Friday, September 4, 2009

Human rights tribunal back down to man's right to speech

In terms of Canada's struggle to retain its Constitutional rights as contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, September 2, 2009, may go down in Canadian history as the day that the citizens who believe in freedom of speech finally managed to throw a monkey-wrench into the gears of the Zionist Censorship Juggernaut that has been rolling relentlessly over our rights and freedoms for the past half a century.

At 9:30 EST the Decision in the long-awaited section 13 "hate crimes" complaint Warman v. Lemire finally appeared on the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's website . The gist of the ruling by Tribunal Member Athanasios D. Hadjis respecting the manner in which this controversial law was used in the six year long trial of Marc Lemire for allegedly posting "hate" materials is contained in my Motion to the Tribunal (see below) which I sent off today after receiving word of the Decision.

But lest readers jump to the conclusion that this means the end of this draconian law designed to silence any and all criticism of Israel or political Zionism please be advised that while it is truly a decisive victory in terms of the battle being waged to rid this country of sec. 13(1) it doesn't automatically mean that the war itself has been won.

There are a number of things to bear in mind and the first one and probably the most important one at this point is the fact that this quasi-judicial body, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, whose members are appointed by government, does not have the legislative power to actually nullify this Bolshevik piece of legislation. What Member Hadjis established in his ruling in Warman v. Lemire was that because of all the discrepancies that have surfaced over the years since this nefarious piece of legislation contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act was first given legal status in the Taylor case back in 1990 and then further slipped into the Anti-Terrorism Act in December of 2001 in the aftermath of 911 he couldn't justify finding Mr. Lemire guilty of the vast majority of the alleged crimes that Mr. Warman had accused him of. Rather, Member Hadjis concluded that, "For all the above reasons, [stated in his ruling. Ed.] I find that s. 13(1) infringes on Mr. Lemire’s freedom of expression guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and that this infringement is not demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter."

What this means first and foremost is that the ruling will be appealable by either the federal Attorney General or else by the Complainant Warman or even by those who intervened on behalf of Warman – organizations like B'nai Brith Canada the fine folks who are currently hoping for a conviction in my own case involving Harry Abrams and the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada. The chances are slim though that Warman or B'nai Brith or the Canadian Jewish Congress or even the SimonWeisenthal Center will file an appeal given the circumstances and the gross examples of misconduct that occurred throughout the six year ordeal that Mr. Lemire was subjected to.

Failing an appeal by the AG and considering the fact that Member Hadjis's decision has now set a temporary precedent in terms of additional or future rulings in such cases the general sense is that this ruling could mark the beginning of the end for Canada's highly repugnant and and anti-Democratic "hate crimes" law.

Of course this ruling hasn't deterred Mr. Harry Abrams at all who feels that it has little to do with his case against myself and In a letter to the Tribunal today from Douglas Christie of the Canadian Free Speech League Mr. Christie stated:

"I write to suggest that in view of the decision of Tribunal Member Hadjis in Warman v. Lemire that it is quite unequivocal and obvious now that this matter should not require a further expenditure of time. I am asking that the Tribunal Member in Abrams v. Topham direct that either the complaint be dismissed or a stay of proceedings be established until such time as the Attorney General launches an appeal and that appeal is successful against the ruling of Member Hadjis.
It seems quite clear to me than any further expenditure of time and energy in this matter would be a waste of judicial resources, and I would suggest further an unnecessary burden on those like me who have always upheld the belief that section 13(1) was an unreasonable limit on freedom of expression. I would ask for some immediate direction on this matter."

Mr. Harry Abrams, being Johnny-on-the-spot, quickly replied to Mr. Christie's suggestion of dismissing the case or at least staying it pending the outcome of a possible appeal by stating in part in a letter also to the Tribunal that:

"I disagree with Mr. Christie.

My take is that Section 13 is completely intact, even re-enforced by the decision."

Just what the outcome of Member Hadjis's ruling will be in terms of my own case is still uncertain but considering the various options and the likelihood that the Lemire Decision will have a widespread effect over time I decided to file another Motion to the Tribunal to dismiss this the case against myself and That Motion is posted below. Please, if you can, pass this information along to others.

Shine your Light for Love, Peace & Justice for All,

Arthur Topham
The Radical Press
Canada's Radical News Network
"Digging to the root of the issues since 1998"

Abrams v. Topham Complaint No. : 20071016 MOTION TO DISMISS

September 2, 2009

Nancy Lafontant
Registry Officer
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal

Dear Nancy Lafontant,

RE: Harry Abrams and the League for Human Rights of B’nai Brith Canada v. Arthur Topham and the
File Number: T1360/9008

In light of today’s (September 2, 2009) decision by Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Member Athanasios D. Hadjis in the Warman v. Lemire complaint I, Arthur Topham, Respondent in the above complaint filed by Harry Abrams and the League for Human Rights of B’nai Brith Canada wish to place before the Tribunal yet another motion requesting that this complaint made against myself and my website be forthwith dismissed.

As has been clearly shown in the excerpts below taken from today’s decision and in the V. Conclusion of Mr. Hadjis’s decision of September 2, 2009 the longstanding and controversial questions surrounding the justness of sec. 13 of the CHR Act as it pertains to the Charter have now been given the prominence and due respect they deserve.

Citing the following paragraphs from the September 2, 2009 decision and summing up with V. Conclusion, Member Hadjis determines that:

[279] This question, however, is not what is relevant to the present discussion. The point is that, when assessed against the characteristics of the penalty provisions enumerated in these decisions, it is evident that s. 13(1) has become more penal in nature (irrespective of whether s. 11 Charter rights are necessarily triggered). The provision can no longer be considered exclusively remedial, preventative and conciliatory in nature, which was at the core of the Court’s finding in Taylor that s. 13(1)’s limitation of freedom of expression is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society, and thereby “saved” under s. 1 of the Charter.

[290] In my view, it is clear that Taylor’s confidence that the human rights process under the Act merely serves to prevent discrimination and compensate victims hinged on the absence of any penal provision akin to the one now found at s. 54(1)(c), as well as on the belief that the process itself was not only structured, but actually functioned in as conciliatory a manner as possible. The evidence before me demonstrates that the situation is not as the Court contemplated in both respects. Thus, following the reasoning of Justice Dickson, at 933, one can no longer say that the absence of intent in s. 13(1) “raises no problem of minimal impairment” and “does not impinge so deleteriously upon the s. 2(b) freedom of expression so as to make intolerable” the provision’s existence in a free and democratic society. On this basis, I find that the Oakes minimum impairment test has not been satisfied, and that s. 13(1) goes beyond what can be defended as a reasonable limit on free expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

[295] For all the above reasons, I find that s. 13(1) infringes on Mr. Lemire’s freedom of expression guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and that this infringement is not demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

V. Conclusion:

“However, I have also concluded that s. 13(1) in conjunction with ss. 54(1) and (1.1) are inconsistent with s. 2(b) of the Charter, which guarantees the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression. The restriction imposed by these provisions is not a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter.”Since a formal declaration of invalidity is not a remedy available to the Tribunal (see Cuddy Chicks Ltd. V. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5), I will simply refuse to apply these provisions for the purposes of the complaint against Mr. Lemire and I will not issue any remedial order against him (see Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54 at paras. 26-7).

"Signed by"

Athanasios D. Hadjis

OTTAWA (Ontario)

September 2, 2009”

Given the now indisputable fact that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has officially recognized the inherent discrepancy that exists within the provisions of section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act and those enshrined under s. 2(b) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, I, Arthur Topham, Respondent, must once again assert that it behooves the Tribunal to look upon this case in light of today’s decision and come to the logical and reasonable conclusion that to continue to pursue an outcome would be an egregious example of imposing undue and unjust hardship upon a law-abiding Canadian citizen as well as wasting the financial resources of myself, other individuals, organizations and government.

The serious import and far-reaching repercussions which this decision encompasses are certain to reverberate throughout Canada’s legal institutions as well as the blogosphere and the media in general and, God willing, will eventually precipitate downward and throughout Canadian society bringing with them a renewed and refreshing hope that our longstanding traditions of jursisprudence, established via Natural Law over centuries of sacrifice and struggle will once again take precedent over those of special interest groups.

Such a process of social infusion regarding this enlightened decision is bound to be greeted with great enthusiasm by the vast majority of Canadians who value their right to freedom of speech regardless of the contrary sentiments and protestations of the Complainants in this case who remain adamant that such a threshold in terms of eliminating sec. 13 from the CHR Act is far from determined in today’s decision and yet to be crossed over.

For these reasons and with due respect to all parties concerned I would ask both the Tribunal and the Commission to give their utmost consideration to this motion.
If there is any further formality that you require, please let me know as soon as possible.


Arthur Topham pro se

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