec. 11368 (1940). During the House debate on the bill, Mr. Faddis of Pennsylvania made the following statement:
"We have made provision to take care of conscientious objectors. I am sure the committee has had all the sympathy in the world with those who appeared claiming to have religious scruples against rendering military service in its various degrees. Some appeared who had conscientious scruples against handling lethal weapons, but who had no
Page 380 U. S. 178
scruples against performing other duties which did not actually bring them into combat. Others appeared who claimed to have conscientious scruples against participating in any of the activities that would go along with the Army. The committee took all of these into consideration, and has written a bill which, I believe, will take care of all the reasonable objections of this class of people."
86 Cong.Rec. 11418 (1940). Thus, the history of the Act belies the notion that it was to be restrictive in application and available only to those believing in a traditional God.
As for the citation to Berman, it might mean a number of things. But we think that Congress' action in citing it must be construed in such a way as to make it consistent with its express statement that it meant substantially to reenact the 1940 provision. As far as we can find, there is not one word to indicate congressional concern over any conflict between Kauten and Berman. Surely, if it thought that two clashing interpretations as to what amounted to "religious belief" had to be resolved, it would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. Thus, we think that, rather than citing Berman for what it said "religious belief" was, Congress cited it for what it said "religious belief" was not. For both Kauten and Berman hold in common the conclusion that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs are political, social or philosophical in nature, rather than religious. Both, in fact, denied exemption on that very ground. It seems more likely, therefore, that it was this point which led Congress to cite Berman. The first part of the § 6(j) definition -- belief in a relation to a Supreme Being -- was indeed set out in Berman, with the exception that the court used the word "God," rather than "Supreme Being." However, as the Government recognizes, Berman took that language word for word from Macintosh. Far from
Page 380 U. S. 179
requiring a conclusion contrary to the one we reach here, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion, as we have pointed out, supports our interpretation.
Admittedly, the second half of the statutory definition -- the rejection of sociological and moral views -- was taken directly from Berman. But, as we have noted, this same view was adhered to in United States v. Kauten, supra. Indeed, the Selective Service System has stated its view of the cases' significance in these terms:
"The United States v. Kauten and Herman Berman v. United States cases ruled that a valid conscientious objector claim to exemption must be based solely on 'religious training and belief,' and not on philosophical, political, social, or other grounds. . . ."
Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 337 (1950). See id. at 278. That the conclusions of the Selective Service System are not to be taken lightly is evidenced in this statement by Senator Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and sponsor of the Senate bill containing the present version of § 6(j):
"The bill which is now pending follows the 1940 act, with very few technical amendments, worked out by those in Selective Service who had charge of the conscientious objector problem during the war."
94 Cong.Rec. 7305 (1948). Thus, we conclude that, in enacting § 6(j), Congress simply made explicit what the courts of appeals had correctly found implicit in the 1940 Act. Moreover, it is perfectly reasonable that Congress should have selected Berman for its citation, since this Court denied certiorari in that case, a circumstance not present in Kauten.
Section 6(j), then, is no more than a clarification of the 1940 provision involving only certain "technical amendments," to use the words of Senator Gurney. As such, it continues the congressional policy of providing exemption from military service for those whose opposition
Page 380 U. S. 180
is based on grounds that can fairly be said to be "religious." [Footnote 3] To hold otherwise would not only fly in the face of Congress' entire action in the past; it would ignore the historic position of our country on this issue since its founding.
4. Moreover, we believe this construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community. The eminent Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views the Government concedes would come within the statute, identifies God not as a projection "out there" or beyond the skies, but as the ground of our very being. The Court of Appeals stated in No. 51 that Jakobson's views "parallel [those of] this eminent theologian rather strikingly." 325 F.2d 415-416. In his book, Systematic Theology, Dr. Tillich says:
"I have written of the God above the God of theism. . . . In such a state [of self-affirmation], the God of both religious and theological language disappears. But something remains, namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism, but the 'God above God,' the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God."
II Systematic Theology 12 (1957).
Page 380 U. S. 181
Another eminent cleric, the Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson, in his book, Honest To God (1963), states:
"The Bible speaks of a God 'up there.' No doubt its picture of a three-decker universe, of 'the heaven above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth,' was once taken quite literally. . . ."
At 11.
"[Later,] in place of a God who is literally or physically 'up there,' we have accepted, as part of our mental furniture, a God who is spiritually or metaphysically 'out there.' . . . But now it seems there is no room for him, not merely in the inn, but in the entire universe: for there are no vacant places left. In reality, of course, our new view of the universe had made not the slightest difference. . . ."
At 13-14.
"But the idea of a God spiritually or metaphysically 'out there' dies very much harder. Indeed, most people would be seriously disturbed by the thought that it should need to die at all. For it is their God, and they have nothing to put in its place. . . . Every one of us lives with some mental picture of a God 'out there,' a God who 'exists' above and beyond the world he made, a God 'to' whom we pray and to whom we 'go' when we die."
At 14.
"But the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the whole conception of a God 'out there,' which has served us so well since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming more of a hindrance than a help."
At 15-16. (Emphasis in original.)
The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council included a most significant declaration on religion: [Footnote 4]
Page 380 U. S. 182
"The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ultimate end, God. Men expect from the various religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is the moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?"
"* * * *"
"Ever since primordial days, numerous peoples have had a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of things and over the events that make up the lives of men; some have even come to know of a Supreme Being and Father. Religions in an advanced culture have been able to use more refined concepts and a more developed language in their struggle for an answer to man's religious questions."
"* * * *"
"Nothing that is true and holy in these religions is scorned by the Catholic Church. Ceaselessly the Church proclaims Christ, 'the Way, the Truth, and the Life,' in whom God reconciled all things to Himself. The Church regards with sincere reverence those ways of action and of life, precepts and teachings which, although they differ from the ones she sets forth, reflect nonetheless a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men."
Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, states in his book, Ethics As a Religion (1951), that "[e]verybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively few) believes in some kind of God," and that
"The proper question to ask, therefore, is
Page 380 U. S. 183
not the futile one, Do you believe in God? but rather, What kind of God do you believe in?"
Id. at 86-87. Dr. Muzzey attempts to answer that question:
"Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men. What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires in men moral purpose."
At 95.
"Thus, the 'God' that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements which retard its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the right.'"
At 98.
These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow a construction on the provisions of § 6(j), and thereby lend conclusive support to the construction which we today find that Congress intended.
5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished
Page 380 U. S. 184
a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant's words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?
Moreover, it must be remembered that, in resolving these exemption problems, one deals with the beliefs of different individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight. Recognition of this was implicit in this language, cited by the Berman court from State v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894 (1906):
"Surely a scheme of life designed to obviate [man's inhumanity to man], and, by removing temptations and all the allurements of ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness, patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not pertaining to religion when its devotees regard it as an essential tenet of their religious faith."
132 Iowa at 315, 109 N.W. at 898, cited in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381. (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.) The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant's "Supreme Being" or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. As MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 322 U. S. 86 (1944):
"Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others."
Local
Page 380 U. S. 185
boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible." Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held, and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.
But we hasten to emphasize that, while the "truth" of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact -- a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out that, in Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, (1946), this Court held that:
"The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final, even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant."
At 327 U. S. 122-123.
APPLICATION OF § 6(j) TO THE INSTANT CASES
As we noted earlier, the statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code." The records in these cases, however,
Page 380 U. S. 186
show that at no time did any one of the applicants suggest that his objection was based on a "merely personal moral code." Indeed, at the outset, each of them claimed in his application that his objection was based on a religious belief. We have construed the statutory definition broadly, and it follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of the words "merely personal" seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which is not only personal, but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief, and is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that, if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants in these cases meet the test that we lay down, then their objections cannot be based on a "merely personal" moral code.
In Seeger, No. 50, the Court of Appeals failed to find sufficient "externally compelled beliefs." However, it did find that
"it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is not bowing to 'external commands' in virtually the same sense as is the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power."
326 F.2d 853. It found little distinction between Jakobson's devotion to a mystical force of "Godness" and Seeger's compulsion to "goodness." Of course, as we have said, the statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress intended no such distinction.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was no question of the applicant's sincerity. He was a product of a devout Roman Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which he said "much of [his] thought is derived"; he approved of their opposition to war in any form; he devoted his spare hours to the American
Page 380 U. S. 187
Friends Service Committee, and was assigned to hospital duty.
In summary, Seeger professed "religious belief" and "religious faith." He did not disavow any belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"; indeed, he stated that "the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence." He decried the tremendous "spiritual" price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
"And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God. . . ."
Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations. 57 (1948). (Emphasis supplied.) It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term "Supreme Being." But, as we have said, Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.
In Jakobson, No. 51, the Court of Appeals found that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was related to a Supreme Being. We agree, and affirm that judgment.
We reach a like conclusion in No. 29. It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged "some power manifest in
Page 380 U. S. 188
nature . . . the supreme expression" that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied, "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." We think that, under the test we establish here, the Board would grant the exemption to Peter, and we therefore reverse the judgment in No. 29.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 51, United States v. Jakobson, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 29, Peter v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
[Footnote 1]
See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d Cir. 1943); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (C.A.9th Cir. 1946).
[Footnote 2]
See Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition); Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1949).
[Footnote 3]
A definition of "religious training and belief" identical to that in § 6(j) is found in § 337 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 258, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1958 ed.). It is noteworthy that, in connection with this Act, the Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate Immigration and Naturalization stated:
"The subcommittee realizes and respects the fact that the question of whether or not a person must bear arms in defense of his country may be one which invades the province of religion and personal conscience."
Thus, it recommended that an alien not be required to vow to bear arms when he asserted "his opposition to participation in war in any form because of his personal religious training and belief." S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 742, 746.
[Footnote 4]
Draft declaration on the Church's relations with non-Christians, Council Daybook, Vatican II, 3d Sess., p. 282, N.C.W.C., Washington, D.C., 1965.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith, rather than another, would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others -- an invidious discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497.
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words "Supreme Being" to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one, we said that the words of a statute may be strained "in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 47. [Footnote 2/1]
Page 380 U. S. 189
The words "a Supreme Being" have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian civilization, the idea of God had taken hold in many forms. Mention of only two -- Hinduism and Buddhism -- illustrates the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept. In the Hindu religion, the Supreme Being is conceived in the forms of several cult Deities. The chief of these, which stand for the Hindu Triad, are Brahma, Vishnu and Siva. Another Deity, and the one most widely worshipped, is Sakti, the Mother Goddess, conceived as power, both destructive and creative. Though Hindu religion encompasses the worship of many Deities, it believes in only one single God, the eternally existent One Being, with his manifold attributes and manifestations. This idea is expressed in Digveda, the earliest sacred text of the Hindus, in verse 46 of a hymn attributed to the mythical seer Dirghatamas (Rigveda, I, 164):
"They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna and Agni"
"And also heavenly beautiful Garutman:"
"The Real is One, though sages name it variously --"
"They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan."
See Smart, Reasons and Faiths p. 35, n. 1 (1958); 32 Harvard Oriental Series pp. 434-435. (Lanman, ed. 1925). See generally 31 and 32 id.; Editors of Life Magazine, The World's Great Religions Vol. 1, pp. 17-48 (1963).
Indian philosophy, which comprises several schools of thought, has advanced different theories of the nature of the Supreme Being. According to the Upanisads, Hindu sacred texts, the Supreme Being is described as the power which creates and sustains everything, and to which the created things return upon dissolution. The word which is commonly used in the Upanisads to indicate the Supreme Being is Brahman. Philosophically, the
Page 380 U. S. 190
Supreme Being is the transcendental Reality which is Truth, Knowledge, and Bliss. It is the source of the entire universe. In this aspect, Brahman is Isvara, a personal Lord and Creator of the universe, an object of worship. But, in the view of one school of thought, that of Sankara, even this is an imperfect and limited conception of Brahman which must be transcended: to think of Brahman as the Creator of the material world is necessarily to form a concept infected with illusion, or maya -- which is what the world really is, in highest truth. Ultimately, mystically, Brahman must be understood as without attributes, as neti neti (not this, not that). See Smart, op. cit., supra, p. 133.
Buddhism -- whose advent marked the reform of Hinduism -- continued somewhat the same concept. As stated by Nancy Wilson Ross,
"God -- if I may borrow that word for a moment -- the universe, and man are one indissoluble existence, one total whole. Only THIS-capital THIS -- is. Anything and everything that appears to use as an individual entity or phenomenon, whether it be a planet or an atom, a mouse or a man, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in form; every activity that takes place, whether it be birth or death, loving or eating breakfast, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in activity. When we look at things this way, naturally we cannot believe that each individual person has been endowed with a special and individual soul or self. Each one of us is but a cell, as it were, in the body of the Great Self, a cell that comes into being, performs its functions, and passes away, transformed into another manifestation. Though we have temporary individuality, that temporary, limited individuality is not either a true self or our true self. Our true self is the Great Self; our true body is the Body of Reality, or the Dharmakaya, to give it its technical Buddhist name."
The World of Zen, p. 18 (1960).
Page 380 U. S. 191
Does a Buddhist believe in "God" or a "Supreme Being"? That, of course, depends on how one defines "God," as one eminent student of Buddhism has explained:
"It has often been suggested that Buddhism is an atheistic system of thought, and this assumption has given rise to quite a number of discussions. Some have claimed that, since Buddhism knew no God, it could not be a religion; others, that, since Buddhism obviously was a religion which knew no God, the belief in God was not essential to religion. These discussions assume that God is an unambiguous term, which is by no means the case."
Conze, Buddhism, pp. 38-39 (1959). Dr. Conze then says that, if "God" is taken to mean a personal Creator of the universe, then the Buddhist has no interest in the concept. Id., p. 39. But if "God" means something like the state of oneness with God as described by some Christian mystics, then the Buddhist surely believes in "God," since this state is almost indistinguishable from the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, "the supreme Reality; . . . the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace." Id., pp. 39-40. And, finally, if "God" means one of the many Deities in an at least superficially polytheistic religion like Hinduism, then Buddhism tolerates a belief in many Gods:
"the Buddhists believe that a Faith can be kept alive only if it can be adapted to the mental habits of the average person. In consequence, we find that, in the earlier Scriptures, the deities of Brahmanism are taken for granted, and that, later on, the Buddhists adopted the local Gods of any district to which they came."
Id., p. 42.
When the present Act was adopted in 1948, we were a nation of Buddhists, Confucianists, and Taoists, as well as Christians. Hawaii, then a Territory, was indeed filled with Buddhists, Buddhism being "probably the major
Page 380 U. S. 192
faith, if Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are deemed different faiths." Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States, p. 560 (1964). Organized Buddhism first came to Hawaii in 1887 when Japanese laborers were brought to work on the plantations. There are now numerous Buddhist sects in Hawaii, and the temple of the Shin sect in Honolulu is said to have the largest congregation of any religious organization in the city. See Mulholland, Religion in Hawaii pp. 44-50 (1961).
In the continental United States, Buddhism is found "in real strength" in Utah, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and California.
"Most of the Buddhists in the United States are Japanese or Japanese-Americans; however, there are 'English' departments in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Tacoma."
Mead, Handbook of Denominations, p. 61 (1961). The Buddhist Churches of North America, organized in 1914 as the Buddhist Mission of North America and incorporated under the present name in 1942, represent the Jodo Shinshu Sect of Buddhism in this country. This sect is the only Buddhist group reporting information to the annual Yearbook of American Churches. In 1961, the latest year for which figures are available, this group alone had 55 churches and an inclusive membership of 60,000; it maintained 89 church schools, with a total enrollment of 11,150. Yearbook of American Churches, p. 30 (1965). According to one source, the total number of Buddhists of all sects in North America is 171,000. See World Almanac, p. 636 (1965).
When the Congress spoke in the vague general terms of a Supreme Being, I cannot, therefore, assume that it was so parochial as to use the words in the narrow sense urged on us. I would attribute tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities. In sum, I agree with the Court that any person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which, in his life, fills the same place as a belief
Page 380 U. S. 193
in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist; [Footnote 2/2] one as a sincere believer in "goodness and virtue for their own sakes." His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.
[Footnote 2/1]
And see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 62; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 350 U. S. 433; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 341, 297 U. S. 348 (concurring opinion).
[Footnote 2/2]
If he was an atheist, quite different problems would be presented. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488.
Link to the Full Text of Case: http://supreme.justia.com/us/380/163/case.html
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
United States v. Seeger
No. 50
Argued November 16-17, 1964
Decided March 8, 1965*
380 U.S. 163
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Syllabus
These three cases involve the exemption claims under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of conscientious objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. Section 6(j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of their "religious training and belief," i.e., belief in an individual's relation to a Supreme Being involving duties beyond a human relationship but not essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. In all the cases, convictions were obtained in the District Courts for refusal to submit to induction in the armed forces; in Nos. 50 and 51 the Court of Appeals reversed, and in No. 29, the conviction was affirmed.
Held:
1. The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 173-180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief. P. 380 U. S. 173.
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question. Pp. 380 U. S. 173-174.
(c) This test accords with long established legislative policy of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is based on religious beliefs. Pp. 380 U. S. 177-180.
2. Local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious; they are not to require proof of the religious
Page 380 U. S. 164
doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not comprehensible. Pp. 380 U. S. 184-185.
3. Under the broad construction applicable to § 6(j), the applications involved in these cases, none of which was based on merely personal moral codes, qualified for exemption. Pp. 380 U. S. 185-188.
326 F.2d 846 and 325 F.2d 409 affirmed; 324 F.2d 173 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who, by
Page 380 U. S. 165
reason of their religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The cases were consolidated for argument, and we consider them together although each involves different facts and circumstances. The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the section which defines the term "religious training and belief," as used in the Act, as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) the section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson (No. 51) and Peter (No. 29) also claim that their beliefs come within the meaning of the section. Jakobson claims that he meets the standards of § 6(j) because his opposition to war is based on belief in a Supreme Reality, and is therefore an obligation superior to one resulting from man's relationship to his fellow man. Peter contends that his opposition to war derives from his acceptance of the existence of a universal power beyond that of man, and that this acceptance, in fact, constitutes belief in a Supreme Being, qualifying him for exemption. We granted certiorari in each of the cases because of their importance in the administration of the Act. 377 U.S. 922.
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being," rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that, under this construction, the test of belief
Page 380 U. S. 166
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders, we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in No. 29.
THE FACTS IN THE CASES
No. 50: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S (student), and he remained in this status until 1958, when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957, after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his "religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than answer yes' or `no'"; that his "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God" did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever"; that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." R. 69-70, 73. He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere, honest,
Page 380 U. S. 167
and made in good faith, and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger's claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j) of the Act. At trial, Seeger's counsel admitted that Seeger's belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because, "under the present law, Mr. Seeger's position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently," R. 49, and could be "accommodated" under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished "between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs," and was therefore an "impermissible classification" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 326 F.2d 846.
No. 51: Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, as required by § 6(j). 325 F.2d 409.
Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953, and intermittently enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was not until April, 1958, that he made claim to noncombatant classification (1-A-O) as a conscientious objector. He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who was "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately responsible for the existence of" man, and who was "the Supreme Reality" of which "the existence of man is the result." R. 44. (Emphasis in the original.) He explained that his religious
Page 380 U. S. 168
and social thinking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be "partly spiritual," and, therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality," and that his "most important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end. . . ." R. 45-46. In December, 1958, he requested a 1-O classification, since he felt that participation in any form of military service would involve him in "too many situations and relationships that would be a strain on [his] conscience that [he felt he] must avoid." R. 70. He submitted a long memorandum of "notes on religion" in which he defined religion as the "sum and essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence," R. 72 (emphasis in the original); he said that he believed in "Godness," which was "the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being of the Universe"; that to deny its existence would but deny the existence of the universe, because "anything that Is, has an Ultimate Cause for its Being." R. 73. There was a relationship to Godness, he stated, in two directions, i.e., "vertically, towards Godness directly," and "horizontally, towards Godness through Mankind and the World." R. 74. He accepted the latter one. The Board classified him 1-A-O, and Jakobson appealed. The hearing officer found that the claim was based upon a personal moral code, and that he was not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A. It did not indicate upon what ground it based its decision, i.e., insincerity or a conclusion that his belief was only a personal moral code. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of § 6(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.
Page 380 U. S. 169
No. 29: Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form, he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to execute section VII of the questionnaire, but attached to it a quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred. In a later form, he hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition, and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life, and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his conviction was religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John Haynes Holmes' definition of religion as
"the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands . . . ; [it] is the supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling his deepest, and living his best."
R. 27. The source of his conviction he attributed to reading and meditation "in our democratic American culture, with its values derived from the western religious and philosophical tradition." Ibid. As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he supposed "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." R. 11. In 1959, he was classified 1-A, although there was no evidence in the record that he was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction for failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals, assuming arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed, 324 F.2d 173.
BACKGROUND OF § 6(j)
Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931), enunciated the rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection
Page 380 U. S. 170
to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various conscription laws when he declared that, "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been maintained." At 283 U. S. 633 (dissenting opinion). In a similar vein, Harlan Fiske Stone, later Chief Justice, drew from the Nation's past when he declared that
"both morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process."
"Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Col.Univ.Q. 253, 269 (1919)."
Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons of certain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the history of this country. Various methods of ameliorating their difficulty were adopted by the Colonies, and were later perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions. Thus, by the time of the Civil War, there existed a state pattern of exempting conscientious objectors on religious grounds. In the Federal Militia Act of 1862, control of conscription was left primarily in the States. However, General Order No. 99, issued by the Adjutant General pursuant to that Act, provided for striking from the conscription list those who were exempted by the States; it also established a commutation or substitution system fashioned from earlier state enactments. With the Federal Conscription Act of 1863,
Page 380 U. S. 171
which enacted the commutation and substitution provisions of General Order No. 99, the Federal Government occupied the field entirely, and, in the 1864 Draft Act, 13 Stat. 9, it extended exemptions to those conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations opposed to the bearing of arms and who were prohibited from doing so by the articles of faith of their denominations. Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 40-41 (1950). In that same year, the Confederacy exempted certain pacifist sects from military duty. Id. at 46.
The need for conscription did not again arise until World War I. The Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 78, afforded exemptions to conscientious objectors who were affiliated with a
"well recognized religious sect or organization [then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its members to participate in war in any form. . . ."
The Act required that all persons be inducted into the armed services, but allowed the conscientious objectors to perform noncombatant service in capacities designated by the President of the United States. Although the 1917 Act excused religious objectors only, in December, 1917, the Secretary of War instructed that "personal scruples against war" be considered as constituting "conscientious objection." Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection at 54-55 (1950). This Act, including its conscientious objector provisions, was upheld against constitutional attack in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 245 U. S. 389-390 (1918).
In adopting the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act, Congress broadened the exemption afforded in the 1917 Act by making it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious sect if the claimant's own opposition to war was based on "religious training and belief." 54 Stat. 889. Those found to be within the exemption were
Page 380 U. S. 172
not inducted into the armed services, but were assigned to noncombatant service under the supervision of the Selective Service System. The Congress recognized that one might be religious without belonging to an organized church just as surely as minority members of a faith not opposed to war might, through religious reading, reach a conviction against participation in war. Congress Looks at the Conscientious Objector (National Service Board for Religious Objectors, 1943) 71, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89. Indeed, the consensus of the witnesses appearing before the congressional committees was that individual belief -- rather than membership in a church or sect -- determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct, and that "there is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God." Id. at 29-31. See also the proposals which were made to the House Military Affairs Committee but rejected. Id. at 21-23, 82-83, 85. Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to one's individual belief, the Congress nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing from armed service those who believed that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of not participating in war in any form.
Between 1940 and 1948, two courts of appeals [Footnote 1] held that the phrase "religious training and belief" did not include philosophical, social or political policy. Then, in 1948, the Congress amended the language of the statute and declared that "religious training and belief" was to be defined as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The only significant mention of
Page 380 U. S. 173
this change in the provision appears in the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee recommending adoption. It said simply this:
"This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. (See United States v. Berman (sic), 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795)."
S.Rep.No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 14; U.S.Code Cong. Service 1948, p. 2002.
I
NTERPRETATION OF § 6(j)
1. The crux of the problem lies in the phrase "religious training and belief," which Congress has defined as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." In assigning meaning to this statutory language, we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government, and, in matters which can be said to fall within these areas, the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the state. United States v. Macintosh, supra (dissenting opinion). The statute further excludes those whose opposition to war stems from a "merely personal moral code," a phrase to which we shall have occasion to turn later in discussing the application of § 6(j) to these cases. We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist, or attacks the statute on this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with
Page 380 U. S. 174
or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases. Nor do the parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger, who bases his position here not on factual, but on purely constitutional, grounds) is that they adhere to theism, which is the "Belief in the existence of a god or gods; . . . Belief in superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods," as opposed to atheism. [Footnote 2] Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: does the term "Supreme Being," as used in § 6(j), mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent"? Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition). In considering this question, we resolve it solely in relation to the language of § 6(j), and not otherwise.
2. Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man's predicament in life, in death, or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase "Supreme Being" a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country. Over 250 sects inhabit our land. Some believe in a purely personal God, some in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life envisioning, as its ultimate goal, the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace. There are those who think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being is
Page 380 U. S. 175
the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss. Even those religious groups which have traditionally opposed war in every form have splintered into various denominations: from 1940 to 1947, there were four denominations using the name "Friends," Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 13 (1950); the "Church of the Brethren" was the official name of the oldest and largest church body of four denominations composed of those commonly called Brethren, id. at 11; and the "Mennonite Church" was the largest of 17 denominations, including the Amish and Hutterites, grouped as "Mennonite bodies" in the 1936 report on the Census of Religious Bodies, id. at 9. This vast panoply of beliefs reveals the magnitude of the problem which faced the Congress when it set about providing an exemption from armed service. It also emphasizes the care that Congress realized was necessary in the fashioning of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs.
In spite of the elusive nature of the inquiry, we are not without certain guidelines. In amending the 1940 Act, Congress adopted almost intact the language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, supra:
"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
At 283 U. S. 633-634. (Emphasis supplied.)
By comparing the statutory definition with those words, however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase "Supreme Being" for the appellation "God." And, in so doing, it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as "Supreme Being." By so refraining, it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief
Page 380 U. S. 176
Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word "God" had myriad meanings for men of faith:
"[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of conscience within its proper field."
At 283 U. S. 634.
Moreover, the Senate Report on the bill specifically states that § 6(j) was intended to reenact "substantially the same provisions as were found" in the 1940 Act. That statute, of course, refers to "religious training and belief," without more. Admittedly, all of the parties here purport to base their objection on religious belief. It appears, therefore, that we need only look to this clear statement of congressional intent as set out in the report. Under the 1940 Act, it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.
Page 380 U. S. 177
3. The Government takes the position that, since Berman v. United States, supra, was cited in the Senate Report on the 1948 Act, Congress must have desired to adopt the Berman interpretation of what constitutes "religious belief." Such a claim, however, will not bear scrutiny. First, we think it clear that an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more weight than the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number of things. Congress specifically stated that it intended to reenact substantially the same provisions as were found in the 1940 Act. Moreover, the history of that Act reveals no evidence of a desire to restrict the concept of religious belief. On the contrary, the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, which reported out the 1940 exemption provisions, stated:
"We heard the conscientious objectors and all of their representatives that we could possible hear, and, summing it all up, their whole objection to the bill, aside from their objection to compulsory military training, was based upon the right of conscientious objection and, in most instances, to the right of the ministerial students to continue in their studies, and we have provided ample protection for those classes and those groups."
86 Cong.Rec. 11368 (1940). During the House debate on the bill, Mr. Faddis of Pennsylvania made the following statement:
"We have made provision to take care of conscientious objectors. I am sure the committee has had all the sympathy in the world with those who appeared claiming to have religious scruples against rendering military service in its various degrees. Some appeared who had conscientious scruples against handling lethal weapons, but who had no
Page 380 U. S. 178
scruples against performing other duties which did not actually bring them into combat. Others appeared who claimed to have conscientious scruples against participating in any of the activities that would go along with the Army. The committee took all of these into consideration, and has written a bill which, I believe, will take care of all the reasonable objections of this class of people."
86 Cong.Rec. 11418 (1940). Thus, the history of the Act belies the notion that it was to be restrictive in application and available only to those believing in a traditional God.
As for the citation to Berman, it might mean a number of things. But we think that Congress' action in citing it must be construed in such a way as to make it consistent with its express statement that it meant substantially to reenact the 1940 provision. As far as we can find, there is not one word to indicate congressional concern over any conflict between Kauten and Berman. Surely, if it thought that two clashing interpretations as to what amounted to "religious belief" had to be resolved, it would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. Thus, we think that, rather than citing Berman for what it said "religious belief" was, Congress cited it for what it said "religious belief" was not. For both Kauten and Berman hold in common the conclusion that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs are political, social or philosophical in nature, rather than religious. Both, in fact, denied exemption on that very ground. It seems more likely, therefore, that it was this point which led Congress to cite Berman. The first part of the § 6(j) definition -- belief in a relation to a Supreme Being -- was indeed set out in Berman, with the exception that the court used the word "God," rather than "Supreme Being." However, as the Government recognizes, Berman took that language word for word from Macintosh. Far from
Page 380 U. S. 179
requiring a conclusion contrary to the one we reach here, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion, as we have pointed out, supports our interpretation.
Admittedly, the second half of the statutory definition -- the rejection of sociological and moral views -- was taken directly from Berman. But, as we have noted, this same view was adhered to in United States v. Kauten, supra. Indeed, the Selective Service System has stated its view of the cases' significance in these terms:
"The United States v. Kauten and Herman Berman v. United States cases ruled that a valid conscientious objector claim to exemption must be based solely on 'religious training and belief,' and not on philosophical, political, social, or other grounds. . . ."
Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 337 (1950). See id. at 278. That the conclusions of the Selective Service System are not to be taken lightly is evidenced in this statement by Senator Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and sponsor of the Senate bill containing the present version of § 6(j):
"The bill which is now pending follows the 1940 act, with very few technical amendments, worked out by those in Selective Service who had charge of the conscientious objector problem during the war."
94 Cong.Rec. 7305 (1948). Thus, we conclude that, in enacting § 6(j), Congress simply made explicit what the courts of appeals had correctly found implicit in the 1940 Act. Moreover, it is perfectly reasonable that Congress should have selected Berman for its citation, since this Court denied certiorari in that case, a circumstance not present in Kauten.
Section 6(j), then, is no more than a clarification of the 1940 provision involving only certain "technical amendments," to use the words of Senator Gurney. As such, it continues the congressional policy of providing exemption from military service for those whose opposition
Page 380 U. S. 180
is based on grounds that can fairly be said to be "religious." [Footnote 3] To hold otherwise would not only fly in the face of Congress' entire action in the past; it would ignore the historic position of our country on this issue since its founding.
4. Moreover, we believe this construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community. The eminent Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views the Government concedes would come within the statute, identifies God not as a projection "out there" or beyond the skies, but as the ground of our very being. The Court of Appeals stated in No. 51 that Jakobson's views "parallel [those of] this eminent theologian rather strikingly." 325 F.2d 415-416. In his book, Systematic Theology, Dr. Tillich says:
"I have written of the God above the God of theism. . . . In such a state [of self-affirmation], the God of both religious and theological language disappears. But something remains, namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism, but the 'God above God,' the power of being, which works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God."
II Systematic Theology 12 (1957).
Page 380 U. S. 181
Another eminent cleric, the Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson, in his book, Honest To God (1963), states:
"The Bible speaks of a God 'up there.' No doubt its picture of a three-decker universe, of 'the heaven above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth,' was once taken quite literally. . . ."
At 11.
"[Later,] in place of a God who is literally or physically 'up there,' we have accepted, as part of our mental furniture, a God who is spiritually or metaphysically 'out there.' . . . But now it seems there is no room for him, not merely in the inn, but in the entire universe: for there are no vacant places left. In reality, of course, our new view of the universe had made not the slightest difference. . . ."
At 13-14.
"But the idea of a God spiritually or metaphysically 'out there' dies very much harder. Indeed, most people would be seriously disturbed by the thought that it should need to die at all. For it is their God, and they have nothing to put in its place. . . . Every one of us lives with some mental picture of a God 'out there,' a God who 'exists' above and beyond the world he made, a God 'to' whom we pray and to whom we 'go' when we die."
At 14.
"But the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the whole conception of a God 'out there,' which has served us so well since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming more of a hindrance than a help."
At 15-16. (Emphasis in original.)
The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council included a most significant declaration on religion: [Footnote 4]
Page 380 U. S. 182
"The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ultimate end, God. Men expect from the various religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is the moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?"
"* * * *"
"Ever since primordial days, numerous peoples have had a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of things and over the events that make up the lives of men; some have even come to know of a Supreme Being and Father. Religions in an advanced culture have been able to use more refined concepts and a more developed language in their struggle for an answer to man's religious questions."
"* * * *"
"Nothing that is true and holy in these religions is scorned by the Catholic Church. Ceaselessly the Church proclaims Christ, 'the Way, the Truth, and the Life,' in whom God reconciled all things to Himself. The Church regards with sincere reverence those ways of action and of life, precepts and teachings which, although they differ from the ones she sets forth, reflect nonetheless a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men."
Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, states in his book, Ethics As a Religion (1951), that "[e]verybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively few) believes in some kind of God," and that
"The proper question to ask, therefore, is
Page 380 U. S. 183
not the futile one, Do you believe in God? but rather, What kind of God do you believe in?"
Id. at 86-87. Dr. Muzzey attempts to answer that question:
"Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men. What ultimate reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that it expresses itself in the human world as the power which inspires in men moral purpose."
At 95.
"Thus, the 'God' that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements which retard its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the right.'"
At 98.
These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow a construction on the provisions of § 6(j), and thereby lend conclusive support to the construction which we today find that Congress intended.
5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished
Page 380 U. S. 184
a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant's words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?
Moreover, it must be remembered that, in resolving these exemption problems, one deals with the beliefs of different individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight. Recognition of this was implicit in this language, cited by the Berman court from State v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894 (1906):
"Surely a scheme of life designed to obviate [man's inhumanity to man], and, by removing temptations and all the allurements of ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness, patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not pertaining to religion when its devotees regard it as an essential tenet of their religious faith."
132 Iowa at 315, 109 N.W. at 898, cited in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381. (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.) The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant's "Supreme Being" or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. As MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 322 U. S. 86 (1944):
"Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others."
Local
Page 380 U. S. 185
boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible." Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held, and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.
But we hasten to emphasize that, while the "truth" of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact -- a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out that, in Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, (1946), this Court held that:
"The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final, even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant."
At 327 U. S. 122-123.
APPLICATION OF § 6(j) TO THE INSTANT CASES
As we noted earlier, the statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code." The records in these cases, however,
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show that at no time did any one of the applicants suggest that his objection was based on a "merely personal moral code." Indeed, at the outset, each of them claimed in his application that his objection was based on a religious belief. We have construed the statutory definition broadly, and it follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of the words "merely personal" seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which is not only personal, but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief, and is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that, if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants in these cases meet the test that we lay down, then their objections cannot be based on a "merely personal" moral code.
In Seeger, No. 50, the Court of Appeals failed to find sufficient "externally compelled beliefs." However, it did find that
"it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is not bowing to 'external commands' in virtually the same sense as is the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power."
326 F.2d 853. It found little distinction between Jakobson's devotion to a mystical force of "Godness" and Seeger's compulsion to "goodness." Of course, as we have said, the statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress intended no such distinction.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was no question of the applicant's sincerity. He was a product of a devout Roman Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which he said "much of [his] thought is derived"; he approved of their opposition to war in any form; he devoted his spare hours to the American
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Friends Service Committee, and was assigned to hospital duty.
In summary, Seeger professed "religious belief" and "religious faith." He did not disavow any belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"; indeed, he stated that "the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence." He decried the tremendous "spiritual" price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
"And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God. . . ."
Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations. 57 (1948). (Emphasis supplied.) It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term "Supreme Being." But, as we have said, Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.
In Jakobson, No. 51, the Court of Appeals found that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was related to a Supreme Being. We agree, and affirm that judgment.
We reach a like conclusion in No. 29. It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged "some power manifest in
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nature . . . the supreme expression" that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied, "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." We think that, under the test we establish here, the Board would grant the exemption to Peter, and we therefore reverse the judgment in No. 29.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 51, United States v. Jakobson, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 29, Peter v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
[Footnote 1]
See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d Cir. 1943); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (C.A.9th Cir. 1946).
[Footnote 2]
See Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition); Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1949).
[Footnote 3]
A definition of "religious training and belief" identical to that in § 6(j) is found in § 337 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 258, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1958 ed.). It is noteworthy that, in connection with this Act, the Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate Immigration and Naturalization stated:
"The subcommittee realizes and respects the fact that the question of whether or not a person must bear arms in defense of his country may be one which invades the province of religion and personal conscience."
Thus, it recommended that an alien not be required to vow to bear arms when he asserted "his opposition to participation in war in any form because of his personal religious training and belief." S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 742, 746.
[Footnote 4]
Draft declaration on the Church's relations with non-Christians, Council Daybook, Vatican II, 3d Sess., p. 282, N.C.W.C., Washington, D.C., 1965.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith, rather than another, would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others -- an invidious discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497.
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words "Supreme Being" to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one, we said that the words of a statute may be strained "in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt." United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 47. [Footnote 2/1]
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The words "a Supreme Being" have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian civilization, the idea of God had taken hold in many forms. Mention of only two -- Hinduism and Buddhism -- illustrates the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept. In the Hindu religion, the Supreme Being is conceived in the forms of several cult Deities. The chief of these, which stand for the Hindu Triad, are Brahma, Vishnu and Siva. Another Deity, and the one most widely worshipped, is Sakti, the Mother Goddess, conceived as power, both destructive and creative. Though Hindu religion encompasses the worship of many Deities, it believes in only one single God, the eternally existent One Being, with his manifold attributes and manifestations. This idea is expressed in Digveda, the earliest sacred text of the Hindus, in verse 46 of a hymn attributed to the mythical seer Dirghatamas (Rigveda, I, 164):
"They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna and Agni"
"And also heavenly beautiful Garutman:"
"The Real is One, though sages name it variously --"
"They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan."
See Smart, Reasons and Faiths p. 35, n. 1 (1958); 32 Harvard Oriental Series pp. 434-435. (Lanman, ed. 1925). See generally 31 and 32 id.; Editors of Life Magazine, The World's Great Religions Vol. 1, pp. 17-48 (1963).
Indian philosophy, which comprises several schools of thought, has advanced different theories of the nature of the Supreme Being. According to the Upanisads, Hindu sacred texts, the Supreme Being is described as the power which creates and sustains everything, and to which the created things return upon dissolution. The word which is commonly used in the Upanisads to indicate the Supreme Being is Brahman. Philosophically, the
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Supreme Being is the transcendental Reality which is Truth, Knowledge, and Bliss. It is the source of the entire universe. In this aspect, Brahman is Isvara, a personal Lord and Creator of the universe, an object of worship. But, in the view of one school of thought, that of Sankara, even this is an imperfect and limited conception of Brahman which must be transcended: to think of Brahman as the Creator of the material world is necessarily to form a concept infected with illusion, or maya -- which is what the world really is, in highest truth. Ultimately, mystically, Brahman must be understood as without attributes, as neti neti (not this, not that). See Smart, op. cit., supra, p. 133.
Buddhism -- whose advent marked the reform of Hinduism -- continued somewhat the same concept. As stated by Nancy Wilson Ross,
"God -- if I may borrow that word for a moment -- the universe, and man are one indissoluble existence, one total whole. Only THIS-capital THIS -- is. Anything and everything that appears to use as an individual entity or phenomenon, whether it be a planet or an atom, a mouse or a man, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in form; every activity that takes place, whether it be birth or death, loving or eating breakfast, is but a temporary manifestation of THIS in activity. When we look at things this way, naturally we cannot believe that each individual person has been endowed with a special and individual soul or self. Each one of us is but a cell, as it were, in the body of the Great Self, a cell that comes into being, performs its functions, and passes away, transformed into another manifestation. Though we have temporary individuality, that temporary, limited individuality is not either a true self or our true self. Our true self is the Great Self; our true body is the Body of Reality, or the Dharmakaya, to give it its technical Buddhist name."
The World of Zen, p. 18 (1960).
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Does a Buddhist believe in "God" or a "Supreme Being"? That, of course, depends on how one defines "God," as one eminent student of Buddhism has explained:
"It has often been suggested that Buddhism is an atheistic system of thought, and this assumption has given rise to quite a number of discussions. Some have claimed that, since Buddhism knew no God, it could not be a religion; others, that, since Buddhism obviously was a religion which knew no God, the belief in God was not essential to religion. These discussions assume that God is an unambiguous term, which is by no means the case."
Conze, Buddhism, pp. 38-39 (1959). Dr. Conze then says that, if "God" is taken to mean a personal Creator of the universe, then the Buddhist has no interest in the concept. Id., p. 39. But if "God" means something like the state of oneness with God as described by some Christian mystics, then the Buddhist surely believes in "God," since this state is almost indistinguishable from the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, "the supreme Reality; . . . the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace." Id., pp. 39-40. And, finally, if "God" means one of the many Deities in an at least superficially polytheistic religion like Hinduism, then Buddhism tolerates a belief in many Gods:
"the Buddhists believe that a Faith can be kept alive only if it can be adapted to the mental habits of the average person. In consequence, we find that, in the earlier Scriptures, the deities of Brahmanism are taken for granted, and that, later on, the Buddhists adopted the local Gods of any district to which they came."
Id., p. 42.
When the present Act was adopted in 1948, we were a nation of Buddhists, Confucianists, and Taoists, as well as Christians. Hawaii, then a Territory, was indeed filled with Buddhists, Buddhism being "probably the major
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faith, if Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are deemed different faiths." Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States, p. 560 (1964). Organized Buddhism first came to Hawaii in 1887 when Japanese laborers were brought to work on the plantations. There are now numerous Buddhist sects in Hawaii, and the temple of the Shin sect in Honolulu is said to have the largest congregation of any religious organization in the city. See Mulholland, Religion in Hawaii pp. 44-50 (1961).
In the continental United States, Buddhism is found "in real strength" in Utah, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and California.
"Most of the Buddhists in the United States are Japanese or Japanese-Americans; however, there are 'English' departments in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Tacoma."
Mead, Handbook of Denominations, p. 61 (1961). The Buddhist Churches of North America, organized in 1914 as the Buddhist Mission of North America and incorporated under the present name in 1942, represent the Jodo Shinshu Sect of Buddhism in this country. This sect is the only Buddhist group reporting information to the annual Yearbook of American Churches. In 1961, the latest year for which figures are available, this group alone had 55 churches and an inclusive membership of 60,000; it maintained 89 church schools, with a total enrollment of 11,150. Yearbook of American Churches, p. 30 (1965). According to one source, the total number of Buddhists of all sects in North America is 171,000. See World Almanac, p. 636 (1965).
When the Congress spoke in the vague general terms of a Supreme Being, I cannot, therefore, assume that it was so parochial as to use the words in the narrow sense urged on us. I would attribute tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities. In sum, I agree with the Court that any person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which, in his life, fills the same place as a belief
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in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist; [Footnote 2/2] one as a sincere believer in "goodness and virtue for their own sakes." His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.
[Footnote 2/1]
And see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 62; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 350 U. S. 433; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 341, 297 U. S. 348 (concurring opinion).
[Footnote 2/2]
If he was an atheist, quite different problems would be presented. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488.
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