Wednesday, July 17, 2019

Religious beliefs exonerate two refusing to serve in the US military!! Conscientious Objector

398 U.S. 333
Welsh v. United States (No. 76)
Argued: January 20, 1970
Decided: June 15, 1970
___
Syllabus
Petitioner was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces despite his claim for conscientious objector status under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That provision exempts from military service persons who by reason of "religious training and belief" are conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that term being defined in the Act as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" but not including "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code." In his exemption application, petitioner stated that he could not affirm or deny belief in a "Supreme Being," and struck the words "my religious training and" from the form. He affirmed that he held deep conscientious scruples against participating in wars where people were killed. The Court of Appeals, while noting that petitioner's "beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions," concluded that those beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of § 6(j), and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner contends that the Act violates the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion, and that his conviction should be set aside on the basis of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, which held that the test of religious belief under § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption.
Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 335-367.
404 F.2d 1078, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that:
This case is controlled by United States v. Seeger, supra, to which it is factually similar. Under Seeger, § 6(j) is not limited to those whose opposition to war is prompted by orthodox or parochial religious beliefs. A registrant's conscientious objection to all war is "religious" within the meaning of § 6(j) if this [p334] opposition stems from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and these beliefs are held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. In view of the broad scope of the word "religious," a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as "nonreligious" is not a reliable guide to those administering the exemption. Pp. 335-344.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that:
1. The language of § 6(j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra, and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training and belief" to limit religion to its theistic sense, and to confine it to formal, organized worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of § 6(j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
3. Section 6(j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief, while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with that clause, an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367. [p335]

TOP Opinion
BLACK, J., Opinion of the Court
MR. JUSTICE BLACK announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join.
The petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a), and was, on June 1, 1966, sentenced to imprisonment for three years. One of petitioner's defenses to the prosecution was that § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he was "by reason of religious training and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." [n1] After finding that there was no religious basis for petitioner's conscientious objector claim, the Court of Appeals, Judge Hamley dissenting, affirmed the conviction. 404 F.2d 1078 (1968). We granted certiorari chiefly to review the contention that Welsh's conviction should be set aside on the basis of this Court's decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 396 U.S. 816 (1969). For the reasons to be stated, and without passing upon the constitutional arguments that have been raised, we vote to reverse this conviction because of its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger, supra.
The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up in religious homes and attended church in their childhood, but in neither case was this church one which taught its members not to engage in war at any time for [p336] any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his childhood religious ties into his young manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion during the period of his involvement with the Selective Service System. At the time of registration for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on war developed only in subsequent years, but, when their ideas did fully mature, both made application to their local draft boards for conscientious objector exemptions from military service under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That section then provided, in part: [n2]
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
In filling out their exemption applications, both Seeger and Welsh were unable to sign the statement that, as printed in the Selective Service form, stated, "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously [p337] opposed to participation in war in any form." Seeger could sign only after striking the words "training and" and putting quotation marks around the word "religious." Welsh could sign only after striking the words "my religious training and." On those same applications, neither could definitely affirm or deny that he believed in a "Supreme Being," both stating that they preferred to leave the question open. [n3] But both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such an evil practice. Their objection to participating in war in any form could not be said to come from a "still, small voice of conscience"; rather, for them, that voice was so loud and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was never any question about the sincerity and depth of Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and the same is true of Welsh. In this regard the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he government concedes that [Welsh's] beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions." 404 F.2d at 1081. But, in both cases, the Selective Service System concluded that the beliefs of these men were in some sense insufficiently "religious" to qualify them for conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of § 6(j). Seeger's conscientious objector claim was denied "solely because it was not based upon a ‘belief in a relation to a Supreme Being,' as required by § 6(j) of the Act," United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965), while Welsh was [p338] denied the exemption because his Appeal Board and the Department of Justice hearing officer "could find no religious basis for the registrant's beliefs, opinions and convictions." App. 52. Both Seeger and Welsh subsequently refused to submit to induction into the military, and both were convicted of that offense.
In Seeger, the Court w as confronted, first, with the problem that § 6(j) defined "religious training and belief" in terms of a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being . . . ," a definition that arguably gave a preference to those who believed in a conventional God, as opposed to those who did not. Noting the "vast panoply of beliefs" prevalent in our country, the Court construed the congressional intent as being in "keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs," id. at 175, and accordingly interpreted "the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions. . . ." Id. at 165. (Emphasis added.) But, having decided that all religious conscientious objectors were entitled to the exemption, we faced the more serious problem of determining which beliefs were "religious" within the meaning of the statute. This question was particularly difficult in the case of Seeger himself. Seeger stated that his was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." 380 U.S. at 166. In a letter to his draft board, he wrote:
My decision arises from what I believe to be considerations of validity from the standpoint of the welfare of humanity and the preservation of the democratic values which we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-defeating, and that, from the more important moral standpoint, it is unethical.
326 F.2d 846, 848 (1964). [p339]
On the basis of these and similar assertions, the Government argued that Seeger's conscientious objection to war was not "religious," but stemmed from "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."
In resolving the question whether Seeger and the other registrants in that case qualified for the exemption, the Court stated that "[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious." 380 U.S. at 185. (Emphasis added.) The reference to the registrant's "own scheme of things" was intended to indicate that the central consideration in determining whether the registrant's beliefs are religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the registrant's life. The Court's principal statement of its test for determining whether a conscientious objector's beliefs are religious within the meaning of § 6(j) was as follows:
The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.
380 U.S. at 176. The Court made it clear that these sincere and meaningful beliefs that prompt the registrant's objection to all wars need not be confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion. It held that § 6(j) "does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs," id. at 186, and also held that "intensely personal" convictions which some might find "incomprehensible" or "incorrect" come within the meaning of "religious belief" in the Act. Id. at 184-185. What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious [p340] objection to all war to be "religious" within the meaning of § 6(j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. Most of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality -- a God -- who communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content, but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel to that filled by . . . God" in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 6(j) as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions.
Applying this standard to Seeger himself, the Court noted the "compulsion to ‘goodness'" that shaped his total opposition to war, the undisputed sincerity with which he held his views, and the fact that Seeger had "decried the tremendous ‘spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life." 380 U.S. at 186-187. The Court concluded:
We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.
380 U.S. at 187. Accordingly, the Court found that Seeger should be granted conscientious objector status.
In the case before us, the Government seeks to distinguish our holding in Seeger on basically two grounds, [p341] both of which were relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming Welsh's conviction. First, it is stressed that Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were religious. For example, in filling out their conscientious objector applications, Seeger put quotation marks around the word "religious," but Welsh struck the word "religious" entirely, and later characterized his beliefs as having been formed "by reading in the fields of history and sociology." App. 22. The Court of Appeals found that Welsh had "denied that his objection to war was premised on religious belief," and concluded that "[t]he Appeal Board was entitled to take him at his word." 404 F.2d at 1082. We think this attempt to distinguish Seeger fails for the reason that it places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs. The Court's statement in Seeger that a registrant's characterization of his own belief as "religious" should carry great weight, 380 U.S. at 184, does not imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be treated similarly. When a registrant states that his objections to war are "religious," that information is highly relevant to the question of the function his beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word "religious" as used in § 6(j), and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption. Welsh himself presents a case in point. Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, he later, upon reflection, wrote a long and thoughtful letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his beliefs were "certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word." He explained:
I believe I mentioned taking of life as not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, I assumed Mr. [Brady (the Department of Justice hearing [p342] officer)] was using the word "religious" in the conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest, did not characterize my belief as "religious."
App. 44.
The Government also seeks to distinguish Seeger on the ground that Welsh's views, unlike Seeger's, were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." As previously noted, the Government made the same argument about Seeger, and not without reason, for Seeger's views had a substantial political dimension. Supra at 338-339. In this case, Welsh's conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his perception of world politics. In a letter to his local board, he wrote:
I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the military complex wastes both human and material resources, that it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern) human needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to "defend" our "way of life" profoundly change that way of life. I see that, in our failure to recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation.
App. 30. We certainly do not think that § 6(j)'s exclusion of those persons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" should be read to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy. The two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within these exclusions from the exemption are those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle, but instead rests solely upon [p343] considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. In applying § 6(j)'s exclusion of those whose views are "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical" or of those who have a "merely personal moral code," it should be remembered that these exclusions are definitional, and do not therefore restrict the category of persons who are conscientious objectors by "religious training and belief." Once the Selective Service System has taken the first step and determined under the standards set out here and in Seeger that the registrant is a "religious" conscientious objector, it follows that his views cannot be "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical." Nor can they be a "merely personal moral code." See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
Welsh stated that he "believe[d] the taking of life -- anyone's life -- to be morally wrong." App. 44. In his original conscientious objector application, he wrote the following:
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore, I will not injure or kill another human being. This belief (and the corresponding "duty" to abstain from violence toward another person) is not "superior to those arising from any human relation." On the contrary: it is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore, conscientiously comply with the Government's insistence that I assume duties which I feel are immoral and totally repugnant.
App. 10. Welsh elaborated his beliefs in later communications with Selective Service officials. On the basis of these beliefs and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that he held them "with the strength of more traditional religious convictions," 404 F.2d at 1081, we think Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. Section [p344] 6(j) requires no more. That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.
The judgment is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
1. 162 Stat. 612. See also 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j). The pertinent provision as it read during the period relevant to this case is set out infra at 336.
2. 62 Stat. 612. An amendment to the Act in 1967, subsequent to the Court's decision in the Seeger case, deleted the reference to "Supreme Being" but continued to provide that "religious training and belief" does not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 1 Stat. 104, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
3. In his original application in April, 1964, Welsh stated that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, but, in a letter to his local board in June, 1965, he requested that his original answer be stricken and the question left open. App. 29.

TOP Concurrence
HARLAN, J., Concurring Opinion
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the result.
Candor requires me to say that I joined the Court's opinion in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), only with the gravest misgivings as to whether it was a legitimate exercise in statutory construction, and today's decision convinces me that, in doing so, I made a mistake which I should now acknowledge. [n1]
In Seeger, the Court construed § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act so as to sustain a conscientious objector claim not founded on a theistic belief. The Court, in treating with the provision of the statute that limited conscientious objector claims to those stemming from belief in "a Supreme Being," there said:
Congress, in using the expression "supreme Being," rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
and held that the test of belief
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox [p345] belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.
380 U.S. at 165-166. Today, the prevailing opinion makes explicit its total elimination of the statutorily required religious content for a conscientious objector exemption. The prevailing opinion now says:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content, but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time
(emphasis added), he qualifies for a § 6(j) exemption.
In my opinion, the liberties taken with the statute both in Seeger and today's decision cannot be justified in the name of the familiar doctrine of construing federal statutes in a manner that will avoid possible constitutional infirmities in them. There are limits to the permissible application of that doctrine, and, as I will undertake to show in this opinion, those limits were crossed in Seeger, and even more apparently have been exceeded in the present case. I therefore find myself unable to escape facing the constitutional issue that this case squarely presents: whether § 6(j) in limiting this draft exemption to those opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. For reasons later appearing, I believe it does, and, on that basis, I concur in the judgment reversing this conviction, and adopt the test announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACK not as a matter of statutory construction, but as the touchstone for salvaging a congressional policy of long standing that would otherwise have to be nullified.
I
Section 6(j) provided during the period relevant to this case:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant [p346] training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j).
The issue is then whether Welsh's opposition to war is founded on "religious training and belief," and hence "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" as Congress used those words. It is, of course, true that certain words are more plastic in meaning than others. "Supreme Being" is a concept of theology and philosophy, not a technical term, and consequently may be, in some circumstances, capable of bearing a contemporary construction as notions of theology and philosophy evolve. Cf. United States v. Storrs, 272 U.S. 652 (1926). This language appears, however, in a congressional enactment; it is not a phrase of the Constitution, like "religion" or "speech," which this Court is freer to construe in light of evolving needs and circumstances. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and my concurring opinion in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 595-596 (1965), and my opinion concurring in the judgment in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961). Nor is it so broad a statutory directive, like that of the Sherman Act, that we may assume that we are free to adopt and shape policies limited only by the most general statement of purpose. Cf., e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). It is Congress' will that must here be divined. In that endeavor, [p347] it is one thing to give words a meaning not necessarily envisioned by Congress so as to adapt them to circumstances also uncontemplated by the legislature in order to achieve the legislative policy, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); it is a wholly different matter to define words so as to change policy. The limits of this Court's mandate to stretch concededly elastic congressional language are fixed in all cases by the context of its usage and legislative history, if available, that are the best guides to congressional purpose and the lengths to which Congress enacted a policy. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). [n2] The prevailing opinion today snubs both guidelines, for it is apparent from a textual analysis of § 6(j) and the legislative history that the words of this section, as used and understood by Congress, fall short of enacting the broad policy of exempting from military service all individuals who in good faith oppose all war. [p348]
A
The natural reading of § 6(j), which quite evidently draws a distinction between theistic and nontheistic religions, is the only one that is consistent with the legislative history. Section 5(g) of the 1940 Draft Act exempted individuals whose opposition to war could be traced to "religious training and belief," 54 Stat. 889, without any allusion to a Supreme Being. In United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d Cir.1943), the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Augustus Hand, broadly construed "religious training and belief" to include a
belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.
133 F.2d at 708. The view was further elaborated in subsequent decisions of the Second Circuit, see United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 621 (C.A.2d Cir.1943); United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (C.A.2d Cir.1944). This expansive interpretation of § 5(g) was rejected by a divided Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380-381 (1946):
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training and belief" . . . was written into the statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly one.
* * * *
[I]n United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 . . . , Mr. [Chief] Justice Hughes in his dissent . . . said: "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." [p349]
The unmistakable and inescapable thrust of the Berman opinion, that religion is to be conceived in theistic terms, is rendered no less straightforward by the court's elaboration on the difference between beliefs held as a matter of moral or philosophical conviction and those inspired by religious upbringing and adherence to faith.
There are those who have a philosophy of life, and who live up to it. There is evidence that this is so in regard to appellant. However, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used in the statute. It is said in State v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894, 898 . . . :
surely a scheme of life designed to obviate such results (man's inhumanity to man), and by removing temptations, and all the inducements of ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness, patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not pertaining to religion when its devotee regards it as an essential tenet of their [sic] religious faith.
(Emphasis of Court of Appeals.) Ibid.
In the wake of this intercircuit dialogue, crystallized by the dissent in Berman, which espoused the Second Circuit interpretation in Kauten, supra, Congress enacted § 6(j) in 1948. That Congress intended to anoint the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 5(g) would seem beyond question in view of the similarity of the statutory language to that used by Chief Justice Hughes in his dissenting opinion in Macintosh and quoted in Berman and the Senate report. The first half of the new language was almost word for word that of Chief Justice Hughes in [p350] Macintosh, and quoted by the Berman majority; [n3] and the Senate Committee report adverted to Berman, thus foreclosing any possible speculation as to whether Congress was aware of the possible alternatives. The report stated:
This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relationship to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. (See United States v. Berman [sic], 156 F. (2d) 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795.)
S.Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 14. [n4] [p351]
B
Against this legislative history, it is a remarkable feat of judicial surgery to remove, as did Seeger, the theistic requirement of § 6(j). The prevailing opinion today, however, in the name of interpreting the will of Congress, has performed a lobotomy and completely transformed the statute by reading out of it any distinction between religiously acquired beliefs and those deriving from "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."
In the realm of statutory construction, it is appropriate to search for meaning in the congressional vocabulary in a lexicon most probably consulted by Congress. Resort to Webster's [n5] reveals that the meanings of "religion" are:
1. The service and adoration of God or a god as expressed in forms of worship, in obedience to divine commands . . . ; 2. The state of life of a religious . . . ; 3. One of the systems of faith and worship; a form of theism; a religious faith . . . ; 4. The profession or practice of religious beliefs; religious observances collectively; pl. rites; 5. Devotion or fidelity; . . . conscientiousness; [p352] 6. An apprehension, awareness, or conviction of the existence of a supreme being, or more widely, of supernatural powers or influences controlling one's own, humanity's, or nature's destiny; also, such an apprehension, etc., accompanied by or arousing reverence, love, gratitude, the will to obey and serve, and the like. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Of the five pertinent definitions, four include the notion of either a Supreme Being or a cohesive, organized group pursuing a common spiritual purpose together. While, as the Court's opinion in Seeger points out, these definitions do not exhaust the almost infinite and sophisticated possibilities for defining "religion," there is strong evidence that Congress restricted, in this instance, the word to its conventional sense. That it is difficult to plot the semantic penumbra of the word "religion" does not render this term so plastic in meaning that the Court is entitled, as matter of statutory construction, to conclude that any asserted and strongly held belief satisfies its requirements. It must be recognized that the permissible shadow of connotation is limited by the context in which words are used. In § 6(j), Congress has included not only a reference to a Supreme Being, but has also explicitly contrasted "religious" beliefs with those that are "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical" and a "personal moral code." This exception certainly is, at the very least, the statutory boundary, the "asymptote," of the word "religion." [n6] [p353]
For me, this dichotomy reveals that Congress was not embracing that definition of religion that alone speaks in terms of "devotion or fidelity" to individual principles acquired on an individualized basis, but was adopting, at least, those meanings that associate religion with formal, organized worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Indeed, this requirement was explicit in the predecessor to the 1940 statute. The Draft Act of 1917 conditioned conscientious objector status on membership in or affiliation with a
well-recognized religious sect or organization [then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forb[ade] its members to participate in war in any form. . . .
§ 4, 40 Stat 78. That § 5(g) of the 1940 Act eliminated the affiliation and membership requirement does not, in my view, mean as the Court, in effect, concluded in Seeger that Congress was embracing a secular definition of religion. [n7] [p354]
Unless we are to assume an Alice-in-Wonderland world where words have no meaning, I think it fair to say that Congress' choice of language cannot fail to convey to the discerning reader the very policy choice that the prevailing opinion today completely obliterates: that between conventional religions that usually have an organized and formal structure and dogma and a cohesive group identity, even when nontheistic, and cults that represent schools of thought and in the usual case are without formal structure or are, at most, loose and informal associations of individuals who share common ethical, moral, or intellectual views.
II
When the plain thrust of a legislative enactment can only be circumvented by distortion to avert an inevitable constitutional collision, it is only by exalting form over substance that one can justify this veering off the path that has been plainly marked by the statute. Such a course betrays extreme skepticism as to constitutionality, and, in this instance, reflects a groping to preserve the conscientious objector exemption at all cost.
I cannot subscribe to a wholly emasculated construction of a statute to avoid facing a latent constitutional question, in purported fidelity to the salutary doctrine of avoiding unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues, a principle to which I fully adhere. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288"] 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). It is, of course, desirable to salvage by construction legislative enactments whenever there is good reason to believe that Congress did not intend to legislate consequences that are unconstitutional, but it is not permissible, in my judgment, to take a lateral step that robs legislation of all meaning in order to avert the collision between its plainly intended purpose and the commands of the Constitution. [p355] Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). As the Court stated in 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). It is, of course, desirable to salvage by construction legislative enactments whenever there is good reason to believe that Congress did not intend to legislate consequences that are unconstitutional, but it is not permissible, in my judgment, to take a lateral step that robs legislation of all meaning in order to avert the collision between its plainly intended purpose and the commands of the Constitution. [p355] Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). As the Court stated in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964):
It must be remembered that, "[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute . . ." or judicially rewriting it. Scales v. United States [ 367 U.S. 203, 211]. To put the matter another way, this Court will not consider the abstract question of whether Congress might have enacted a valid statute, but, instead, must ask whether the statute that Congress did enact will permissibly bear a construction rendering it free from constitutional defects.
The issue comes sharply into focus in Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement for the Court in Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933):
"A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score." . . . But avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. Here, the intention of the Congress is revealed too distinctly to permit us to ignore it because of mere misgivings as to power. The problem must be faced and answered.
If an important congressional policy is to be perpetuated by recasting unconstitutional legislation, as the prevailing opinion has done here, the analytically sound approach is to accept responsibility for this decision. Its justification cannot be by resort to legislative intent as that term is usually employed, but by a different kind of legislative intent, namely, the presumed grant of power to the courts to decide whether it more nearly accords with [p356] Congress' wishes to eliminate its policy altogether or extend it in order to render what Congress plainly did intend, constitutional. Compare, e.g., Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928). I therefore turn to the constitutional question.
III
The constitutional question that must be faced in this case is whether a statute that defers to the individual's conscience only when his views emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs is within the power of Congress. Congress, of course, could, entirely consistently with the requirements of the Constitution, eliminate all exemptions for conscientious objectors. Such a course would be wholly "neutral," and, in my view, would not offend the Free Exercise Clause, for reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963). See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (dictum); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264-265 (1934); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1961). However, having chosen to exempt, it cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs, on the one hand, and secular beliefs, on the other. Any such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); [p357] Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). The implementation of the neutrality principle of these cases requires, in my view, as I stated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra,
an equal protection mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical question is whether the scope of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that [all groups that] could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter [are included].
397 U.S. at 696.
The "radius" of this legislation is the conscientiousness with which an individual opposes war in general, yet the statute, as I think it must be construed, excludes from its "scope" individuals motivated by teachings of nontheistic religions, [n8] and individuals guided by an inner ethical voice that bespeaks secular, and not "religious," reflection. It not only accords a preference to the "religious," but also disadvantages adherents of religions that do not worship a Supreme Being. The constitutional infirmity cannot be cured, moreover, even by an impermissible construction that eliminates the theistic requirement and simply draws the line between religious and nonreligious. This, in my view, offends the Establishment Clause and is that kind of classification [p358] that this Court has condemned. See my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp (Goldberg, J., concurring), supra; Engel v. Vitale, supra; Torcaso v. Watkins, supra.
If the exemption is to be given application, it must encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those whose beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. [n9] The common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held. [n10] Common experience teaches that, among [p359] "religious" individuals, some are weak and others strong adherents to tenets, and this is no less true of individuals whose lives are guided by personal ethical considerations.
The Government enlists the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), as precedent for upholding the constitutionality of the religious conscientious objector provision. That case involved the power of Congress to raise armies by conscription and only incidentally the conscientious objector exemption. The language emphasized by the Government to the effect that the exemption for religious objectors and ministers constituted neither an establishment nor interference with free exercise of religion can only be considered an afterthought, since the case did not involve any individuals who claimed to be nonreligious conscientious objectors. [n11] This conclusory assertion, unreasoned and unaccompanied by citation, surely cannot foreclose consideration of the question in a case that squarely presents the issue.

Other authorities assembled by the Government, far from advancing its case, demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the distinction drawn in § 6(j) between religious and nonreligious beliefs. Everson v. Board of Educational, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Sunday Closing Law Cases, 366 U.S. 420, 582, 599, and 617 (1961), and Board [p360] of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), all sustained legislation on the premise that it was neutral in its application and thus did not constitute an establishment, notwithstanding the fact that it may have assisted religious groups by giving them the same benefits accorded to nonreligious groups. [n12] To the extent that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and Sherbert v. Verner, supra, stand for the proposition that the Government may (Zorach), or must (Sherbert), shape its secular programs to accommodate the beliefs and tenets of religious [p361] groups, I think these cases unsound. [n13] See generally Kurland, supra. To conform with the requirements of the First Amendment's religious clauses as reflected in the mainstream of American history, legislation must, at the very least, be neutral. See my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra.
IV
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion, there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). [n14] [p362]
The appropriate disposition of this case, which is a prosecution for refusing to submit to induction and not an action for a declaratory judgment on he constitutionality of § 6(j), is determined by the fact that, at the time of Welsh's induction notice and prosecution the Selective Service was, as required by statute, exempting individual whose beliefs were identical in all respects to those held by petitioner except that they derived from a religious source. Since this created a religious benefit not accorded to petitioner, it is clear to me that this conviction must be reversed under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment unless Welsh is to go remediless. Cf. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, supra; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931). [n15] [p363]
This result, while tantamount to extending the statute, is not only the one mandated by the Constitution in this case, but also the approach I would take had this question been presented in an action for a declaratory judgment [p364] or "an action in equity where the enforcement of a statute awaits the final determination of the court as to validity and scope." Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. at 565. [n16] While the necessary remedial operation, extension, is more analogous to a graft than amputation, I think the boundaries of permissible choice may properly be considered fixed by the legislative pronouncement on severability.
Indicative of the breadth of the judicial mandate in this regard is the broad severability clause, 65 Stat. 88, which provides that,
[i]f any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
While the absence of such a provision would not foreclose the exercise of discretion in determining whether a legislative policy should be repaired or abandoned, cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n. 27 (1968), its existence "discloses an intention to make the Act divisible and creates a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been satisfied with what remained. . . ." Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). See also Skinner [p365] v. Oklahoma, supra; Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928). [n17]
In exercising the broad discretion conferred by a severability clause it is, of course, necessary to measure the intensity of commitment to the residual policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation. Cf. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra, (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
The policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors is one of longstanding tradition in this country and accords recognition to what is, in a diverse and "open" society, the important value of reconciling individuality [p366] of belief with practical exigencies whenever possible. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). It dates back to colonial times, and has been perpetuated in state and federal conscription statutes. See Mr. Justice Cardozo's separate opinion in Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. at 267; Macintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845, 847 (1930). That it has been phrased in religious terms reflects, I assume, the fact that ethics and morals, while the concern of secular philosophy, have traditionally been matters taught by organized religion and that, for most individuals, spiritual and ethical nourishment is derived from that source. It further reflects, I would suppose, the assumption that beliefs emanating from a religious source are probably held with great intensity.
When a policy has roots so deeply embedded in history, there is a compelling reason for a court to hazard the necessary statutory repairs if they can be made within the administrative framework of the statute and without impairing other legislative goals, even though they entail not simply eliminating an offending section, but rather building upon it. [n18] Thus, I am prepared to accept the prevailing opinion's conscientious objector test not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but, as patchwork [p367] of judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion in § 6(j) and can be administered by local boards in the usual course of business. [n19] Like the prevailing opinion, I also conclude that petitioner's beliefs are held with the required intensity, and consequently vote to reverse the judgment of conviction.


TOP Dissent
WHITE, J., Dissenting Opinion
MR JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
Whether or not United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), accurately reflected the intent of Congress in providing draft exemptions for religious conscientious objectors to war, I cannot join today's construction of § 6(j) extending draft exemption to those who disclaim religious objections to war and whose views about war represent a purely personal code arising not from religious training and belief, as the statute requires, but from readings in philosophy, history, and sociology. Our obligation [p368] in statutory construction cases is to enforce the will of Congress, not our own, and, as MR. JUSTICE HARLAN has demonstrated, construing § 6(j) to include Welsh exempts from the draft a class of persons to whom Congress has expressly denied an exemption.
For me, that conclusion should end this case. Even if Welsh is quite right in asserting that exempting religious believers is an establishment of religion forbidden by the First Amendment, he nevertheless remains one of those persons whom Congress took pains not to relieve from military duty. Whether or not § 6(j) is constitutional, Welsh had no First Amendment excuse for refusing to report for induction. If it is contrary to the express will of Congress to exempt Welsh, as I think it is, then there is no warrant for saving the religious exemption and the statute by redrafting it in this Court to include Welsh and all others like him.
If the Constitution expressly provided that aliens should not be exempt from the draft, but Congress purported to exempt them and no others, Welsh, a citizen, could hardly qualify for exemption by demonstrating that exempting aliens is unconstitutional. By the same token, if the Constitution prohibits Congress from exempting religious believers, but Congress exempts them anyway, why should the invalidity of the exemption create a draft immunity for Welsh? Surely not just because he would otherwise go without a remedy along with all those others not qualifying for exemption under the statute. And not as a reward for seeking a declaration of the invalidity of § 6(j); for as long as Welsh is among those from whom Congress expressly withheld the exemption, he has no standing to raise the establishment issue even if § 6(j) would present no First Amendment problems if it had included Welsh and others like him.
[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the [p369] statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). Nothing in the First Amendment prohibits drafting Welsh and other nonreligious objectors to war. Saving § 6(j) by extending it to include Welsh cannot be done in the name of a presumed congressional, will but only by the Court's taking upon itself the power to make draft exemption policy.
If I am wrong in thinking that Welsh cannot benefit from invalidation of 6(j) on Establishment Clause grounds, I would nevertheless affirm his conviction; for I cannot hold that Congress violated the Clause in exempting from the draft all those who oppose war by reason of religious training and belief. In exempting religious conscientious objectors, Congress was making one of two judgments, perhaps both. First, § 6(j) may represent a purely practical judgment that religious objectors, however admirable, would be of no more use in combat than many others unqualified for military service. Exemption was not extended to them to further religious belief or practice, but to limit military service to those who were prepared to undertake the fighting that the armed services have to do. On this basis, the exemption has neither the primary purpose nor the effect of furthering religion. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, said in a separate opinion in the Sunday Closing Law Cases, 366 U.S. 420, 468 (1961), an establishment contention "can prevail only if the absence of any substantial legislative purpose other than a religious one is made to appear." See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366.
Second, Congress may have granted the exemption because otherwise religious objectors would be forced into conduct that their religions forbid, and because, [p370] in the view of Congress, to deny the exemption would violate the Free Exercise Clause, or at least raise grave problems in this respect. True, this Court has more than once stated its unwillingness to construe the First Amendment, standing alone, as requiring draft exemptions for religious believers. Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 263-264 (1934); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-624 (1931). But this Court is not alone in being obliged to construe the Constitution in the course of its work; nor does it even approach having a monopoly on the wisdom and insight appropriate to the task. Legislative exemptions for those with religious convictions against war date from colonial days. As Chief Justice Hughes explained in his dissent in United States v. Macintosh, supra, at 633, the importance of giving immunity to those having conscientious scruples against bearing arms has consistently been emphasized in debates in Congress, and such draft exemptions are "‘indicative of the actual operation of the principles of the Constitution.'" However this Court might construe the First Amendment, Congress has regularly steered clear of free exercise problems by granting exemptions to those who conscientiously oppose war on religious grounds.
If there were no statutory exemption for religious objectors to war, and failure to provide it was held by this Court to impair the free exercise of religion contrary to the First Amendment, an exemption reflecting this constitutional command would be no more an establishment of religion than the exemption required for Sabbatarians in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), or the exemption from the flat tax on book sellers held required for evangelists, Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). Surely a statutory exemption for religionists required by the Free Exercise Clause is not an invalid establishment because it fails to include nonreligious believers as well; nor would it be any less an establishment [p371] if camouflaged by granting additional exemptions for nonreligious, but "moral," objectors to war.

On the assumption, however, that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not, by its own force, require exempting devout objectors from military service, it does not follow that § 6(j) is a law respecting an establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. It is very likely that § 6(j) is a recognition by Congress of free exercise values and its view of desirable or required policy in implementing the Free Exercise Clause. That judgment is entitled to respect. Congress has the power "To raise and support Armies" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" that power. Art. I, § 8. The power to raise armies must be exercised consistently with the First Amendment, which, among other things, forbids laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. It is surely essential therefore -- surely "necessary and proper" -- in enacting laws for the raising of armies to take account of the First Amendment and to avoid possible violations of the Free Exercise Clause. If this was the course Congress took, then just as in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where we accepted the judgment of Congress as to what legislation was appropriate to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, here we should respect congressional judgment accommodating the Free Exercise Clause and the power to raise armies. This involves no surrender of the Court's function as ultimate arbiter in disputes over interpretation of the Constitution. But it was enough in Katzenbach "to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did," 384 U.S. at 653, and plainly, in the case before us, there is an arguable basis for § 6(j) in the Free Exercise Clause, since, without the exemption, the law would compel some members of the public to engage in combat [p372] operations contrary to their religious convictions. Indeed, one federal court has recently held that to draft a man for combat service contrary to his conscientious beliefs would violate the First Amendment. United States v. Sisson, 297 F.Supp. 902 (1969). There being substantial roots in the Free Exercise Clause for § 6(j), I would not frustrate congressional will by construing the Establishment Clause to condition the exemption for religionists upon extending the exemption also to those who object to war on nonreligious grounds.
We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. "Neutrality," however, is not self-defining. If it is "favoritism" and not "neutrality" to exempt religious believers from the draft, is it "neutrality," and not "inhibition" of religion, to compel religious believers to fight when they have special reasons for not doing so, reasons to which the Constitution gives particular recognition? It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classification. The Amendment protects belief and speech, but, as a general proposition, the free speech provisions stop short of immunizing conduct from official regulation. The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper cut: it protects conduct, as well as religious belief and speech.
[I]t safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts, -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940). Although socially harmful acts may, as a rule, be banned despite the Free Exercise Clause even where religiously motivated, there is an area of conduct that cannot be forbidden to religious practitioners but that may be forbidden to others. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Follett v. [p373] McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). We should thus not labor to find a violation of the Establishment Clause when free exercise values prompt Congress to relieve religious believers from the burdens of the law, at least in those instances where the law is not merely prohibitory, but commands the performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man's religion.
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961), a majority of the Court rejected claims that Sunday closing laws placed unacceptable burdens on Sabbatarians' religious observances. It was not suggested, however, that the Sunday closing laws in 21 States exempting Sabbatarians and others violated the Establishment Clause because no provision was made for others who claimed nonreligious reasons for not working on some particular day of the week. Nor was it intimated in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), that the nonestablishment holding might be infirm because only those pursuing religious studies for designated periods were released from the public school routine; neither was it hinted that a public school's refusal to institute a released-time program would violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, construed the Free Exercise Clause to require special treatment for Sabbatarians under the State's unemployment compensation law. But the State could deal specially with Sabbatarians whether the Free Exercise Clause required it or not, for, as MR. JUSTICE HARLAN then said -- and I agreed with him -- the Establishment Clause would not forbid an exemption for Sabbatarians who otherwise could not qualify for unemployment benefits.
The Establishment Clause, as construed by this Court, unquestionably has independent significance; its function is not wholly auxiliary to the Free Exercise Clause. It bans some involvements of the State with religion that [p374] otherwise might be consistent with the Free Exercise Clause. But when, in the rationally based judgment of Congress, free exercise of religion calls for.shielding religious objectors from compulsory combat duty, I am reluctant to frustrate the legislative will by striking down the statutory exemption because it does not also reach those to whom the Free Exercise Clause offers no protection whatsoever.
I would affirm the judgment below.
1. For a discussion of those principles that determine the appropriate scope for the doctrine of stare decisis, see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, also decided today, post, p. 375; Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, ante, p. 235; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
2. The difference is between the substitution of judicial judgment for a principle that is set forth by the Constitution and legislature and the application of the legislative principle to a new "form" that is no different in substance from the circumstances that existed when the principle was set forth. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). As the Court said in Weems v. United States,
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, . . . from an experience of evils, . . . its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. . . . [A] principle, to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (emphasis added).
While it is by no means always simple to discern the difference between the residual principle in legislation that should be given effect in circumstances not covered by the express statutory terms and the limitation on that principle inherent in the same words, the Court in Seeger and the prevailing opinion today read out language that, in my view, plainly limits the principle, rather than illustrates the policy and circumstances that were in mind when § 6(j) was enacted.
3. The substitution in § 6(j) of "Supreme Being" instead of "God" as used in Macintosh does not, in my view, carry the burden, placed on it in the Seeger opinion, of demonstrating that Congress "deliberately broadened" Chief Justice Hughes' definition. "God" and "Supreme Being" are generally taken as synonymous terms meaning Deity. It is common practice to use various synonyms for the Deity. The Declaration of Independence refers to "Nature's God," "Creator," "Supreme Judge of the world," and "divine Providence." References to the Deity in preambles to the state constitutions include, for example, and use interchangeably "God," "Almighty God," "Supreme Being." A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 561 (1964). In Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), the Court spoke of man's relations to his "Creator" and to his "Maker"; in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306"] 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), and 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962), to the "Almighty."
4. The Seeger opinion relies on the absence of any allusion to the judicial conflict to parry the thrust of the legislative history, and assigns significance to the Committee citation of Berman as manifestation of its intention to reenact § 5(g) of the 1940 Act, and also as authority for the exclusion of those whose beliefs are grounded in secular ethics. The citation to Berman would not be conclusive of congressional purpose if Congress had simply reenacted the 1940 Act adding only the express exclusion in the last clause. But the reasoning in Seeger totally ignores the fact that Congress, without other apparent reason, added the "Supreme Being" language of the Berman majority in the face of the Berman dissent which espoused Judge Hand's view in Kauten. The argument in Seeger is not, moreover, strengthened by the fact that Congress, in drafting the 1948 Selective Service laws, placed great weight on the views of the Selective Service System which, the Court suggested, did not view Berman and Kauten as being in conflict. 380 U.S. at 179. The Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection (1950) was not before Congress when § 6(j) was enacted, and the fact that the Service relied on both Kauten and Berman for the proposition that conscientious objection must emanate from a religious, and not a secular, source does not mean that it considered the Supreme Being discussion in Berman as surplusage.
5. New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2d ed.1934).
6. The prevailing opinion's purported recognition of this distinction slides over the "personal moral code" exception, in § 6(j). Thus, that opinion, in concluding that § 6(j) does not exclude
those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy,
but excludes individuals whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest upon "moral, ethical or religious principle," but, instead, rests solely upon considerations of "policy, pragmatism, or expediency," ante at 342-343, blends morals and religion, two concepts that Congress chose to keep separate.
7. The apparent purpose of the 1940 change in language was to eliminate membership as a decisive criterion in recognition of the fact that mere formal affiliation is no measure of the intensity of beliefs, and that many nominal adherents do not share or pursue the ethics of their church. That the focus was made the conscientiousness of the individual's own belief does not mean that Congress was indifferent to its source. Were this the case, there would have been no occasion to allude to "religious training" in the 1940 enactment, and to contrast it with secular ethics in the 1948 statute. Yet the prevailing opinion today holds that "beliefs that are purely ethical," no matter how acquired, qualify the holder for § 6(j) status if they are held with the requisite intensity.
However, even the prevailing opinion's ambulatory concept of "religion" does not suffice to embrace Welsh, since petitioner insisted that his beliefs had been formed "by reading in the fields of history and sociology" and "denied that his objection to war was premised on religious belief." 404 F.2d at 1082. That opinion not only establishes a definition of religion that amounts to "Newspeak," but it refuses to listen to petitioner who is speaking the same language.
8. This Court has taken notice of the fact that recognized "religions" exist that "do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God," Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11, e.g., "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Ibid. See also Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127 (1957); 2 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; J. Archer, Faiths Men Live By 12138, 254-313 (2d ed. revised by Purinton 1958); Stokes & Pfeffer, supra, n. 3, at 560.
9. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court held unconstitutional over my dissent a state statute that conditioned eligibility for unemployment benefits on being "able to work and . . . available for work" and further provided that a claimant was ineligible "[i]f . . . The has failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer. . . ." This, the Court held, was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Seventh Day Adventists whose religious background forced them as a matter of conscience to decline Saturday employment. My own conclusion, to which I still adhere, is that the Free Exercise Clause does not require a State to conform a neutral secular program to the dictates of religious conscience of any group. I suggested, however that a State could constitutionally create exceptions to its program to accommodate religious scruples. That suggestion must, however, be qualified by the observation that any such exception in order to satisfy the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, would have to be sufficiently broad to be religiously neutral. See my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra. This would require creating an exception for anyone who, as a matter of conscience, could not comply with the statute. Whether, under a statute like that involved in Sherbert, it would be possible to demonstrate a basis in conscience for not working Saturday is quite another matter.
10. Without deciding what constitutes a definition of "religion" for First Amendment purposes it suffices to note that it means, in my view, at least the two conceivable readings of § 6(j) set forth in Part II, but something less than mere adherence to ethical or moral beliefs in general or a certain belief such as conscientious objection. Thus, the prevailing opinion's expansive reading of "religion" in § 6(j) does not, in my view, create an Establishment Clause problem in that it exempts all sincere objectors but does not exempt others, e.g., those who object to war on pragmatic grounds and contend that pragmatism is their creed.
11. Thus, Mr. Chief Justice White said:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act . . . because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.
245 U.S. at 389-390.
12. My Brother WHITE in dissent misinterprets, in my view, the thrust of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's language in the Sunday Closing Law Cases. See post at 369. Section 6(j) speaks directly to belief divorced entirely from conduct. It evinces a judgment that individuals who hold the beliefs set forth by the statute should not be required to bear arms, and the statutory belief that qualifies is only a religious belief. Under these circumstances, I fail to see how this legislation has "any substantial legislative purpose" apart from honoring the conscience of individuals who oppose war on only religious grounds. I cannot, moreover, accept the view, implicit in the dissent, that Congress has any ultimate responsibility for construing the Constitution. It, like all other branches of government, is constricted by the Constitution, and must conform its action to it. It is this Court, however, and not the Congress, that is ultimately charged with the difficult responsibility of construing the First Amendment. The Court has held that universal conscription creates no free exercise problem, see cases cited supra at 356, and Congress can constitutionally draft individuals notwithstanding their religious beliefs. Congress, whether in response to political considerations or simply out of sensitivity for men of religious conscience, can, of course, decline to exercise its power to conscript to the fullest extent, but it cannot do so without equal regard for men of nonreligious conscience. It goes without saying that the First Amendment is perforce a guarantee that the conscience of religion may not be preferred simply because organized religious groups in general are more visible than the individual who practices morals and ethics on his own. Any view of the Free Exercise Clause that does not insist on this neutrality would engulf the Establishment Clause and render it vestigial.
13. That the "released-time" program in Zorach did not utilize classroom facilities for religious instruction, unlike McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), is a distinction for me without Establishment Clause substance. At the very least, the Constitution requires that the State not excuse students early for the purpose of receiving religious instruction when it does not offer to nonreligious students the opportunity to use school hours for spiritual or ethical instruction of a nonreligious nature. Moreover, whether a released-time program cast in terms of improving "conscience" to the exclusion of artistic or cultural pursuits, would be "neutral" and consistent with the requirement of "voluntarism," is by no means an easy question. Such a limited program is quite unlike the broad approach of the tax exemption statute, sustained in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, which included literary societies, playgrounds, and associations "for the moral or mental improvement of men."
14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, where MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in an opinion holding infirm under the Equal Protection Clause a state statute that required sterilization of habitual thieves who perpetrated larcenies but not those who engaged in embezzlement, noted the alternative courses of extending the statute to cover the excluded class or not applying it to the wrongfully included group. The Court declined to speculate which alternative the State would prefer to adopt and simply reversed the judgment.
15. In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court in a decision holding that the State had denied petitioners equal protection of the laws by taxing them more heavily than their competitors, observed that:
The right invoked is that to equal treatment, and such treatment will be attained if either their competitors' taxes are increased or their own reduced.
284 U.S. at 247. Based on the impracticality of requiring the aggrieved taxpayer at that stage to "assume the burden of seeking an increase of the taxes which . . . others should have paid," the Court held that petitioner was entitled to recover the overpayment.
The Establishment Clause case that comes most readily to mind as involving "underinclusion" is Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). There, the State prohibited the teaching of evolutionist theory but "did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man." 393 U.S. at 109. The Court held the Arkansas statute, which was framed as a prohibition, unconstitutional. Since the statute authorized no positive action, there was no occasion to consider the remedial problem. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). Most of the other cases arising under the Establishment Clause have involved instances where the challenged legislation conferred a benefit on religious as well as secular institutions. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra; Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Board of Education v. Allen, supra. These cases, had they been decided differently, would still not have presented the remedial problem that arises in the instant case, for they were cases of alleged "overinclusion." The school prayer cases, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra, and Engel v. Vitale, supra, and the released-time cases, Zorach v. Clauson, supra; McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, also failed to raise the remedial issue. In the school prayer situation, the requested relief was an injunction against the saying of prayers. Moreover, it is doubtful that there is any analogous secular ritual that could be performed so as to satisfy the neutrality requirement of the First Amendment and even then the practice of saying prayers in schools would still offend the principle of voluntarism that must be satisfied in First Amendment cases. See my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra. The same considerations prevented the issue from arising in the one released-time program case that held the practice unconstitutional.
In McCollum, where the Court held unconstitutional a program that permitted
religious teachers, employed by private religious groups . . . to come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours .set apart for secular teaching, and then and there, for a period of thirty minutes, substitute their religious teaching for the secular education provided under the compulsory education law,
333 U.S. at 205, the relief requested was an order to mandamus the authorities to discontinue the program. No question arose as to whether the program might have been saved by extending a similar privilege to other students who wished extracurricular instruction in, for example, atheistic or secular ethics and morals. Cf. my separate opinion in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra. Moreover. as in the prayer cases, since the defect in the Illinois program was not the mere absence of neutrality, but also the encroachment on "voluntarism," see ibid., it is doubtful whether there existed any remedial alternative to voiding the entire program. A further complication would have arisen in these cases by virtue of the more limited discretion this Court enjoys to extend a policy for the States even as a constitutional remedy. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
16. As long as the Selective Service continues to grant exemptions to religious conscientious objectors, individuals like petitioner are not required to submit to induction. This is tantamount to extending the present statute to cover those in petitioner's position. Alternatively the defect of underinclusion that renders this statute unconstitutional could be cured in a civil action by eliminating the exemption accorded to objectors whose beliefs are founded in religion. The choice between these two courses is not one for local draft boards nor is it one that should await civil litigation where the question could more appropriately be considered. Consequently, I deem it proper to confront the issue here, even though, as a technical matter, no judgment could issue in this case ordering the Selective Service to refrain entirely from granting exemptions.
17. In Skinner, the Court impliedly recognized the mandate of flexibility to repair a defective statute -- even by extension -- conferred by a broad severability clause. As already noted, the Court there declined to exercise discretion, however, since, absent a clear indication of legislative preference it was for the state courts to determine the proper course.
While Mr. Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion in Nat. Life Ins. Co., supra, at 522, 534-535, expressed the view that a severability clause in terms like that, before us now is not intended to authorize amendment by expanding the scope of legislation, his remarks must be taken in the context of a dissent to a course he deemed contrary to that Congress would have chosen. Thus, after quoting Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 (1922), to the effect that a severability clause
furnishes assurance to courts that they may properly sustain separate sections or provisions of a partly invalid act without hesitation or doubt as to whether they would have been adopted, even if the legislature had been advised of the invalidity of part [b]ut . . . does not give . . . power to amend the act,
Justice Brandeis observed, that:
Even if such a clause could ever permit a court to enlarge the scope of a deduction allowed by a taxing statute, . . . the asserted unconstitutionality can be cured as readily by [excision] as by [enlargement],
and that the former would most likely have been the congressional preference in that particular case. Cf. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, supra.
18. I reach these conclusions notwithstanding the admonition in United States v. Reese that it "is no part of [this Court's] duty" "[t]o limit [a] statute in [such a way as] to make a new law, [rather than] enforce an old one." 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). See also Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60 (1968). Neither of these cases involved statutes evincing a congressional intent to confer a benefit on a particular group, thus requiring the frustration of third-party beneficiary legislation when the acts were held invalid. Moreover the saving construction in Marchetti would have thwarted, not complemented, the primary purpose of the statute by introducing practical difficulties into that enforcement of state gambling laws that the statute was designed to further.
19. During World War I, when the exemption was granted to members or affiliates of "well-recognized religious sect[s]," the Selective Service System found it impracticable to compile a list of "recognized" sects, and left the matter to the discretion of the local boards. Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20, 1918, p. 56. As a result, some boards treated religious and nonreligious objectors in the same manner. Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the First Draft Under the Selective Service Act, 1917, p. 59. Finally, by presidential regulation dated March 20, 1918, it was ordered that conscientious objector status be open to all conscientious objectors without regard to any religious qualification. The experience during World War II, when draft boards were operating under the broad definition of religion in United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d Cir.1943), also demonstrates the administrative viability of today's test. Not only would the test announced today seem manageable, but it would appear easier than the arcane inquiry required to determine whether beliefs are religious or secular in nature.

Monday, May 20, 2019

HAGUE v. CANCER RELIEF & RESEARCH INSTITUTE [1939]

HAGUE v. CANCER RELIEF & RESEARCH INSTITUTE [1939] MJ. No. 19 [1939]4D.L.R.19l

Manitoba King's Bench Dysart J. Judgment: July 11, 1939 (36 paras.)

Counsel: W D. Lawrence, K.C. and S. Freedman, for plaintiff W C. Hamilton, K.C. and H Adamson, for defendant.
1 DYSART J.:--

Ths action is brought by a practicing physician and surgeon to compel the defendant to furnish him from time to time with radium and its emanations for use in his treatment of cancer among his patients.

2 Briefly, the plaintiff claims that the defendant is a corporation incorporated by an Act of the Legislature of this Province for the purposes, inter alia, of acquiring radium and distributing it and its emanations to qualified physicians for use in their treatment of cancer; that the defendant has accordingly acquired a supply of radium ample for these purposes; that the plaintiff is a qualified physician and is entitled to supplies of that radium, and in fact did so get supplies until January, 1938, but that since that date he has been wrongfully and unfairly refused supplies by the defendant; and that he has thereby been greatly injured in his professional practice, reputation and income. He asks for damages and other relief~
chiefly a mandamus to compel the defendant to place his name on the list of physicians to whom it will supply radium needed for treatment of patients.

 3 The defendant takes the position that it has discretion and right to supply or withhold its radium; that in discontinuing supplies to plaintiff it acted in good faith and in its honest belief that the plaintiff is not qualified to use radium It maintains it cannot be compelled by mandamus to meet plaintiffs demands, but that the most the Court can do is to direct the defendant to reconsider the plaintiffs application

 4 Admittedly, the plaintiffs rights, if any, are not founded upon any contract with the defendant, nor upon any proprietary interest in the radium In so far as they exist, his rights are to be found in some statutory duty owing to him by the defendant by reason of the provisions of the Cancer Relief Act, 1930 (Man.), c. 1, as amended by c. 5 of  l936. 5

Before proceeding to deal with this case upon its ''merits,1I I feel that I must point out, as I did in the early stages of the trial that the defendant seems to have no corporate existence whatever. If this semblance of unreality proves to be the fact, the difficulties of disposing of this action satisfactorily will be greatly increased. At the request of counsel for both parties, the trial proceeded subject to this uncertainty. But the difficulties must now be met. 6 Section 2 of the Cancer Relief Act, 1930, reads: 'There is hereby created a corporation to be called 'The Cancer Relief and Research Institute' (hereinafter called 'the Institute'). The Institute shall be a body corporate and politic, and have perpetual succession, with a corporate seal and may sue and be sued, plead and be imp leaded in all Courts whatsoever. II

7 Nothing more is to be found in the Act respecting the creation or the constitution of the Institute. No corporation or members are named or indicated. Unlike other corporations, this Institute is not composed of any constituent elements. Objects, purposes and powers are ascribed to it, but even those do not include power to appoint any governing or managing body of trustees or directors, nor officers, agents or servants. It seems to be nothing more than a name. In itself of itself and by itself it is utterly powerless and helpless.

 8 But the Act sets up an independent body to manage and conduct the affairs of the Institute. Section 3 provides that: 'The Institute shall be governed and managed by a Board of Trustees (hereinafter called 'the Board');11 and s. 8 adds: 'The property, business and affairs of the Institute shall be under the charge, control and management of the Board. II

 9 The powers of this Board are wide enough to enable it to do practically anything that falls within the objects and purposes of the Institute. But the Board is entirely separate and distinct from the Institute. Its member trustees are all to be appointed and have always been appointed by designated authorities and organizations that are wholly unrelated to the Institute. So that this manager of the Institute's affairs is in no way answerable to the Institute for its membership, term of office, duties, or responsibilities.

10 In this set up, it might be thought that the Board is in effect the Institute. I would gladly so treat it, if the Act permitted, but the Act precludes this course. It might also be considered that the Board should be added as a party defendant--at least alternatively--but although I suggested that course to counsel the suggestion was respectfully declined. I am therefore driven to examine furher into the status of the Institute to see how far it can be affected by any judgment or order that might be pronounced in this case; and how far, if at all such judgment or order might bind the Board or its members, none of whom are parties to these proceedings.

11 This inquiry is necessary because of the nature of the judgment the plaintiff seeks. It is not merely declaratory--it is mainly mandatory. But if there is no real commandable defendant before the Court, such a judgment, even if granted, would be of less effect even than "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." That would be so unless the Board, of its own accord, would choose to honour the judgment in the name of the Institute. I do not think that the Board could be compelled in this action to obey an order directed against the Institute.

s 12 The Institute, by the Act, is said to be " ... created a corporation ... a body corporate and politic." (s. 2) It is therefore a corporation or nothing. What is a corporation? According to our system of law, a corporation is a group or series of persons which by a legal fiction is regarded and treated as a person itself It is a legal entity composed of persons. In law "a person" is any being that is capable of having rights and duties, and is confined to that. Persons are of two classes only --natural persons and legal persons. A natural person is a human being that has the capacity for rights or duties. A legal person is anything to which the law gives a legal or fictitious existence and personality, with capacity for rights and duties. The only legal person known to our law is the corporation--the body corporate.

13 There are other groups or associations of natural persons which the statute law recognizes, and endows with some personality and some rights or duties, such as registered trade unions, but these are not corporations. In any event they are composed of persons.

14 It must follow that there can be no corporation, that is no legal person, unless and until there is first a group or series of natural persons to compose or constitute the corporation, because although later corporations may be formed of existing corporations, these component corporations in the first instance must consist exclusively of natural persons.

15 Authority for these propositions maybe found in Sahond on Jurisprudence, 9th ed., pp. 416-435; 8 Hals. (2nd ed.), especially at pp. 1-4, and 18-23; and Dillon on Corporations, 5th ed., c. 2; and many others.

16 This Institute is composed of nothing. It is based on nothing. It is nothing. While we must concede to the Legislature of this Province great powers in creating corporations in certain fields, it can exercise its creative powers only upon material out of which corporations can be made. Without such material it cannot create a corporation. It may, like the poet, "give to airy nothing a local habitation and a name," but it cannot give to nothingness a corporate personality with corporate powers. It cannot do the impossible. The purported creation of the Institute is merely an attempt at the impossible.

17 And I may add that this Cancer Relief Act is the only provincial Act that can be found in which this sort of incorporation is attempted. In every other Act creating a corporation or board or commission or institute--and I have examined scores of them--the body so created is expressly declared to "consist of' or to be "composed of' persons. The attempt in this instance would seem to be due less to delberate design than to some oversight.

18 But the Act declares, in said s. 2, that the ''Institute'' may "be sued ... and be impleaded." If that is so, any such suit can be brought home to the Institute only through its Board of Trustees. And that is what has taken place, at least in form The Board has accepted service of the statement of claim, has filed a statement of defence in the name of the Institute, and has stoutly defended the action.

19 Does that mean that the Board would be obligated to satisfy any judgment that might be obtained in this action against the Institute, for instance to obey a mandamus issued against the Institute; and would the members of the Board be individually liable for contempt if they disregarded such a mandamus? Could they be so liable when they are not named as defendants? To answer these questions in the affirmative would seem strange doctrine.

 20 However that is a responsibility that counsel have assumed. Having expressed my views on these teclmical aspects ofthis case, I shall now, in compliance with, counsel's request, deal with the case on its "merits."

21 The objects of the Institute are:
 "(a) To take such steps as may be considered advisable by the Board for the relief or cure of cancer in the Province of Manitoba.
(b) To endeavor to secure for use in the Province of Manitoba an adequate supply of radium, and to erect and operate a radium emanation plant, in the Physics Department of the University and such other plants and apparatus as may be considered advisable, with the hope of making radium available for the treatment of cancer for all citizens of Manitoba who may require it, and to assist hospitals, institutions and -registered medical practitioners in private practice in providing adequate treatment for any of their patients having or suspected of having a malignant disease.
( c) To assist in establishing and operating a clinic or clinics in hospitals or institutions for the examination and diagnosis and/or treatment of persons in the Province of Manitoba afflicted or suspected of being afflicted with cancer. "
( d) To adopt such measures as may be deemed requisite for informing the public generally as to the treatment of and care for persons afflicted with cancer, and to adopt such measures as may be deemed requisite for preventing or minimizing the development or spread of the disease in the Province. "
( e) To disseminate information in such manner and form as may be found best adapted to aid in the control and successful treatment of cancer. "
(f) To issue from time to time such reports, statistics, circulars and other publications as may be deemed advisable. "
(g) To correlate and co-ordinate by voluntary means all agencies in the Province which may have like objects or purposes in view."

22 The Board is empowered to ''make by-laws, rules or regulations" under s. 9, relating to, "
(a)The appointment, functions, duties and removal of all agents, officers and servants of the Institute and their remuneration
 "(b) The time and place of the calling and holding of meetings, regular and special~ of the Board, the quorum, and the procedure in all things at such meetings.
"(c) The conduct in all other particulars of the affairs of the Institute.

" 23 Under s. 15: 'The Board shall have power from time to time to make rules and regulations governing the use and issue of radium, the property of the Board, but shall have no control over any radium which is not the property of the Board, and without restricting the generality of the foregoing such rules and regulations shall provide for the following matters:
 "(1) That no one in the Province of Manitoba shall be deprived of the benefit of  radium treatment through inability to pay.
 "(2) For those who can afford to pay, a reasonable charge will be made to be determined by the Board.
 "(3) That the use and issue ofradium or its emanations should be confined to regularly licensed competent physicians, or institutions who have made a thorough study of its therapuetic value, as well as its dangers.
 "(4) That if the Institute have a sufficient supply of radium it may make radium emanations available for residents of the adjacent provinces at a price to be determined by the Board.

" 24 Soon after the Board was established, a quantity ofradium was purchased by the Board in the name of the Institute, and was paid fur by money borrowed on a $100,000 bond issued by the Board in the name of the Institute and guaranteed as to principal and interest by the Government of Manitoba. Over this radium the Board exerts the only control to which the radium is subject. The Board has no radium of its own. There is no other radium supply in Manitoba, nor nearer than the City of Chicago, U.S.A.

25 About 1930 the Board drew up a ''list'' of the names of 31 physicians to whom the Board thereafter upon application issued radium and its emanations for several years. The plaintiff was on that list. He applied for and received radium and its emanations on many occasions. His qualifications were never questioned.

26 Under the 1936 Act a new Board was set up to replace the former Board. This new Board cancelled the "list," and invited the medical profession to apply to be placed on a new list. Of the 31 physicians on the old list, 20 applied to be placed on the new list. The plaintiffwas among these applicants, but his application and one other were rejected. Four physicians who had not been on the old list also applied, but all four were rejected.

27 The plaintiff says that the treatment committee of the Board refused his application, and the Board confirmed that refusal without giving him any fair chance to be heard in support of his application; that members of the committee and Board did not fairly or fully investigate his qualifications, and wrongfully rejected his application to be placed on the new ''list.'' The defence is a denial of wrong doing, and a justification of the rejection.

28 The great purpose or ''hope'' of the Act is to make "radium available for all citizens of Manitoba who may require it." To that end the Institute and the Board are "to assist .. . registered medical practitioners in private practice in providing adequate treatment" for those citizens.

 29 Citizens who are patients of plaintiff; and who may require radium treatment, are among the beneficiaries of the Act. They have a right to the radium and are not to ''be deprived of the benefit:" s. 15(1). The Board is therefore in the position of trustee of this radiun Not only was the acquisition ofthe radium made possible by the use of provincial credit, but the costs of operation and maintenance are borne chiefly by donations or grants from the provincial treasury, and from certain quasi-public charities. The very name ''Board of Trustees" indicates a trust. The duty of the Board is, inter alia, to issue radium to patients who may require it, and to do so not directly but through physicians. The Board must recognize each patient's right to select his own physician, and cannot interfere in the choice. If plaintiff is so chosen, the Board's duty is "to assist" him "in providing adequate treatment." The Board is not placed in any position of arbitrary power, or even discretionary power. Their duty is to assist practitioners--not to hamper them Practitioners are to point the way; the Board is to follow.

30 The only qualification or limitation upon this duty is that the Board should confine the use and issue of radium and its emanations '~o regularly licensed competent physicians ... who have made a thorough study" of radium (s. 15(3)). In ascertaining what physicians qualify under this heading, competency is a fact to be established in the ordinary way, by evidence. In other words, the inquiry into competency should be conducted along judicial lines, fairly and fully; the physician concerned should be invited to establish his competency, ifit is doubted, and should be given opportunity to meet opposing evidence and argument. The same procedure should be followed in respect of the study qualification of physicians.

 31 From the evidence before me, I am satisfied that, however sincere the members of the Board may have been in their motives and intentions, they did not conduct a fair, adequate inquiry into plaintiffs qualifications. The evidence, upon which they chiefly relied, consisted of case records of plaintiffs cancer cases. These were interpreted adversely to plaintiff although plaintiff was not afforded adequate opportunity to explain them, nor to support them The omissions and errors said to be disclosed in these records are, in the opinion of plaintiffs expert testimony, of trivial or discretionary or speculative importance only. If so, this view might have been presented on plaintiffs behalf It was not.

 32 The opinion of members of the treatment committee and of the Board was greatly influenced by the views expressed by the then Registrar of the Institute, formed upon those records. The Registrar declares that he was guided to his conclusion by the view that no one but surgeons are or can be qualified to administer radium, and that from these records he is satisfied that plaintiff is not a competent surgeon. This conclusion, as might be expected, is contradicted by plaintiff; who holds himself out as a specialist in surgery. But whether plaintiff is a competent surgeon or not, and whether the Registrar's view is sound or not, no such principle or guide is laid down in the Act. The radium is for competent physicians, and no other standard can be justified under the Act.

 33 On the point of special "study," the treatment committee decided that in dealing with plaintiffs application it was necessary to go behind his academic degrees and diplomas, and to ascertain the content of the courses of training and study which the plaintiff had followed in the University of Toronto. We are told that if this inquiry disclosed a satisfactory course of study, the plaintiffs application would be granted and he would be placed on the new "list." For various reasons this inquiry was in fact never pursued, and yet plaintiffs application was rejected.

 34 In saying what I have said about the method or procedure of dealing with plaintiffs application, I express no opinion on the question of plaintiffs competency or study qualifications, but I cannot but remark that plaintiff did not receive at the hands of the Board, or of committees of the Board, that fair, open, impartial treatment, to which he was entitled. He was and is "a registered medical practitioner," "a regularly licensed" physician whose general competency has not been challenged except in connection with his radium application. His "study" qualifications should be examined more fully and fairly before he js denied the benefit of radium under this Act.

35 In view of what I already said, the defendant Institute is not such a thing as can be reached directly by mandamus, and as the Board is not a party defendant in the action it cannot directly be affected by any judgment in this action. The only hope then js that the Board may adopt the suggestion implied as contained in the foregoing discussion and reconsider the plaintiffs application upon its merits, along the lines that I have indicated. The plaintiffs right to any other relief is not established.

The plaintiff should have costs of this action.

Monday, March 25, 2019

The Goods on the Oath of Allegiance

BP-241E

OATHS OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE
CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

Prepared by:
James R. Robertson
Law and Government Division
October 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE CONSTITUTION
OATHS AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO TAKE THE OATH
BREACH OF AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
CASES INVOLVING OTHER LEGISLATURES
CASES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
WHAT CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OR BREACH OF THE OATH?
CONCLUSIONS


OATHS OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE
CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS
INTRODUCTION
Questions have recently arisen with respect to the oath of allegiance that is required to be taken by all parliamentarians. Two basic issues are involved. First, is it necessary to take the oath, and what are the consequences of a failure or refusal to do so? Second, what are the consequences of an alleged violation or breach of the oath, and how is the validity of such an allegation established?
This paper will discuss the main issues surrounding the oath of allegiance. It will review relevant precedents in Canada and Great Britain and some of the arguments that may be raised.
Section 128 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides as follows:
Every member of the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada shall before taking his Seat therein take and subscribe before the Governor General or some Person authorized by him, and every Member of a Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly of any Province shall before the Lieutenant Governor of the Province or some Person authorized by him, the Oath of Allegiance contained in the Fifth Schedule to this Act; …
The oath set out in the Fifth Schedule reads as follows:
I, A.B. do swear, That I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria.
Note. The name of the King or Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the Time being is to be substituted from Time to Time, with Proper Terms of Reference thereto.
As can be seen, the oath is one of allegiance to the monarch, not to Canada or the Canadian Constitution.
The Canadian oath of allegiance derives from that used in the British Parliament, where the requirement for such an oath arose from the political and religious conflicts of the sixteenth century. The original purpose of the oath was to assert the primacy of the British sovereign over all matters, both ecclesiastical and temporal; as such, it was primarily directed at preventing Catholics from holding public office. (Other religious denominations were also affected incidentally, until the reforms of the nineteenth century.)
Since 1905, Members of Parliament have been allowed to "solemnly, sincerely and truly affirm" that, though they could not take the oath, they were still loyal to the Monarch.(1) The wording of the affirmation as it stands today is as follows:
I, ……………., do solemnly, sincerely and truly affirm and declare the taking of an oath is according to my religious belief unlawful, and I do also solemnly, sincerely and truly affirm and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second.
Section 128 of the Constitution Act, 1867 means that only those Members who have taken and subscribed to the oath are allowed to take their sears in the House of Commons. After the Chief Electoral Officer has provided a certificate listing Members returned to serve in Parliament, the Clerk of the House, or any designated Commissioner, administers the oath of allegiance to these Members. According to the Sixth Edition of Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada,
It is not the Oath that makes a person a Member of the House. The person must be a Member before being sworn in. Unless first duly elected under the terms of the Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, one cannot take the Oath. The object of the Oath is to allow the Member to sit in the House. In accordance with this interpretation of the law, Members-elect, as soon as their election is reported to the Clerk by the Chief Electoral Officer, may receive such requisites as are necessary for the performance of their public duties. But if, for some reason or other, a Member were precluded from taking the Oath and sitting in the House, the person would be deprived of any such allowances.(2)
This interpretation is consistent with that found in the Twenty-first Edition of Erskine May, which indicates that a Member who has not taken his or her oath may not sit and vote in the House, but is entitled to all the other privileges of a Member, except the salary, "being regarded, both by the House and by the law, as qualified to serve, until some other disqualification has been shown to exist."(3) Indeed, in exceptional circumstances, Members of the British House of Commons who have not taken the oath have been nominated to and have served on committees.
The provisions of the Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1, also support this position. In Part IV of the Act, which deals with Remuneration of Members of Parliament, section 55(2) provides:
For the purpose of this section, … a person shall be deemed to have become a member of the House of Commons on the day last fixed for the election of a member of the House of Commons for the electoral district represented by the person.
In 1875, a problem arose when a Member of the Canadian House of Commons failed to take the required oath of allegiance before assuming his seat. The matter was referred to the Select Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections, which tabled its report on 8 March 1875. The Committee noted that the Constitution provided no direct forfeiture or penalty for an omission to take the prescribed oath, and neither did any other statute. The report concluded:
Your Committee are therefore of opinion that the seat of Mr. Orton, the member of Centre Wellington, is not affected by his having sat and voted in Your Honourable House before he took the Oath provided, as aforesaid.
Your Committee is further of opinion that the votes of Mr. Orton, before he took the prescribed Oath, should be struck out of the Division List and Journals of Your Honourable House, as he had no right to sit and vote until he had taken that Oath.(4)
Thus, the votes cast by the Member-elect before taking the oath were not recognized, despite his valid election, but he was not disqualified or expelled. It is unclear why Mr. Orton failed to take the oath; it would seem to have been more inadvertent than intentional; furthermore, it would seem that he rectified the situation by taking the oath as soon as the omission was brought to his attention.
In the 1880s, there was a series of court decisions in Great Britain involving a Mr. Bradlaugh and his reluctant to take an oath of allegiance. Various changes to the British form of the oath had been made during the course of the nineteenth century so as to remove objections to it by various groups, such as the Quakers, who objected on religious grounds to any form of oath. These people were expressly exempted by various statutes and permitted to make an affirmation in terms prescribed. A difficulty remained, however, for persons who had no religious belief, and who, therefore, objected to an oath as having no meaning for them.
On being elected to the British House of Commons in 1880, Mr. Bradlaugh, being an atheist, demanded to be allowed to affirm, as he was allowed to do in judicial proceedings, instead of taking an oath. The House permitted him to do this. Litigation ensued, however, on the basis that Mr. Bradlaugh ought to have been required to take the oath, and his not having done so invalidated his votes. The House of Lords eventually held that he was not entitled to make an affirmation in lieu of an oath.(5) Though Mr. Bradlaugh then endeavoured to take the oath, the House resolved that he should not be allowed to do so, presumably because, as an atheist, he would not consider himself bound by it. The courts refused to declare that he was entitled to take the oath.(6) Subsequently, the Court of Appeal decided that Mr. Bradlaugh’s lack of religious belief made it impossible for him to satisfy the requirements of the Act even if he had taken the oath in due form.
In 1886, however, Mr. Bradlaugh did take the oath, along with other Members elected to the new Parliament. The Speaker refused to intervene, saying that he had no authority to prevent a Member from taking the oath: "The honourable member," he said, "takes the oath under whatever risks may attach to him in a court of law."(7) As one commentator wrote:
Mr. Bradlaugh therefore sat and voted subject always to the risk that the law officers of the Crown might proceed against him for penalties incurred and prove to the satisfaction of a jury that having no religious belief he had not taken the oath within the meaning of the Parliamentary Oaths Act.(8)
Two years later, in 1888, the law was changed so as to enable anyone to make an affirmation in lieu of an oath. The Bradlaugh case, while more directly concerned with affirmations than with oaths, also illustrates the need to make an oath or solemn declaration, as well as the extent and limits of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny or review of oaths.
There do not appear to have been any cases of Members of the Canadian House of Commons or the Senate refusing to take the oath of allegiance. It seems clear that a Member who refused to take the oath or make a solemn declaration would not be able to take his or her seat, or draw sessional indemnity. Although various individuals have been elected to the Canadian House of Commons who might have been reluctant to take the oath on various grounds, none of them appears to have neglected to do so or to have refused to swear it or make a solemn declaration.
Failure to take the oath of allegiance is one matter. Breaking an oath is another. According to an early edition of Beauchesne:
Should a member violate his oath he would be amenable to the penalty of not being allowed to sit in the House of Commons. He may be suspended from taking part in the sittings while still remaining a member of Parliament, or, in a case of extreme gravity, a Bill might be passed to annul his election. It may happen, when a state of war exists, that a member of Parliament makes, either outside or on the floor of the House, statements detrimental to Canada and favourable to the enemy. This would be in violation of this oath because allegiance to the King means allegiance to the Country, and the offence would be liable to punishment by the house. The power of dealing with treason is inherent in the Parliament of every country.(9)
Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia was one of the first opponents of Confederation, and led the anti-confederate forces in that province. He was elected to the first House of Commons in 1867. One historian has written:
Despite Howe’s threats in his private letters to England, he assured Major General Hastings Doyle, who was soon to replace Williams as governor, that he would use only constitutional methods to gain repeal. Howe, thus, intended to obey the law of the land, a law which included the act of union. He was not only prepared to take his seat in the Canadian Parliament but he also borrowed $1,000 from W.J. Stairs to enable him to make the trip to Ottawa.(10)
The anti-confederate forces in Nova Scotia argued that attendance at the federal Parliament and the acceptance of seats in the House of Commons would constitute acceptance of the union, and acquiescence in Confederation. Nevertheless, Howe was sworn and took his seat in the House of Commons. The federal Members from Nova Scotia attended the first session of the federal Parliament and remained in Ottawa in spite of the growing insistence in Nova Scotia that they leave. In his first speech in the House of Commons, Howe upheld the right of the anti-confederates to agitate against "a mere act of parliament," but John A. Macdonald noticed that Howe did not pledge himself to agitate. Howe spoke frequently in the House, but, aware of criticism in Nova Scotia, remained apart from the Government and the Opposition. He said that he intended to "…maintain an independent attitude as an anticonfederate, asking nothing and accepting nothing till [the British] Parliament decides for or against us, and then will be governed by circumstances, after full consultation with our friends."(11) In addition to favouring repeal of the act of union, the British North America Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867), Howe also suggested that the tie with Great Britain be re-considered, a rather revolutionary sentiment at the time.
A few years later, Louis Riel was elected to the House of Commons for the riding of Provencher, first in a by-election in 1873, and then in a general election in 1874. Following his 1874 victory, Riel, who was avoiding arrest, travelled to Hull. On 30 March 1874, he crossed the Ottawa River with another Member-elect, Romuald Fiset, and went to the House of Commons to sign the Members’ register and take the oath of office. Having done so, he immediately fled back to Hull before he could be arrested. It appears that the Clerk of the House, who administered the oath, did not recognize Riel, and did not realize who he was until he had left.(12)
Riel was legally elected, sworn and had his name entered on the rolls, but he did not attempt to exercise any of his privileges as a Member.(13) The House of Commons ordered him to appear in the House, which he could not do for fear of arrest, so, after a heated debate, he was expelled for failure to comply with the order. In any event, there appears to have been no question of his refusing to take the oath, nor were there allegations that he had breached it.
In 1942, during World War II, the Bloc populaire was formed in response to the introduction of conscription; by 1944 it had four Members. In the 1945 general election, only two members of the Bloc populaire were elected. There is no indication that the oath of allegiance was or became an issue in relation to them.
It was also in the 1940s that Fred Rose was elected to the House of Commons. One writer has noted that "as Mr. Rose was subsequently convicted in the spy trails of 1946, it would be difficult to say whether his acceptance of the oath of allegiance established a precedent of any significance."(14) Rose was expelled by the House after his conviction, although this was not done on the basis that he had breached his oath of allegiance.
Were a Member to be found to have breached his or her oath of allegiance, the House of Commons could impose punishment. The Canadian House of Commons has from the beginning reserved the right to refuse to let a Member take his or her seat, and to discipline or expel any of its Members. Properly speaking, this right involves the privileges of the House and its Members, and the House’s inherent ability to manage its own affairs, rather than qualifications for membership. There is ample precedent for this practice in Canada, and in other parliamentary systems. Before Confederation, expulsions were effected in Canada in 1800, 1829, 1831, and 1858. Members have frequently challenged the right of other Members to sit and vote. In addition to the expulsion of Louis Riel, there have been a number of serious investigations with respect to the propriety of allowing certain Members to remain in office. Most of these cases involved allegations of criminal activity, although one writer has noted “the readiness of the House to disqualify or expel, even though no statute may have been violated — and provided, perhaps, that party lines could stand the strain."(15)
Although actual rejection of an elected Member by the House is rare, the House of Commons expelled Louis Riel twice in 1874-75, Thomas McGreevy in 1891, and Fred Rose in 1947. In two of these cases, the House did not pass a formal motion of expulsion: in Riel’s second expulsion, the House merely observed that he appeared to have "been adjudged an outlaw for felony," and was, therefore, disqualified; Rose was found to be "incapable of sitting or voting in this House" when he was sent to jail.(16) In none of these cases — even that of Rose, who was convicted of treason — did the issue arise of whether the individual concerned had breached his oath of allegiance.
Members of provincial legislatures and assemblies are required by section 128 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to take the same oath as federal Members of Parliament.
Individuals advocating various forms of separation have been elected to provincial legislatures in Canada. For example, in the wake of Confederation, the anti-confederates gained control of the provincial legislature in Nova Scotia, and eventually formed the government. There is no evidence that any problem or issue arose over their taking the oath of allegiance.
The most recent and dramatic case involves the 1976 election of the Parti Québécois in Quebec. According to one press report, members of the Parti Québécois, faced with the necessity of taking the oath, resolved it by "crossing their fingers" while doing so.(17) Another explanation is that the oath was seen as an oath to the Queen in right of the province, since the Crown in Canada is divisible. As such, the Queen represents the state (or the province), and is a symbol rather than an identifiable individual.
Since 1982, members of Quebec’s National Assembly have been required to take a second oath. Section 15 of the National Assembly Act. R.S.Q., A-23.1, provides: "No member may sit in the Assembly before taking the oath or solemn declaration provided in Schedule I." Schedule I sets out the following oath or affirmation:
I, (full name of the Member), swear (or solemnly affirm) that I will be loyal to the people of Québec and that I will perform the duties of Member honestly and justly in conformity with the constitution of Québec.
According to the Members’ Manual of the National Assembly:
Writers on parliamentary law (Beauchesne, 4th ed) state that the oath of allegiance to the Queen required by section 128 of the British North America Act refers to allegiance to the country, while the oath required by section 15 of the National Assembly Act is an oath of allegiance to the people and Constitution of Quebec.(18)
[unofficial translation]
This distinction between the two oaths, and description of the constitutionally required oath, presumably enables Members to take the oaths who might otherwise object to doing so.
There have been cases where "separatist" parties and individuals have been elected to legislatures in other countries. Again, few specific examples have been found of the failure or refusal to take an oath of allegiance or of allegations that a Member violated or breached such an oath.
In Great Britain, members of Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties have been elected to the British House of Commons. Such individuals have often advocated devolution, and other forms of political restructuring. As they would not necessarily have opposed the continuation of the monarchy, however, they would probably have had no great difficulties in swearing an oath of allegiance to the Crown.
More problematic is the case of Irish Catholic members of the British Parliament who advocate unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Members of Sein Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and others, would presumably be reluctant to pledge allegiance to a British monarch. No cases have been found, however, where a duly elected Member did not take the oath, or was alleged to be in violation of it.
There were problems, however, before the establishment of the Republic of Ireland, when Members of the British Parliament representing constituencies in what was known as the Irish Free State (1921-37) and Eire (1937-49) were constitutionally required to take an oath of allegiance to the British Crown.(19)
Similarly, as various former colonies in the British Empire gained their independence, no doubt legislators were elected who advocated independence, separation, a break from Britain, and other policies that were not necessarily consistent with the oath of allegiance. Even so, the issue does not appear to have arisen in any significant way.
In 1920, the Australian House of Representatives expelled one of its Members, Hugh Mahon, for:
Having, by serious and disloyal utterances at a public meeting … been guilty of conduct unfitting him to remain a Member of this House and inconsistent with the oath of allegiance which he has taken as a Member of this House … .(20)
This is virtually the only case found where a legislator lost his or her seat for violating an oath of allegiance. Even this case seems to have been based on political and personal grounds as much as anything else.
There do not appear to be any cases to illustrate what would constitute a betrayal of the oath of allegiance. The taking of an oath or indeed an affirmation is essentially a question of morality. It is generally believed that people do not take the oath or affirmation lightly, and will consider themselves bound by it. If the person taking the oath lies, on one level that is a matter between that person and his or her conscience or God. At the same time, just as witnesses lie in court, despite having been sworn to tell the truth, people do on occasion break their oaths. Moreover, in the present, less religious era, it is likely that many people are not as intimidated by oaths as was previously the case.
When an oath is broken, penalties are usually imposed. For example, witnesses who lie in court can be charged with perjury or held in contempt of court. It is up to the legislature to punish such contraventions by legislators. Punishment can consist of a motion of censure, or, in the most severe cases, expulsion of the individual.
There can be significant difficulties in establishing whether politicians have broken an oath. Perhaps this would be easy to do in a clear case of treason, but in most other cases it would depend, in part, on how one saw or interpreted the oath, and one’s definition of allegiance or loyalty.
Some see the oath not as one of allegiance to the Queen as an individual so much as one of allegiance to the Crown as a symbol. The Queen can be seen as representing or symbolizing the state, either nationally or provincially, or as the embodiment of a democratic and constitutional form of government.
It is extremely difficult to define what activities would be considered to be a breach of the oath of allegiance. Would the test be objective or subjective? While an individual might feel honestly and sincerely that his or her actions did not breach the oath, others might disagree. Moreover, if the oath is considered to be to the Queen as representative or symbolic of a parliamentary and democratic system, one is arguably remaining faithful to it so long as one does not advocate a violent overthrow of the government.
In a courtroom setting, it may be a relatively simple matter to determine whether someone has told the truth in sworn testimony. In considering concepts like "allegiance," though, determination of a breach is much more difficult. What one person considers to be in the best interests of the country may not seem to be so to other people. An individual may honestly believe that a communist form of government would be good for the people: would this belief be contrary to his or her oath of allegiance? Does how the person goes about achieving the goal make a difference? One person’s idea of loyalty to Canada may not be someone else’s but so long as the objective is pursued by legal, democratic and parliamentary means, it might be argued that the person has not violated the oath of allegiance.
A distinction could also be drawn between those who seek a new constitutional arrangement and those who seek the break-up of the country. Again, by representing certain views of their constituents, Members could be perceived as being themselves at variance with the "national interest." Similarly, even the break-up of the country may not in itself constitute a violation of the oath: the oath is to the Queen, and the Queen could remain the head of any new state that resulted (this would seem to be the policy of the Scottish Nationalist Party in Great Britain).
On 1 November 1990, the Speaker said "Your Speaker is not empowered to make a judgement on the circumstances or the sincerity with which a duly elected Member takes the oath of allegiance. The significance of the oath to each Member is a matter of conscience and so it must remain."(21) He went on to remind the House that:
the fact that an Honourable Member holds views which are vigorously opposed by other Honourable Members can in no sense be allowed to detract from his right to present them.
A historical perspective on Parliament here in Canada and in Great Britain reveals ample precedent for the presence in the House of duly elected Members whose ultimate goal may be at odds with, even inimical to, the constitutional status quo.
Only the House can examine the conduct of its Members and only the House can take action if it decides action is required. Should the House decide that an Honourable Member has in some way committed a contempt, then it is for the House to take appropriate steps.(22)
It is important to understand the purpose of oaths of allegiance. Persons who are elected or appointed to public office are expected to be loyal and faithful. They are assuming positions of public trust, and the oath of allegiance is a pledge that they will conduct themselves "patriotically," and in the best interests of the country. The oath also serves to remind the individual taking it of the serious obligations and responsibilities that he or she is assuming. There is no magic about oaths, but they do serve an important symbolic function.
Various forms of oaths are possible. An oath of allegiance to the head of state is the one adopted in Canada and most Commonwealth countries. Oaths of allegiance to the country, to the people, or to the country’s constitution are also used in various countries. The Dutch have added a requirement that the individual take an oath or affirmation that he or she is not under any obligation to any other person. Variations of these oaths are possible, for example, an oath in favour of democratic traditions. To some extent, the choice of subject matter for oaths depends on the values of the society, and the things seen as the cornerstones of the country’s political system.
The Crown was important in terms of the historical development of the United Kingdom. In the context of the religious battles between Catholics and Protestant, and the debate over religious leadership, the requirement for an oath of allegiance to the monarch is understandable. When the Canadian Constitution was being drafted, the British tradition was imported. As Canada gradually acquired full independence, culminating in the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, the nature of the oath required of legislators in Canada could have been reviewed. Since the Queen is still the head of state of Canada, an oath of allegiance to her is still relevant. The monarchy, however, is not as central to the Canadian political system as it once was; indeed, many Canadians question the concept of a monarch, particularly one who, living in another country, is perceived as "foreign." Others see the Crown as a vestige of the colonial or imperial past. At the same time, however, the oath does not involve the Queen in her personal capacity, but rather the Queen as the symbol or personification of the country, its constitution and traditions, including concepts such as democracy.
Failure to take the oath of allegiance constitutes an absolute bar to sitting or voting in Parliament or the provincial legislatures of Canada. The only way to change this would be to amend the Canadian Constitution. It is not entirely clear whether this could be done under the general amending formula (through resolutions of Parliament and of the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the provinces having at least fifty per cent of the population) or whether it would require unanimity. (One could argue that a single legislature could by itself amend the oath required of its own Members, but any action based on such a premise would probably be challenged.)
There is, however, no penalty for a Member’s failure to take an oath, other than his or her inability to sit or vote or to draw a salary. Presumably, the House of Commons could expel anyone who consistently refused to take the oath, or even declare the seat vacant. Such an act, however, would probably be challenged under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Once a Member has taken the oath of allegiance, thus becoming entitled to take a seat and vote in the House, the only issue that could arise would be whether the Member violated or breached the oath. The House of Commons has the power to expel or otherwise discipline Members who contravene the oath. There do not appear to be any precedents for use of this power, however, and, given the general vagueness of the concept, considerable difficulties would seem to lie in the way of establishing the validity of allegations of contravention. Ultimately, the matter would probably have to be resolved politically, although the Charter of Rights and Freedoms might be relevant in appropriate circumstances.


(1) Arthur Beauchesne, Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, Fourth Edition, The Carswell Company Limited, Toronto,1958, at citation 15, p. 13. This was apparently done by Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet of 15 June 1905. The question arises as to how a Royal Instruction can legally amend a constitutional provision; it does not appear that this issue has been addressed. According to later editions of Beauchesne’s (see, for example, Sixth Edition, 1989, citation 243), the Oaths of Allegiance Act, R.S.C 1985, c. 0-1, permits Members who object to being sworn to make a solemn affirmation if the taking of an oath is contrary to their religious belief, or if they have no religious belief. This, however, does not appear to be correct, as a federal statute cannot override a constitutional provision.
(2) Alistair Fraser, W.F. Dawson, and John A. Holtby, Beauchesne’s Rules & Forms o f the House of Commons of Canada, Sixth Edition, the Carswell Company Limited, Toronto, 1989, citation 242(2), p. 68.
(3) C.J. Boulton, ed., Erksine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, Twenty-first Edition, Butterworths, London, 1989, at p. 231.
(4) House of Commons, Journals 1875, at p. 176.
(5) Clark v. Bradlaugh, (1882-83), 8 App. Ca. 354 (H.L.), on appeal from (1880-81), 7 Q.B.D. (C.A.)
(6) Attorney-General v. Bradlaugh (1884-85), 14 Q.B.D. 667.
(7) Quoted in Sir William R. Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, Fourth Edition, Reissue Revised, Oxford, 1911, Volume I, at p. 93.
(8) Ibid., at p. 93. This text contains a full discussion of the Bradlaugh case, at p. 89-95.
(9) Arthur Beauchesne, Rules & Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, Fourth Edition, the Carswell Company Limited, Toronto, 1958, at citation 16(2), p. 14.
(10) Kenneth George Pryke, "Nova Scotia and Confederation, 1864-1870," Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1962, at p. 147.
(11) Ibid., at p. 152-153. See also J. Murray Beck, Joseph Howe, Volume II, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 1983, at p. 223.
(12) Thomas Flanagan, Louis "David" Riel: "Prophet of the New World," University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1979, at p. 42; William McCartney Davidson, Louis Riel, 1844-1885, The Albertan Publishing Company Ltd., Calgary, 1955, at p. 110; Hartwell Bowsfield, Louis Riel: The Rebel and the Hero, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1971, at p. 70; G.F.G. Stanley, Louis Riel: Patriot or Rebel?, The Canadian Historical Association, Booklet No 2, Ottawa, 1979, at p. 14.
(13) Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1950, at p. 70; see also ibid.
(14) Ibid., p. 79.
(15) Ibid., p. 72.
(16) Norman Ward, Dawson’s The Government of Canada, Sixth Edition, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987, at p. 105. In 1986, the right of the legislature of Nova Scotia to expel a duly elected member who had pleaded guilty to an indictable offence was challenged under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court held that, while the legislature had the power to expel the Member, it could not prevent him from running again.
(17) Charles Lynch, "Bloc Québécois: Members Make Oaths of Office Seem Ridiculous," The Ottawa Citizen, 29 July 1990.
(18) Quebec, National Assembly, Manuel des membres de l’Assemblée nationale, ch. 2.1, 1986, p. 2.
(19) See Donal O’Sullivan, The Irish Free State and its Senate, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1940; J.L McCracken, Representative Government in Ireland, Oxford University Press, London, 1958; Timothy Patrick Coogan, Ireland Since the Rising, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966.
(20) Australia, House of Representatives, Votes and Proceedings (1920-21), p. 431. See also Parliamentary Debates, 1920-21, Vol. SCIV, pp. 6283-6284, 6327-6328, 6382-6475.
(21) House of Commons, Debates, 1 November 1990, p. 14970.
(22) Ibid.

 LEGAL RESEARCH MEMORANDUM                                                                                             Fraud, Breach of Trus...