May our God bless the united states of America
A father wanted to read a magazine but was being bothered by his little girl, Shelby. She wanted to know what the United States looked like so he tore a sheet out of his new magazine on which was printed the map of the country. Tearing it into small pieces, he gave it to Shelby , and said, 'Go into the other room and see if you can put this together. This will show you our whole country today.' After a few minutes, Shelby returned and handed him the map, correctly fitted and taped together. The father was surprised and asked how she had finished so quickly. 'Oh,' she said, 'on the other side of the paper is a picture of Jesus. When I got Jesus back where He belonged, then our country just came together.'
A sanctuary of knowledge and provoking information providing documented proof of a system dominated by a few elite bloated egos and that a ancient solution of a Silver bullet nature exists.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Sunday, August 24, 2008
US Statutes Definition page
Important definitions to know if you wish to see the fraud
TITLE 15 > CHAPTER 22 > SUBCHAPTER III > § 1127
Prev | Next
§ 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
How Current is This?
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context—
The United States includes and embraces all territory which is under its jurisdiction and control.
The word “commerce” means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.
The term “principal register” refers to the register provided for by sections 1051 to 1072 of this title, and the term “supplemental register” refers to the register provided for by sections 1091 to 1096 of this title.
The term “person” and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term “juristic person” includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term “person” also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term “person” also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The terms “applicant” and “registrant” embrace the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of such applicant or registrant.
The term “Director” means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
The term “related company” means any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.
The terms “trade name” and “commercial name” mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or vocation.
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
The term “service mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
The term “certification mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person other than its owner, or
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and files an application to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.
The term “collective mark” means a trademark or service mark—
(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or
(2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.
The term “mark” includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
A mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this paragraph.
The term “dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of—
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
The term “colorable imitation” includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
The term “registered mark” means a mark registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office under this chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of March 19, 1920. The phrase “marks registered in the Patent and Trademark Office” means registered marks.
The term “Act of March 3, 1881”, “Act of February 20, 1905”, or “Act of March 19, 1920”, means the respective Act as amended.
A “counterfeit” is a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.
The term “domain name” means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.
The term “Internet” has the meaning given that term in section 230 (f)(1) of title 47.
Words used in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Search this title:
TITLE 15 > CHAPTER 22 > SUBCHAPTER III > § 1127
Prev | Next
§ 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
How Current is This?
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context—
The United States includes and embraces all territory which is under its jurisdiction and control.
The word “commerce” means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.
The term “principal register” refers to the register provided for by sections 1051 to 1072 of this title, and the term “supplemental register” refers to the register provided for by sections 1091 to 1096 of this title.
The term “person” and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term “juristic person” includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term “person” also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term “person” also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The terms “applicant” and “registrant” embrace the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of such applicant or registrant.
The term “Director” means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
The term “related company” means any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.
The terms “trade name” and “commercial name” mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or vocation.
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
The term “service mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.
The term “certification mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person other than its owner, or
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and files an application to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.
The term “collective mark” means a trademark or service mark—
(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or
(2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter,
and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.
The term “mark” includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
A mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this paragraph.
The term “dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of—
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
The term “colorable imitation” includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
The term “registered mark” means a mark registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office under this chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of March 19, 1920. The phrase “marks registered in the Patent and Trademark Office” means registered marks.
The term “Act of March 3, 1881”, “Act of February 20, 1905”, or “Act of March 19, 1920”, means the respective Act as amended.
A “counterfeit” is a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.
The term “domain name” means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.
The term “Internet” has the meaning given that term in section 230 (f)(1) of title 47.
Words used in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Search this title:
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Court: Smell of pot doesn't justify arrest
POSTED July 17, 12:31 PM
The Supreme Court of Washington ruled unanimously today that a police officer acted improperly by arresting all occupants of a vehicle after detecting a “moderate” smell of marijuana coming from the car. The Court ruled the constitution requires individualized probable cause to justify an arrest and search of each occupant of a vehicle.
On April 6, 2006, a state trooper followed and pulled over a vehicle with dark, tinted windows. Both occupants of the car recognized the trooper, “presumably based on prior encounters,” the court opinion dryly notes.
The trooper detected a smell of marijuana coming from the car and arrested the driver and the passenger, Jeremy Grande. A subsequent search of Grande revealed a marijuana pipe with a small amount of marijuana. A search of the car turned up a joint in the car’s ashtray which the driver claimed as hers. The driver and Grande were arrested; Grande was charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. At a pretrial hearing Grande argued that probable cause did not exist to arrest him for possession. The district court agreed. The case eventually went to the Supreme Court.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” A police officer must have probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and a valid arrest generally gives the officer authority to conduct a search.
The question in this case was whether the smell of marijuana justified the trooper’s intrusion into Grande’s privacy as a vehicle passenger. The Supreme Court pointed out that the right to privacy is individually held, and requires an individual finding of probable cause:
Each individual possesses the right to privacy, meaning that person has the right to be left alone by police unless there is probable cause based on objective facts that the person is committing a crime. In other settings, we have concluded that where officers do not have anything to independently connect an individual to illegal activity, no probable cause exists and an arrest or search of that person is invalid under article I, section 7.
In a prior case the smell of marijuana was sufficient cause, as the driver was the only occupant of the car. In Grande’s case, however, the court reasoned the mere smell of pot did not sufficiently point to either individual.
Our state constitution protects our individual privacy, meaning that we are free from unnecessary police intrusion into our private affairs unless a police officer can clearly associate the crime with the individual. We cannot wait until the people we are associating with “alleviat[e] the suspicion” from us. Unless there is specific evidence pinpointing the crime on a person, that person has a right to their own privacy and constitutional protection against police searches and seizures.
The court pointed out that the trooper acted improperly by arresting both occupants without establishing sufficient individual justifications.
This does not mean, however, that a law enforcement officer must simply walk away from a vehicle from which the odor of marijuana emanates and in which more than one occupant is present if the officer cannot determine which occupant possessed or used the illegal drug. In this case, because the officer had training and experience to identify the odor of marijuana and smelled this odor emanating from the vehicle, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. Instead, here the police officer arrested both occupants without first establishing individualized probable cause. Thus, Grande’s warrantless arrest was invalid.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled the arrest and search of Jeremy Grande were improper.
We hold that the smell of marijuana in the general area where an individual is located is insufficient, without more, to support probable cause for arrest. Where no other evidence exists linking the passenger to any criminal activity, an arrest of the passenger on the suspicion of possession of illegal substances, and any subsequent searches, is invalid and an unconstitutional invasion of that individual's right to privacy.
Justice Charles W. Johnson wrote the unanimous ruling.
For more info: State v. Grande. The information contained in this article should not be construed as legal advice.
The Supreme Court of Washington ruled unanimously today that a police officer acted improperly by arresting all occupants of a vehicle after detecting a “moderate” smell of marijuana coming from the car. The Court ruled the constitution requires individualized probable cause to justify an arrest and search of each occupant of a vehicle.
On April 6, 2006, a state trooper followed and pulled over a vehicle with dark, tinted windows. Both occupants of the car recognized the trooper, “presumably based on prior encounters,” the court opinion dryly notes.
The trooper detected a smell of marijuana coming from the car and arrested the driver and the passenger, Jeremy Grande. A subsequent search of Grande revealed a marijuana pipe with a small amount of marijuana. A search of the car turned up a joint in the car’s ashtray which the driver claimed as hers. The driver and Grande were arrested; Grande was charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. At a pretrial hearing Grande argued that probable cause did not exist to arrest him for possession. The district court agreed. The case eventually went to the Supreme Court.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” A police officer must have probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and a valid arrest generally gives the officer authority to conduct a search.
The question in this case was whether the smell of marijuana justified the trooper’s intrusion into Grande’s privacy as a vehicle passenger. The Supreme Court pointed out that the right to privacy is individually held, and requires an individual finding of probable cause:
Each individual possesses the right to privacy, meaning that person has the right to be left alone by police unless there is probable cause based on objective facts that the person is committing a crime. In other settings, we have concluded that where officers do not have anything to independently connect an individual to illegal activity, no probable cause exists and an arrest or search of that person is invalid under article I, section 7.
In a prior case the smell of marijuana was sufficient cause, as the driver was the only occupant of the car. In Grande’s case, however, the court reasoned the mere smell of pot did not sufficiently point to either individual.
Our state constitution protects our individual privacy, meaning that we are free from unnecessary police intrusion into our private affairs unless a police officer can clearly associate the crime with the individual. We cannot wait until the people we are associating with “alleviat[e] the suspicion” from us. Unless there is specific evidence pinpointing the crime on a person, that person has a right to their own privacy and constitutional protection against police searches and seizures.
The court pointed out that the trooper acted improperly by arresting both occupants without establishing sufficient individual justifications.
This does not mean, however, that a law enforcement officer must simply walk away from a vehicle from which the odor of marijuana emanates and in which more than one occupant is present if the officer cannot determine which occupant possessed or used the illegal drug. In this case, because the officer had training and experience to identify the odor of marijuana and smelled this odor emanating from the vehicle, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. Instead, here the police officer arrested both occupants without first establishing individualized probable cause. Thus, Grande’s warrantless arrest was invalid.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled the arrest and search of Jeremy Grande were improper.
We hold that the smell of marijuana in the general area where an individual is located is insufficient, without more, to support probable cause for arrest. Where no other evidence exists linking the passenger to any criminal activity, an arrest of the passenger on the suspicion of possession of illegal substances, and any subsequent searches, is invalid and an unconstitutional invasion of that individual's right to privacy.
Justice Charles W. Johnson wrote the unanimous ruling.
For more info: State v. Grande. The information contained in this article should not be construed as legal advice.
Thursday, August 14, 2008
When Pedophile Judges Fear Exposure
When Pedophile Judges Fear Exposure
By Henry Makow PhD
5-7-8
Under a thin veneer of Law, we are governed by a secret network of traitors, pedophiles, Satanists and criminals, masquerading as prominent lawyers and judges, politicians, businessmen and police chiefs. They are often Freemasons who derive their power from the central banking cartel based in London which controls the mass media and seeks to impose its tyranny in the guise of "world government." If you don't believe me, you've probably never heard the names Renate Andres-Auger, Jack Cram and Bruce Clark. They are Vancouver lawyers who were dragged from the courtroom, drugged, disbarred and committed to mental hospitals when they attempted to expose this clique in the 1990's. CITY CONFIDENTIAL Beautiful Vancouver B.C., site of the 2010 Winter Olympics, was described by the "Christian Science Monitor" in 1997 as "a pedophiles' paradise," a place known for its "notorious sex trade," with an international reputation "as a city where it is easy to find a child for sex." In 1999, UNESCO named Vancouver one of the world's top three centers for sex trafficking, child porn and pedophilia because of "suspected judicial protection for child sex offenders." In 1994, Renate Andres-Auger, an aboriginal lawyer and single mother of six girls, found irregularities in a land claim case that were very damning to the judicial process. She also charged certain judges and lawyers with a criminal conspiracy to aid and protect pedophiles. She and her own lawyer Jack Cram presented evidence, including photographs and eye witness accounts that two Supreme Court judges were engaged in pedophilia and were using their office to protect other pedophiles. She named the prestigious "Vancouver Club" as a center of this pedophile ring. (Kevin Annett, "Hidden From History: The Canadian Holocaust," p. 147-150) The Judge ordered Auger removed from the court. "The sheriffs dragged Andres-Auger out of the court and you could hear her thumping down the stairs behind the judge's bench." Then the Judge ordered the sheriffs to remove her lawyer Jack Cram. Police were called to clear the courtroom of about 80 supporters. According to a press release (http://sisis.nativeweb.org/clark/cram.html), this is what happened when Cram took the cause to the public: "One night at about 11:30 p.m., after finishing a radio interview, Mr. Cram returned home, parked his car, and while walking to his apartment building five policemen emerged out of the bushes and leaped on him. He was put in an unmarked van and as soon as they got him in they "shot him full of something" and he was transported to the psychiatric ward of Vancouver General Hospital -- as a "no information" patient. SAVING JACK CRAM "When the committee found out where Mr. Cram was, they had to go to Prince George, some 800 kms away, to find a lawyer who would file a habeas-corpus writ to release Mr. Cram but it was never used as Mr. Cram was again, unexpectedly, released after being held this time for 7 days. "Mr. Cram went directly from the psychiatric ward to a meeting of the committee ... He was still under the effects of the drugs that had been administered to him up until about two hours prior to his release. But he was able to explain everything that had happened. It was two of his closest associates, one of which was the one who had bad mouthed him on TV, that signed papers to have Mr. Cram committed. "After a trial, the court disbarred him for a year and fined him $10,000. He was bankrupt and had lost his practice. Cram moved to his ranch in Princeton, a community about 130 km north of Vancouver. "According to Judge Gibbs, in making his recent judgment on Dr. Clark's appeal, said "after [Mr. Cram] received treatment for his paranoid-delusions mental illness, he subsequently dropped all his court cases that he had started in his delusional phase" and one of the conditions for returning to the bar after one year was that he continue to receive psychiatric treatment for that year. Mr. Cram could have been jailed for three months if he didn't receive the treatment or defaulted on paying the fine." Renate Andres-Auger has gone underground. Law Society of BC official James Taylor, who disbarred Andres-Auger and Cram, became a BC Supreme Court judge and issued an injunction in 2002 against mentioning the pedophile charges. Ed John, a native leader accused of using Mafia tactics, and running cocaine and child prostitution rings, was actually named Minister of Child and Family Services in the NDP (socialist) provincial government in 2000. The injunction also covered any mention of these charges. COMMENTS ON THIS SHAMEFUL EPISODE Deborah Wade, a founder of Amnesty International in Vancouver, said in 1999 (http://www.preferrednetwork.com/Pedophilia_In_Vancouver.htm): "The Cram/Andres-Auger story, to this day, remains a very strange and fearful tale of alleged corruption and pedophilia in high places. It is also a story which has never yet been completely told. Perhaps if it were, along with a few other strange stories, we as Canadians would have little reason to gasp at the exposure of pedophile rings in Belgium operating in high places two years ago. The matter of cover-ups possibly existing for those in high places in Canada is becoming more and more credible as more and more people speak out." In 2007 Anthony Hall , a professor at the University of Lethbridge, commented in "Canadian Dimension" magazine: "No public investigation into the treatment and accusations of Andres-Auger and Cram ever took place. We can only speculate, therefore, on the circumstances behind such a dramatic collapse of dignity and due process in the criminal-justice system. Certainly it is made to seem probable that some highly placed group or individual believed that he, she, or they had a great deal to lose if Andres-Auger and Cram had been able to press charges." Hall relates how in 1995, when lawyer Bruce Clark (http://sisis.nativeweb.org/clark/currvit.html)tried to make a legal argument on behalf of Aboriginal clients, an incident transpired in a rural B.C. court similar to when Andres-Auger and Cram tried to bring their evidence forward. Clark was taken into custody and sent to an institution for a compulsory psychological examination. This is how dissidents were treated in another Illuminati satrap, the USSR. Granted these events took place 13-14 years ago, but you can bet they created a chill that continues today. CONCLUSION The Illuminati has a vital interest in using Native leadership to confiscate Aboriginal land and water, and to operate drug trafficking and pedophile rings. That's why lawyers who attempted to represent ordinary Natives incurred the wrath of these (moral) reptiles. That's when the mask slipped, and we had a glimpse of the ugly reality of our society. Another man to watch is Kevin Annett (http:// www.hiddenfromhistory.org
Source: http://rense.com/general81/rxk.htm
By Henry Makow PhD
5-7-8
Under a thin veneer of Law, we are governed by a secret network of traitors, pedophiles, Satanists and criminals, masquerading as prominent lawyers and judges, politicians, businessmen and police chiefs. They are often Freemasons who derive their power from the central banking cartel based in London which controls the mass media and seeks to impose its tyranny in the guise of "world government." If you don't believe me, you've probably never heard the names Renate Andres-Auger, Jack Cram and Bruce Clark. They are Vancouver lawyers who were dragged from the courtroom, drugged, disbarred and committed to mental hospitals when they attempted to expose this clique in the 1990's. CITY CONFIDENTIAL Beautiful Vancouver B.C., site of the 2010 Winter Olympics, was described by the "Christian Science Monitor" in 1997 as "a pedophiles' paradise," a place known for its "notorious sex trade," with an international reputation "as a city where it is easy to find a child for sex." In 1999, UNESCO named Vancouver one of the world's top three centers for sex trafficking, child porn and pedophilia because of "suspected judicial protection for child sex offenders." In 1994, Renate Andres-Auger, an aboriginal lawyer and single mother of six girls, found irregularities in a land claim case that were very damning to the judicial process. She also charged certain judges and lawyers with a criminal conspiracy to aid and protect pedophiles. She and her own lawyer Jack Cram presented evidence, including photographs and eye witness accounts that two Supreme Court judges were engaged in pedophilia and were using their office to protect other pedophiles. She named the prestigious "Vancouver Club" as a center of this pedophile ring. (Kevin Annett, "Hidden From History: The Canadian Holocaust," p. 147-150) The Judge ordered Auger removed from the court. "The sheriffs dragged Andres-Auger out of the court and you could hear her thumping down the stairs behind the judge's bench." Then the Judge ordered the sheriffs to remove her lawyer Jack Cram. Police were called to clear the courtroom of about 80 supporters. According to a press release (http://sisis.nativeweb.org/clark/cram.html), this is what happened when Cram took the cause to the public: "One night at about 11:30 p.m., after finishing a radio interview, Mr. Cram returned home, parked his car, and while walking to his apartment building five policemen emerged out of the bushes and leaped on him. He was put in an unmarked van and as soon as they got him in they "shot him full of something" and he was transported to the psychiatric ward of Vancouver General Hospital -- as a "no information" patient. SAVING JACK CRAM "When the committee found out where Mr. Cram was, they had to go to Prince George, some 800 kms away, to find a lawyer who would file a habeas-corpus writ to release Mr. Cram but it was never used as Mr. Cram was again, unexpectedly, released after being held this time for 7 days. "Mr. Cram went directly from the psychiatric ward to a meeting of the committee ... He was still under the effects of the drugs that had been administered to him up until about two hours prior to his release. But he was able to explain everything that had happened. It was two of his closest associates, one of which was the one who had bad mouthed him on TV, that signed papers to have Mr. Cram committed. "After a trial, the court disbarred him for a year and fined him $10,000. He was bankrupt and had lost his practice. Cram moved to his ranch in Princeton, a community about 130 km north of Vancouver. "According to Judge Gibbs, in making his recent judgment on Dr. Clark's appeal, said "after [Mr. Cram] received treatment for his paranoid-delusions mental illness, he subsequently dropped all his court cases that he had started in his delusional phase" and one of the conditions for returning to the bar after one year was that he continue to receive psychiatric treatment for that year. Mr. Cram could have been jailed for three months if he didn't receive the treatment or defaulted on paying the fine." Renate Andres-Auger has gone underground. Law Society of BC official James Taylor, who disbarred Andres-Auger and Cram, became a BC Supreme Court judge and issued an injunction in 2002 against mentioning the pedophile charges. Ed John, a native leader accused of using Mafia tactics, and running cocaine and child prostitution rings, was actually named Minister of Child and Family Services in the NDP (socialist) provincial government in 2000. The injunction also covered any mention of these charges. COMMENTS ON THIS SHAMEFUL EPISODE Deborah Wade, a founder of Amnesty International in Vancouver, said in 1999 (http://www.preferrednetwork.com/Pedophilia_In_Vancouver.htm): "The Cram/Andres-Auger story, to this day, remains a very strange and fearful tale of alleged corruption and pedophilia in high places. It is also a story which has never yet been completely told. Perhaps if it were, along with a few other strange stories, we as Canadians would have little reason to gasp at the exposure of pedophile rings in Belgium operating in high places two years ago. The matter of cover-ups possibly existing for those in high places in Canada is becoming more and more credible as more and more people speak out." In 2007 Anthony Hall
Source: http://rense.com/general81/rxk.htm
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
-
Translation It takes the average person about 90 days to ingest the full 60 gram treatment. I suggest that people start with three doses pe...