The Uniform Bonding Code – (UBC)
Modern Bonding Practice
With the advent of powerful computers has come the responsibility of analyzing data much more quickly and thoroughly and in terms of the general economic principles of Leontief Input-Output Matrix Analysis. (See Wassily Leontief, Studies in the Structure of the American Economy, and Wassily Leontief, “The World Economy in the Year 2000,” in Scientific American, September 1980. Wassily Leontief was the 1973 Nobel Prize winner in Economics.)
In the modern system of wagering, as applied to insurance and malpractice bonding, several political-legal-economic factors including Legislation, Judication, Execution (enforcement) and the behavior of the general public are treated mathematically as separate industries within the legal system, with the result that these industries can be interrelated b a system of feedback equations and computations, the individual workings and behavior of each industry can be much more closely monitored, and the behavior of the government and public can be predicted and manipulated.
This amounts to the application of feedback computing to reliable gambling on the economic success or outcome of any given statute or legal process. It results in a scientific bonding system, and results in the transfer of the power and authority of government over to the bonding companies where it belongs if governments do not want to behave themselves. (Money talks, bonding controls.)
The Bonding Problem
As human population increases and mutual human tolerance decreases, municipal corporations tend to become less sensitive to individual human needs and tend to become more antisocial toward the public. It has been put crudely that municipal corporations become slaughterhouse operations with law enforcement officers running the sledgehammer department. Judges ignore the rights of the people and legislators generate heaps of laws, without perfecting the ones already existing to make them fit for bonding. Defective statutes and defective legal processes become an invitation for every sort of official malpractice and malfeasance including economic oppression, and the public, in retaliation, begins suing for every injury, putting the heat on the bonding companies.
In order to survive in the commercial marketplace, the smaller bonding companies have had to become more selective and scientific in their bonding practice.
In the past, bonding was based on marketing a bond which covered a broad aggregate of “bondable” objects, acts and persons.
When a large claim was made against a small bonding company, the claim could bankrupt the small company, especially if the company could not collect its corresponding funds from the parent bonding underwriter.
By partitioning the coverage better, and be excluding persons of an antisocial disposition, the claims could be minimized, thus favoring solvency of the bonding company.
In the old aggregate system, an antisocial enforcement officer operating on an unbounded statute using an unbonded enforcement process could create a monstrous civil rights or constitutional claim against the bonding company which was underwriting the general bond on the municipal corporation for which the officer worked. In order to maintain credibility in the bonding marketplace, the bonding company would have to pay off the claim against the bond even though the official act was criminal instead of civil. (Birds of one feather.) If in addition, the municipal corporation was operated by an antisocial office staff, it would tend to support, and retain in employment, the antisocial enforcement officer rather than the more civilized officers on the staff, if for no other reason than because an antisocial officer was more likely to bully the public into dropping malpractice suits and paying revenue into the corporate coffers, and thereby keep the corporate paychecks coming.
When such an antisocial corporation would get sued, as inevitably would happen, the bonding company working under the old system of aggregate bonding, would get ripped to shreds, perhaps even bankrupted. Of course, the injured bonding company would tell the municipal corporation to take its business elsewhere, and the next bonding company, being somewhat more cautious, might refuse to bond the corporation, or ask a larger premium to cover the gambling risk. Ultimately the municipal corporation would not be able to buy a bond due to its “track record” and the consequent high cost of bonding, with the result that the municipal corporation would resort to what is called “self-bonding.”
In the past, the state incorporation laws have required all corporations engaged in business potentially hazardous to the public safety, health and welfare, to be bonded against public accident and the malpractice of their officers, but more recently “self-bonding” has become a state-condoned option extended to municipal corporations to insulate them against prosecution for violation of the general state incorporation laws which demand public hazard licensing and bonding for all corporations. A corporation that is “self-bonded” is a limited corporation (ltd.) with a low ceiling of limited liability. The term, “self-bonded,” is a fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporate liability status. It says in effect that the payment of the commercial debts of the corporation will take second place to the payment of the malpractice obligations of the corporations. Furthermore, “self-bonding” cannot possibly be expected to cover the anti-civil rights and anti-constitutional malpractice potential of today’s modern antisocial municipal corporations. Simply put, “self-bonding” is “no-bonding;” it is corporate limited liability misrepresentation and fraud.
(Bonding is valid only when it is provided by an independent third party money wagering pool with no conflict of interest and no possibility of the bonded party dipping into the till.)
In order to pull out of the municipal corporate bonding rat race, the smaller bonding companies have had to adopt a set of bonding policies aimed at segregation, partitioning, and making more certain, their liabilities in the bonding marketplace. The following excerpts from the Uniform Bonding Code contains a presentation of those policies.
Claims Access Pursuant to Civil Rights Law
Improper enforcements which run counter to the U.S. Constitution can involve as many as thirty-five (35) violations of the provisions of the United States Constitution valued per 18 USC 241 at $10,000 per constitutional violation, per offense, per officer, per injured party when the officer is acting as a part of a law enforcement agency effort.
The civil value is therefore approximately $350,000 per enforcement offense, per enforcement officer, per injured party.
The statutes enabling the suit and civil claim are part of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871. (42 USC 1983, 1985, 1986 . . .) These statutes guarantee, among other things, the equal protection of the law for racial minority groups. Although the argument is commonly raised that these statutes apply only to racial minority population groups, they actually apply to racial discrimination regardless of the race and regardless of the population of the group.
The application of these equal protection statutes to only racial minority population groups would create a racial discrimination against racial majority population groups, and hence impose a “justice minority” situation upon the racial majority population groups. But this would make the racial minority statutes applicable to a majority race, because the intended purpose of the statute is to eliminate the prejudicial discrimination of the law and its enforcement, not to favor any specific race, color, creed, religious faith, sec or population group (be it small or large).
The issue can be made even clearer by a second very appropriate example. The legal profession’s labor union, the Bar Association, was established immediately after the Civil War to substitute a system of general slavery to replace the old system of black slavery, by guaranteeing a monopoly of the courts for attorneys, judges and municipal corporations (city, county, state). This labor union, the Bar Association, has forbidden anyone but union (Bar) attorneys to give legal advice, and has prevented anyone from being assisted in court by a non-union lawyer or by a non-lawyer, thus converting the courts into closed union shops. This corresponds to pre-Civil War United States wherein blacks were not taught to read and were not allowed to get a public education lest they become strong enough persons to speak out against their repression and overthrow their slavemasters.
The unionization of the legal system by the Bar Association makes the people individually, and the public as a whole, a legal justice minority group with access to the Civil Rights Act of 1871and to 42 USC 1983, 1985 and 1986.
The bar association act in violation of anti-trust and anti-monopoly laws of the U.S.
Organized Crime in Government
Government officials maintain control of the courts by “licensing lawyers” and by forbidding the common citizens to “practice law” or give “legal advice,” three phrases which have never been adequately defined for any statute. To protect government dominance, “law schools” are the only schools allowed to teach law, and specifically “safe law” (attornment). To protect malfeasance, attorneys are forbidden to file criminal complaints against malfeasance officials, officer and clerks and against officers of other corporations. If they disobey, they lose their “license to practice law.” Similarly, when the citizen files a criminal complaint against a public official, the prosecutor is expected to protect the public official from prosecution for official malfeasance by exercising some mystical doctrine of “selective prosecution” (an act of misprision of crime) which is nothing more or less than an excuse for legal prejudice to issue from the prosecutor’s office calculated to overthrow the public’s legal redress against official malfeasance.
Bonding of Governments in General
A government (its officials, its officers, and its clerks) will not be bonded:
1. if it does not eliminate its own internal malfeasance with the same diligence that it pursues civilian felons. (In other words, a government shall clean its own nest thoroughly),
2. if it rules by force without reason and/or without the consent of the people which it governs. In such a case it shall be deemed a criminal government and its officials, officers, and clerks shall be deemed criminally malfeasant,
3. if it behaves wirh malice or with deliberate contempt or rudeness towards its citizens.
“Let us contemplate our forefathers, and posterity and resolve to maintain the rights bequeathed to us from the former, for the sake of the latter. The necessity of the times, more than ever, calls for our outmost circumspection, deliberation, fortitude and perseverance. Let us remember that ‘if we suffer tamely a lawless attack upon our liberty, we encourage it, and involves others in our doom.’ It is a very serious consideration . . . that millions yet unborn may be the miserable shares of the event.”
1.0 LEGISLATIVE INPUT
Input Definitions and Principles
Words called terms are used to construct the ships of state called statutes. When the terms are not properly defined, the statutes become like ships without rudders. They move easily in any direction and do all manner of damage on the rivers of life.
TERMS WITHOUT DEFINITIONS ARE THE DAGGERS OF LAW
The Input/Definitions and Principles of Legislation will be bonded only if the bonding company finds that:
1. all “common terms” in the stated principles are used according to their common dictionary definition,
2. all special terms in the states principles are exhaustively
A. listed, and
B. defined using “common terms.”
3. The “Principles” are universally accepted as true---also called “Axioms of Law.” Or “Maxims of Law.”
A simple example of an Axiom or Maxim of Law would be:
(Definition: “Hire” = a wage or reward for work.)
(Axiom/Maxim: [A workman is worthy of his hire.)
1.1 BONDING AND DEFINITIONS
-- COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS -¬
(Definitions, Principles, Axioms, Maxims)
The bondability of a statute. (Legislative), the bondability of the process created and used to enforce a statute (Judicative), and the bondability of the act of enforcement and of the enforcement officer (Executive) all rest primarily and absolutely upon the ability to write a binding contract in very definite terms between the bonding company and the bonded party or parties. No bonding company will enter into a bonding agreement unless the definitive terms of the bonding contract are laid out to the precision that is likely to be tested by public claims against the bond.
The Legislative Bond: A statute, in order to be bondable, must satisfactorily define the terms and concepts used or involved in the construction of the statute.
(A statute shall not be bonded if the terms and concepts of the subject matter of the statute are not both exhaustively listed and clearly defined.)
- Unlawful or wrongful act.
- Wrongdoing in general.
- Improper or illegal treatment (Med).
- Improper or immoral conduct.
-(A) An act that subjects the doer to
-(B) The commission or omission of an act
specifically forbidden or enjoined by public law.
-(C) Any grave offense against morality or social order.
- Penal law vs. criminal law.
- Implying crime or heinous wickedness.
- Citizen rather than ecclesiastical or military.
- Legal relations between citizens or between citizen and state
- legal rights.
- Oral malicious falsehood.
- Written slander.
1.2 BONDING AND PRINCIPLES/MAXIMS
Statutes are the motor vehicles of government. They are used to collect revenue, to collect power and to provide public service.
Properly constructed statutes serve the public properly, poorly constructed statutes poorly, or destructively.
A defective statute is easily misused.
The easy misuse of a statute is an invitation to a rampant misuse of the statute.
If a statute can be misused to get money or power, its misuse is likely.
If a statute can easily be misused to get money or power, its misuse is virtually certain.
Defective statutes invite the deliberate misuse of the statutes.
Deliberate misuse (misapplication) of a statute is a criminal act.
The lack of job insurance/bonding makes people personally more cautious, causing a decrease in accidents, negligence, malfeasance and crime. The cost of bonding premiums discourages negligence.
The bonding of negligence encourages the commission of negligence on the part of the people who do not pay the premium.
A bonding company shall not bond negligence.
No statutes are bonded against deliberate misuse, i.e., criminal use.
If malfeasance (criminal malpractice) were to be bonded, that bonding would encourage malfeasance.
Malfeasance if unchecked will multiply.
Therefore, a bonding company shall not bond malfeasance or criminal malpractice.
Criminal acts include acts committed in violation of a citizen's constitutional rights and in violation of guarantees of equal protection of the law (civil rights).
Statutes which encourage criminal acts in order to enforce the statutes are not bondable statutes.
The bonding of criminal acts would encourage the commission of criminal acts, hence criminal acts (crimes) cannot be bonded.
Bonding companies are not required to bond what they do not want to bond.
A bonding company only pays claims for damages against a bond which it sells/issues. A bonding company must pay a claim on a bond which it has sold if the condition of the bond claim is satisfied.
A bonding company will not bond a defective statute because it does not want to pay the claim on the misuse of the statute.
Bonding a defective statute is an invitation to bankruptcy.
2.0 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
The control/logic of legislation will be bonded only if the bonding company finds to its satisfaction that:
1. the definitions of the terms used in the logic are bonded.
2. the principles used in the logic are bonded.
3. the logic being used to design the statute tests, and the conclusions obtained represent, all of the possible combinations of principles and applications (situations) for which the specific statute is being designed, and
4. none of the conclusions derived from the cited tested combination of principles and applications contradicts any condition. or condition known to be wholesome to the civilization.
5. if a conclusion logically derived from the cited tested combination of principles and applications contradicts any condition known to be wholesome to civilization, then the reason for the contradiction has been pursued relentlessly until the cause of the contradiction has been understood perfectly, lest the definition, the principles, the logic or the understanding of the application be faulty.
6. a complete record has been kept of the definitions, principles and logic underlying the design of the statute and that record is publicly available.
2.1 - BONDING PUBLIC EDUCATION
RE: Right vs. Wrong
It is said that ignorance of the law is no excuse for wrong action; that all persons are presumed to know the difference between right and wrong, hence know the law. If that is true:
1. there would be no reason for public education and the practice of law,
2. then there would be no reason to have law schools,
3. Then there would be no reason why citizens could not "practice law without a license,"
4. then there would be no reason why a citizen should not or could not sit beside a friend in court and counsel him or her.
Thomas Jefferson put it well when he said, "I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves: and if we think them
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a( wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion." Thomas Jefferson's Letter, September 28, 1820. (Source??)
What he said was that the common public should be able to "practice law without a license" and to be able to do so, they should be given a public education in law.
The public and the bonding companies would both benefit from such a situation. It would eliminate the professional law conspiracy which preserves the malfeasance of public officials, injures the public, and precipitates most of the claims against bonding companies.
Therefore, bonding companies shall engage the policy that they shall not bond (insure) public schools which do not teach their student body law and "the practice of law," and specifically shall not bond public schools which do not teach:
1. the Declaration of Independence,
2. the United States Constitution,
3. the method of writing an event log for a court case,
4. the method of compiling a document log,
5. the method of compiling a document analysis log,
6. the method of analyzing legal briefs, civil complaints and criminal charges,
7. the method of writing affidavits,
8. the method of writing and filing U. S. criminal complaints,
9. the method of writing a quality contract,
10. the method of composing expository information for distribution on the street,
11. the method of distressing and liening property, and
12. several other processes valuable to citizens for securing their rights against, and overthrowing the malfeasance of public officials.
A public official, clerk or servant shall lose his bond:
1. if he interferes with the education of the public in matters of law and the "practice of law,"
2. if he refuses to give to a citizen legal advice about a process with which he isfamiliar or if he refuses to give to a citizen legal advice which he is qualified to give because of his familiarity with and pertaining to the normal course of his public service. But no public servant or citizen shall be held legally liable for any information which he shall give when it is given upon demand, pursuant to a citizen's written or spoken writ of mandamus (an order to come to one's aid), pursuant to 42 USC 1986, the brother's keeper statute of the United States.
3. if he injures or oppresses any citizen who is acting in good faith and good behavior with a genuine and honest intent to practice law and/or to give legal counsel or assistance to other,
4. if he tries to get a citizen prosecuted for "practice of law without a license" where there is no clear evidence of false advertising, fraud or injury to the party being counseled,
5. if he tries to get a citizen prosecuted for "practice of law without a license" in order to eliminate competition in a litigation, a legal process or the legal industry generally,
6. if he operates a court of the legal system as a facility of a legal labor union (bar association) reserved for state licensed attorneys only, that is as a closed union shop.
2.2 - Bonding Taxation Statutes
Just Compensation vs. Fraudulent Taxation
A government/public trust is supposed to operate on taxes, and if a government operates commercial enterprises using tax money in competition with a free enterprise public, then the money of the citizens is being used in competition with the citizens, and that will discourage the payment and collection of taxes. It will cause tax rebellion. (Conflict of interest) Therefore, all revenue raised by a government's offices of public trust must be obtained by the performance of public service not provided by ordinary free enterprise businesses. Public service is the only sort of business in which a government is supposed to be employed.
("Nor shall private property [taxes] be taken for public use without -Lust compensation [valuable, publicly needed and publicly wanted service rendered by government]"). - The 16th so-called amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not base the assessment of taxes on services rendered by the government for the public but rather upon the services rendered by public citizens for third parties, hence, the 16th so-called amendment of the U.S. Constitution violates the 5th so¬called amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Essentially, the only lawful personal tax assessable for operating a government is a per capita_ tax determined by dividing the cost of operating the government by the number of emancipated citizens (or persons of majority age-eighteen years old or older).
(A U.S. constitutional 5th so-called Amendment system of taxation based on just compensation requires a per capita tax.) (uniform)
A legislator will not be bonded if he legislates or attempts to legislate a law to create a source of revenue without providing an equally valuable public service which the public needs and wants. (Just compensation)
In the U.S. constitutional 16th so-called amendment deduction system of taxation there are three economic industries:
2. goods, and services
Each has a one hundred per cent (100%) deductibility of overhead. Therefore, the common man who works to support his family can deduct all of his household expenses for his part of providing the labor force of the nation. There would be nothing left to tax. Originally, the U.S. 16th so-called amendment applied only to corporate income. Since its beginning, its wording, "Taxation on income from whatever source derived." has been applied by the I.R.S.:
1. to the common laboring household although it is 100% deductible,
2. to gifts and inheritance to which the government has contributed no valuable, service,- which funds are, therefore, being taxed twice,
3. to collecting taxes on crime, namely, bank robbery, organized crime and hard drug sales (25% excise tax), making the government a beneficiary of, hence favorable toward, the commission of paying crime.
Furthermore, the Social Security System of the I.R.S. operates a fraudulent insurance/bonding scheme in competition with honest free enterprise insurance/bonding companies, as follows.
If a husband and wife both pay into the Social Security insurance system out of their common social and commercial conjugal relationship, and if one dies, the other gets the payment of the Social Security benefit on only one person. This is a mutual financial sacrifice of two people joined as one social commercial unit, paid back only partially to the surviving person. That is blatant insurance fraud on the part of the Social Security insurance system, and the Social Security system finances so many social service programs which it was never intended for, that it is in constant financial trouble.
A sales tax is no better. Federal Law (Title 42 of the U.S. Code) includes an anti-peonage law which declares that no natural person (citizen) can be compelled to work for free (not even to collect taxes or do bookkeeping for the I.R.S. or the state sales tax commissions). Even if the government agrees to pay for the collection of the taxes, the law allows that a citizen can refuse to work for any specific person or organization.
Also, many persons do not believe it to be patriotic to pay taxes to the I.R.S. The I.R.S. is a Rothschild enterprise, not a part of the U.S. government, and there has been a movement in government to brand as right wing anti-Semites, those Patriots who point out the fact that the I.R.S., the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC are all well known financial enterprises of the Jewish Rothschild family of Europe. In fact, much of the tax protest movement, and much of the civil rights violations heaped on citizens by the legal establishment because of tax rebellion, arise out of the now common knowledge that the "national debt" has been created by a sequence of wars financed on both sides by the Rothschild family to force the U.S. to borrow money from Rothschild banks, creating an attachment of all U.S. property as collateral to pay off Rothschild war loans. The vociferates of anti¬-Semitism are not coming from common Jews, but from the Rothschild banking system which detests having the burglar's mask ripped off its face, and which uses anti-Semitism as a decoy.
(It should be clear that it is pure financial insanity to bond any statutes, processes or enforcements connected with any form of tax collection other than those based upon a per capita tax.)
2.3 - BONDING EXIGENCY STATUTES
(Emotional Urgent Necessity Statutes)
A legislator is said to be engaging in the confidence game of statutory fraud when he by the legislation of statute(s) creates a false problem for, or artificial or fraudulent need in, any citizen or group of citizens in order:
1. to justify the creation of the capacity to offer a solution for the false problem created, or
2. to justify the collection of taxes or revenue to finance the solution of the problem created.
A fraudulent need or want is a need or want which:
1. has not been solicited by the public, or
2. has been pawned off on the public
A. by coercive suggestion
B. by lack of representation, or
C. by misrepresentation of its consequences
i. for the good of the many at the expense of individual liberty or property, or
ii. for the good of any one at the expense of the freedom of many (lottery), and
3. which is not a valuable service to the public generally.
A legislator is said to be engaging in statutory fraud when he creates a false source or apparent source of supply (a false solution) for any citizen or group of citizens in order
1. to create, for the government, the capacity to create problems for the public, or
2. to create, for the government, a source of revenue (e.g., the lottery).
BONDING vs. LOTTERY
Responsible Wagering versus Non-Responsible Wagering
Taxation Without Representation
An Example of the creation of a fraudulent need or want or an apparent source of supply is the operation of a state lottery. Such a system is solicited by the public, because a large portion of the public likes to, hence wants to, gamble. However, the consequences of a state lottery are not honestly represented to the public by the state, and the lottery does not render a valuable service for the public. Money from the lottery gives state high officials a sense of independence which makes them feel that they can do without bonding and can risk malfeasance because they have adequate funds with which to manipulate inferior officers, clerks and the public.
Although bonding is wagering-you might call it insurance- set free from the behavioral restrictions of bonding by its monetary wealth, the state will degenerate to an organized crime syndicate and resort to the seizure of substance (real estate, etc.) and the means of the conveyance of substance (waterways, etc.), by condemnation (eminent domain), and by issuing letters of marque and reprisal (orders to march and seize) to mercenary law enforcement officers/UN troops.
Legislators who legislate a potentially publicly hazardous statute, must themselves be bonded against the possibility of being sued for any misuse of that statute which could arise as a consequence of the defective construction of the statute.
A legislator will not be bonded if he legislates or attempts to legislate a law to create a source of revenue without providing an equally valuable public service which the public needs and wants (just compensation).
A Solution in Need of Problems - Environmentalism
Governments create causes and problems in order to justify taxation and political domination. They always need a credible enemy to create the urgent necessity to ask for more money and to make more laws for "the good of the public" and "in the interest of national security."
To obtain the "consent of the public," governments create problems, or scenarios of problems, so that they will be able to offer solutions which an ignorant and somewhat gullible and self-serving public will buy.
The classic political example is the now publicly known strategy by which President F. D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill maneuvered the Japanese into attacking the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. [footnote: Theobald, Rear Admiral Robert A., The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, Publisher, date. and Barnes, Harry Elmer, Pearl Harbor After A Quarter of A Century, Publisher, Date.]
Although there are many very real environmental problems, environmentalism as a political lever is the latest trick to obtain the "consent of the public." It is legally known as The New World Order;it is economically known as Globalism. "Environmental" statutes must be closely examined for exigency fraud. [Footnote: Hage, Wayne, Storm Over Rangelands, P.O. Box 1085, Tonopah NV 89049. $15.]
Some of the exigency statutes of present day governments are designed by banking and military war games computers. The economic war games computers are the new guns of governments, firing statutes and economic and social situations as bullets. [Footnote: Lewin, Leonard C., A Report From Iron Mountain, Pub? Date? and "Silent Weapons For Quiet Wars, America's Promise Newsletter, P.O. Box 30,000, Phoenix AZ 85046]
2.4 - BONDING INSURANCE STATUTES
The bonding of statutes which require natural persons (non-incorporated persons) to purchase insurance, must be very carefully analyzed, and be regarded with the utmost caution. As a general rule, it is against the law for any entity to compel any citizen to pay any wager or premium for the privilege of not being injured or for the privilege of not being threatened with injury (Protection Insurance Racketeering). [Footnote: U.S. R.I.C.O. Laws]
Corporations may be required by the state in which they are incorporated, to purchase public hazard insurance because the corporation, being an artificial/paper person (a legal fiction), is regarded as having no conscience other than the state, making the state as a silent partner of the corporation, financially responsible for the acts of the corporation. (That which the liege-lord giveth, the liege-lord taketh away.) When the benefit which the state gives to the corporation is limited liability, which is a limited commercial responsibility to the commercial public, to a reasonable extent, then the state must protect the commercial public to a reasonable extent from a potential lack of commercial responsibility of the corporation or from a tendency toward a potential lack of commercial responsibility of the corporation, by requiring the corporation to purchase hazard bonding. This requirement protects the public from some losses, and protects the state from some civil liability, by a showing of commercial good faith action.
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance
Citizens are required to surrender the ultimate title of ownership of their motor vehicles (the manufacturer's statement of origin/MSO) to their respective states in exchange for a certificate of title of ownership and license plates. The state owns the vehicle because it hold the ultimate title to the motor vehicle. The citizen has the permission to use the vehicle. The permission can be revoked at any time by the state.
[Tennessee Department of Revenue Operations Supervisor, Denise Rottero, before Judge Greer. She explained Tennessee's auto registration process.]
The vehicle can be seized and auctioned off to provide revenue for the state. For example, the state of Oregon seizes and auctions citizens' motor vehicles as a penalty for soliciting a prostitute; proving that the auto belongs to the state.
Because the state has the ultimate ownership of all of the vehicles used by all of its citizens, the state also has the ultimate liability for all accidents in which those vehicles become involved. This is a potential reason for the state to compel citizens to purchase motor vehicle insurance. Another reason is obvious. The state is a silent partner in every insurance corporation incorporated in that state, and so, many of the insurance companies within the state are mere alter egos or "second selves" of the state. In this insurance scheme the state makes it mandatory for the citizen to buy a product which the state is selling. The individual state will get part of the insurance business; the interstate insurance companies, regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, will get the remainder of the insurance business.
Also, states need civil malpractice insurance. This sort of insurance comes from "above", from interstate insurance companies and international maritime insurance companies such as Rothschild, so, some states prostitute their legislative power as an inducement to get insurance companies to give them a better payment rate for their own malpractice insurance coverage premiums for their own corporate activities, by compelling citizens to purchase motor vehicle insurance.
In any compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme, a citizen's purchase of motor vehicle insurance is guaranteed by a threat of injury in the form of a suspension of the driver's license, seizure of the vehicle, fines and imprisonment if the citizen does not comply with the state's mandate. This creates the basic fabric of a protection insurance racket, hence a very real credibility problem for insurance and bonding companies.
The bonding problem gets really nasty when a judge compels a citizen to either buy auto insurance or to quite driving "his" (the "citizen's") car. Because a bond or insurance is only a promise to pay and not a tangible product, a citizen can lawfully and rightfully argue that, like a savings and loan or a bank, an insurance bonding/bonding company might not be around when damage is done and it is time for a claim payoff. Therefore the citizen can lawfully guarantee the auto insurance policy by putting a common law lien on enough of the property of the law enforcement officer and the judge to cover the face value of the insurance policy.
"This commercial lien cannot be removed."
"A federal R.I.C.O. action against the enforcement officer and the judge can also compel them to pay all of the premiums for all of the persons whom they have compelled to buy insurance."
The voluntary purchasing of motor vehicle insurance is smart. It is a good investment. But compulsory purchase of any sort of insurance in order to continue the daily act of living is protection insurance racketeering. Any bonding company which bonds compulsory motor vehicle insurance statutes is going to have big unresolvable problems, and any officer or judge who enforces compulsory motor vehicle insurance statutes is laying himself wide open to economic ruin.
3.0 - LEGISLATIVE OUTPUT
The Output Conclusion of legislation will be bonded and become a valid and lawful statute thereby, only if the bonding company finds that:
1. the definitions of the terms used in the conclusion are bonded,
2. the principles used in the conclusion are bonded,
3. the logic used in the conclusion is bonded,
4. the conclusion has been presented to the public, has been negatively criticized because of its construction or effect, then, the conclusion has been returned to the analysis and logic stage to test and justify its construction and effect, and
5. the legislated conclusion, after it has been subjected to public scrutiny and further analysis, is economically feasible for a wager on its public application. If it survives this last step, the conclusion is said to be perfected for legislative bonding, and becomes a judiciable statute [FN: "A legislative conclusion becomes a valid and lawful statute only if it is legislatively bonded."]
4.0 - JUDICATIVE INPUT, GENERALLY
An official, officer or clerk will not be bonded:
1. if he uses the power of his public office, or his position in that office, or his power of enforcement
A. to harass or to oppress a citizen, or
B. to create, obstacles to prevent a citizen from exercising his remedies by the due course of law.
2. if he deprives or hinders a citizen in the free exercise of rights guaranteed or of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the constitution of the state by which the officer is employed, or guaranteed by the National constitution or of the state into which the officer's work takes him.
3. if he interferes in a citizen's U.S. constitutional first (so-called) amendment
A. legislative rights of freedom of religion,
B. Judicative rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press (the right to access the court of public opinion), and/or
C. Executive rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances (i.e., file civil and criminal complaints-especially against malfeasant public officials).
4. FN "If he will not file or receive the filing of a criminal" complaint [no filing fee is required] against a public official. which such is necessary to curb the malfeasance of that official." (See also - Bonding of District Attorneys, infra.)
4.1 - Judicative Input, Specifically
The process of receipt of date input/allegations for judication by the government will be bonded only if the bonding company finds that no act was committed by any official, officer or clerk:
1. to ridicule, harass, oppress, injure or punish the citizen for submission or attempting to submit affidavits, allegations, arguments, claims, criminal complaints and/or damages for consideration, litigation or prosecution, or
2. hinder or prevent the composition (writing), receiving, filing or processing of the citizen's affidavits, allegations, arguments, considerations, claims, criminal complaints and/or demands.
This rule also applies to the composition, receiving, filing and processing of affidavits, allegations, arguments, claims, criminal complaints and demands of prisoners. For example, the enforcement process of an enforcement officer will not be bonded if the judicial process of receipt of data input/affidavits . . . is not bonded, or is not bondable. Example:
Translation (If it is found that an accused person was not allowed by an official or clerk to file a counter complaint with the prosecuting attorney, then the official process of the complaint against the accused party, and all official processes thereafter will not be bonded unless and until this defect of process is rectified and the accused party has had adequate time and opportunity to recover from the damage caused by being denied the opportunity to file the said counter complaint.) An officer sued for false imprisonment for violation of the equal protection of the law (here the prisoner's right to counter complaint) because of an unbondable judicial process of failing to receive data input, will pay for the damage out of municipal. corporate property or his own personal property.
5.0 - JUDICATIVE CONTROL
The court rules, jurisdiction, and the processes of consideration of affidavits and other filings, litigation, and prosecution will be bonded only if the bonding company finds that:
1. The general rules or local rules of the court contain an explanation of the purpose for existence of each and every rule so that the purpose of the rule will take priority over the wording of the rule, and so that substance will take priority over form.
2. The general rules or local rules of the court contain common terms and plain wording and are of such simplicity that the common citizen can easily understand and easily and quickly make use of the rules without the need of a counselor.
3. The setting of the case is proper, the parties to the action are all truthfully stated, and all civil and criminal elements are clearly identified and segregated into their own jurisdictional categories.
4. A criminal case brought in behalf of the peace and dignity of the state:
A. has been brought ex rel accusers, that is, "on the telling or relation/story of the accuser" with the accusation being related to the prosecuting attorney by the accuser,
B. has named the accuser in the setting of the case, and
C. contains the signed and notarized affidavit of the accuser in the body of the complaint. Otherwise, the state would become the plaintiff/accuser, the case would become federal, and the bonding company would become potentially liable for an agent's false accusation and false imprisonment of a party to the case.
5. In the U.S. constitutional 7th (so-called)amendment, civil elements of answering, discovery, deposition, interrogatories, etc., have been put on temporary hold as a U.S. constitutional 6th (so-called) amendment protection against self-incrimination pending a U.5. constitutional 6th (so-called) amendment prosecution.
6. The U.S. constitutional 6th (so-called) amendment processes have been carried out before the U.S. constitutional 7th (so¬called) amendment processes have proceeded, and these 6th (so-called) amendment processes have proceeded without delay.
Consideration of Affidavits
7. All affidavits have been considered, answered and affirmed or denied categorically, point¬for-point in writing.
Litigation and Prosecution
8. All officials, officer and clerks involved in the processes of litigation have obeyed the Constitution of the United States of the state wherein they are employed, so that;
A. the citizens involved have receive equal protection under the laws, and
B. the citizens' remedies by the due course of law have been protected and guaranteed,
9. the officials, officers and clerks involved in the processes did not operate the court and/or the judicial process as a closed union shop, that is, did not exclude or hinder non¬union lawyers, non-union counsels, non-union para-legals, non-union laborers or any other non-union citizens from exercising the equal profession, the equal practice, the equal performance, the equal perfection and the equal protection of the law,.
10. The officials, officers and clerks involved in the processes did not act in concord, (agreement) union or conspiracy to interfere with or minimize the citizens' creative access to discovery, evidence, counsel and/or remedy by the due process of the law.
Service of Legal Process
11. No party to the case, nor the court, has been allowed to use the U.S. mail to "serve" papers which are required by law to be "served," not "sent." A U.S. postal carrier is not employed and bonded as a witness, hence is not a lawful. legal process server.
5.1 Bondability of Lawyers and Attorneys
(Lawyer and Attorney Are Not Synonymous)
Attorn - Law:
- To agree to recognize a new owner of a property or estate and promise payment of rent to him.
- to consent to the transfer of land by the Lord of the fee, and to the continuance of one's own holding under the new Lord; also, to accord homage to a Lord.
Attornment - Feudal Law:
- The acknowledgment by the tenant of a new Lord on the alienation of land; also, the acknowledgment by a bailee that he holds property for a new party. Funk and Wagnall's Practical Standard Dictionary
Attorn - Law:
- To turn over; to transfer to another money or goods; to assign to some particular use or service. To consent to the transfer of a rent or reversion. To agree to become tenant to one as owner or landlord of an estate previously held of another, or to agree to recognize a new owner of a property or estate and promise payment of rent to him.
Attorn - Feudal Law:
- To turn over; to transfer to another money or goods; to assign to some particular use or service. Where a Lord aliened his seigniory, he might, with the consent of the tenant, and in some cases without, attorn or transfer the homage and service of the latter to the alienee or new Lord.
- In feudal and Old English Law - A turning over or transfer by a Lord of the services of his tenant to the grantee of his seigniory. (Lordship title: seignior, sir) The doctrine of attornment grew out of the peculiar relations existing between the landlord and his tenant under the feudal law, and the reasons for the rule never had any existence in this country, and is inconsistent with our laws, customs and institutions.
Black's Law Dictionary Revised Fourth Edition We need to take a very close look at these words in order to understand the role of an attorney. The setting is old England, the aristocracy held the land. The lower class tilled the land as tenants. When the land changed hands from one aristocratic Lord to another aristocratic Lord, a treaty was made between the tenants and the new Lord lest civil war break out between the tenants and the new Lord. This transfer of power with treaty was called attornment.
Attornment was the method of peacefully passing land from one aristocrat to another aristocrat without disturbing the class structure. It consisted of a peaceful method of maintaining a noble class off citizens acceptable to the common people. This does not mean that the common people liked the situation, but they suffered evils while evils were sufferable, and made their treaties of attornment.
Therefore, in English Law attornment was a method of guaranteeing an unequal protection of the Law for the rich and the poor, but one which was at least tolerable for the poor. It was a "peaceful" maintenance of the class structure.
An attorney's role in this system was to provide the ceremony of the acquiescence of the poor, and to do so in such a manner (modus operandi - MO) as to preserve and maintain the class structure. The peaceful unequal protection of the Law. It is eminently clear that an attorney's role has not changed. Attorneys practice attornment.
- A person learned in the law. One who understands law and who loves law for its capacity to rectify the evils of society. One who professes and practices "Liberty and Justice for all," and therefore the equal protection of the Law. Lawyers "practice" law. The U.S. Constitution provides over thirty guarantees of the equal protection of the law. A lawyer supports those provisions of guarantee; an attorney opposes those provisions. In America, a lawyer obeys the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Law of the Land. An attorney does not obey the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, technically, a lawyer is bondable and an attorney is not bondable. State bar associations, which deal with both extremes, must therefore rely upon "self-bonding."
Testing and Counsel
There are both good and bad counsels. In reality, many so-called "lawyers" practice attornment, and many so-called "attorneys" practice law. Most persons thing the terms "lawyer" and "attorney" mean the same thing, and would not even know how to distinguish one from another. Even the professionals call themselves, "attorneys-at-law," a contradiction of terms which shows the confusion which prevails in law. For the present purposes of the Uniform Bonding Code, the counsels will not be discriminated against because of the term they use to identify their occupation. Only their behavior and "track record" will be used to determine their bondability. "You know a tree by the fruit which it bears." An apple tree does not grow cherries, and a cherry tree does not grow apples. To cite an extreme example: a lawyer will file criminal charges against a judge for failure to protect a citizen's U.S. constitutional rights; an attorney will not. There are many such tests, and contracts of specific performance can be provided to would-be counsels to find out what they are actually ready, willing and able to do.
When it is necessary, a lawyer will act as a substitute and go to jail for a cause in which he believes, whereas an attorney will only dabble at "law," will ask to be removed from a case when the going gets rough and becomes a battle, will run in the face of the enemy, and therefore deserves a summary court martial.
5.2 -- Bonding of District Attorneys
A city, county, state or federal district attorney (including a U.S. district attorney called a "U.S. Attorney') shall lose his bonding and shall not be bonded:
1. if he refuses to properly identify himself to the citizen when asked to do so, including giving the citizen the name and address (or telephone number) of his bonding company and his bond policy number (bond number),
2. if he fails or refuses to receive, for filing, a criminal complaint from a citizen against a citizen or an official,
3. if he refused to mark or stamp the citizen's confirmed (compare with original) copy of the citizen's complaint with any of the following
B. name of receiving office
E. signature or initial of receiving clerk or official, so that the citizen can have an official receipt for delivery of his complaint;
4. if he fails or refuses to make a reasonably diligent effort to process the citizen's complaint (42 USC 1986),
5. if he fails or refuses to see to it that the citizen's complaint is placed in the right hands for processing and/or answering, (return)
6. if he does not make every effort to make sure that the complaining party knows of the status or location of the complaint in the legal system, and does not give the complainant written notice of the same when it is possible.
5.3 - The Bonding of Prosecuting Attorneys
A prosecuting attorney shall lose his bonding, shall not be bonded, and shall be deemed unbondable:
1. if he refuses to prosecute a complaint when it is possible to do so, regardless of whom the complaint is against,
2. if he resorts to "selective prosecution," i.e., any excuse of immunity for an official in order to protect a malfeasant official from prosecution,
3. if he resorts to "selectiveprosecution,"i.e., false or malicious prosecution of a citizen, in order to punish or destroy a citizen for attempting to have a malfeasant official prosecuted.
5.4 - Bonding of Judges
A judge shall lose his bonding, shall not be bonded, and shall be deemed unbondable:
1. if he fails toprotect the U.S, national constitutionally guaranteed remedies of due process and the equal protection of the laws of any citizen appearing in his court of law, or of any citizen appearing in any court of the county in which he works whose case may come to his attention 12y a means.
5.5 - Bonding of Attorneys
A lawyer or an attorney shall lose his bonding, shall not be bonded, and shall be deemed unbondable,:
1. if he fails to protect the remedies of due process and the equal protection of the law of either his client or of the adverse party in an action. In an adversary system of law, each lawyer or attorney shall protect the representation of fact not only for their own party, but shall protect the legal process for both parties without, exception.
5.6 - Bonding an Amicus Curiae
(Friend of the Court - Especially under a Citizen;s Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to 42 USC 1986)
It is not necessary for a non-incorporated lawyer or amicus curiae (friend of the court) to be bonded. But a lawyer or an amicus curiae, if he chose to be bonded, shall lose his bond and shall not be bonded:
1. if he uses his involuntary intervention to interfere with constitutional due process,
2. if he does not speak and act openly for the best interests of both opposing adverse parties, even if paid by one party and sits as counsel to that party. An amicus curiae may favor the cause of one side of an action, but must serve the due process of both sides of an action in order to be of service to the system of law as a whole. If the judge is acting in insurrection and rebellion against the U.S. Constitution, and the judge shows no signs of amending his ways (correcting his court procedure), it is usually best for the amicus curiae to file a notice of criminal malpractice (malfeasance) with the court administrator, and with the bonding company in person, by fax, or by telephone to immediately establish reversible error and. civil damage in the case.
6.0 - JUDICATIVE OUTPUT
The process of Judgment will be bonded only if the bonding company finds that:
1. the terms, definitions, principles (axioms), logic and conclusion underlying the statutes being used in a judgment are all bonded, i.e., the statute used is a valid and lawful statute, i.e., is a bonded statute;
2. the process of receipt of data input is bonded;
3. the Court rules, the jurisdiction and the processes of consideration of affidavits, litigation and prosecution are all bonded;
4. a jury trial was granted, if it was not. waived in writing by all parties to the suit;
5. a summary judgment hearing was not imposed in place of a jury trial as long as there was so much as one genuine issue of material fact or one unprosecuted element of criminal behavior, criminal malpractice, or official or clerical malfeasance; -
6. the jury was allowed to come to a verdict by ballot while sitting in the courtroom without retiring to the jury room to arrive at a verdict; NOTE: Retirement of a jury to a jury room for deliberating a verdict is internal jury tampering, creates an homogenized verdict, constitutes conspiracy to convict or to vindicate, and makes every member of the jury individually and personally liable for the verdict, regardless of the content of the verdict. if a summary accusation or complaint, Judgment. and execution of contempt has been brought against a person appearing before the court because his behavior or argument in favor of his rights in that court displeases the judge, or is held by that judge to be contrary to the order and decorum of the court, and
i. the accusing judge has made out thecomplaint of contempt,
ii. the accused has been tried by a second judge yielding a judgment of contempt,_, and
iii. a third judge has agreed in writing to accept the total liability for both the accusation orcomplaint of contempt, and the judgment of contempt if either or both of the first two judges hasacted with malfeasance in the contempt process, and
iv. the third judge has yielded the order of execution of contempt.
If the contempt charge is later found to be improper or unlawful, the personal liability of the third judge shall be proportional to the number of judges acting in defect of the law. (i.e., treble damages (make triple).
This rate of damages corresponds to the treble damages of a U.S. R.I.C.O. (Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization) suit. The third judge will have to sue the other two judges to recover remedy from them.
8. The order. of execution of the judgment has an attached check list containing a signature¬verified entry for every step of the process which must be bonded in order for the over¬all process to be perfected for judicial bonding. Each step must have a space provided for reference to any attached comments on irregularities in the process. "An order of judgment becomes a valid and lawful order of execution only if it is judicially bonded."
6.1. - Bonding of Judicial Consequence
A government official, officer or clerk shall lose their bond, shall not be bonded, and shall be deemed unbondable:
1. if he fails to answer, or fails to require an answer to, a citizen's complaint, and affidavit of information categorically point¬ for-point, except that, where criminal accusations are made, he shall have the right to remain silent, or allow silence (non-¬answer) as a protection against self-incrimination. Otherwise, the ordinary rule is, "An affidavit unrebutted stands as the truth."
2. if he knowingly imprisons, or keeps as a prisoner, a citizen in violation of that citizen's U.S. constitutional rights and equal protection of the law. The offense shall repeat the application of pertinent remedy statutes each and every twenty-four(24) hours.
3. if he refuses a prisoner the materials and information necessary for the prisoner to defend, acquit or vindicate himself. The offense shall repeat the application of the pertinent remedy statutes each and every twenty-four (24) hours.
NOTE: If an officer or clerk who has lost his bond, gives aid and comfort to a citizen or to a prisoner deprived as described under this chapter, and shall prove himself genuine, the same shall recover his bondability.
7.0 - EXECUTIVE INPUT
Principles of Executive Bonding
Qualifications For Bonding Enforcement Officers The input/qualifications of an executive/enforcement officer shall be bonded.
Pursuant to state incorporation laws, any official, officer or clerk, of any municipal. corporation (city, county, state) engaged in any activity potentially dangerous or hazardous to the public safety, health and welfare must be bonded and must carry an identification card which declares his bonding status.
In a scientific system, the executive bond on a reasonable officer with a good social attitude, a "good track record." and a good education, is less expensive than the bond on a rookie cop (constable or patrol) just as the automobile insurance on an older, sensible, seasoned and proven driver is less than the auto insurance for a younger, impulsive and unproven driver.
The Glass House Doctrine
It is the executive branch which ultimately commits the statutory injuries which the legislative and judicative branches order up for the control and punishment of citizens.
"A person who lives in a glass house should not throw rocks at others." (sic)
Likewise a government infested with malfeasant officials, officers and clerks is in no position to pursue felons in the public sphere. If it would be credible in the eyes of the public and the bonding companies, then it must first eliminate its own malfeasance with the same diligence that it would pursue the civilian felon.
In all complaints of a citizen against a public law enforcement officer, the complaining citizen has the general responsibility of protecting the general enforcement of the laws by giving every opportunity of grace and escape to the officer complained about. The complainant must always remain sensitive to the fact that a law enforcement officer is constantly subject to the most psychologically demanding emergency situations and the most dangerous social combinations, and must be given every benefit of the doubt so that he can survive his daily work.
7.1 - No Criminal Bonding
Criminal acts may not be bonded against prosecution or litigation, or there would be people who would become bonded as a license to commit criminal acts in violation of the peace and dignity of the state.
Likewise, corporations may not be established by a person to hide the criminal acts of that person behind corporate limited liability, or there would be people who would incorporate their activities in order to secure for themselves a license to commit criminal acts behind the corporate limited liability veil in violation of the peace and dignity of the state. Corporate limited liability, as it pertains to civil commercial obligations, is a delicate enough creation without the criminal aspect, and it is only because business people accept the idea that they are gambling in commerce when they deal with a corporation that there is any honesty at all in the limited liability concept of a corporation. For if a person uses a corporation to run up a commercial debt with the intent to abscond (run away and hide) at some future time, then that corporation becomes simply an instrumentality, called an alter ego, for the commission of crime. It is for this reason that the state is a silent partner in every state incorporated artificial person, and has the liability. There is no corporate limited liability for the commission of crimes. Criminal acts committed by corporate officials, officers and clerks pierce the limited liability veil of every type corporation and artificial (purely legal) person. Also, criminal accusation always pierces the veil of corporate limited liability.
No Criminal Bonding
An official, officer or clerk who commits a criminal act (a crime) or gross negligence of duty against a citizen or against the public generally:
1. shall lose his bond,
2. shall not be protected by his official bond,
3. shall not be protected by the limited liability of the corporation, trust, or office of public trust which employs him,
4. shall be personally liable (financially responsible) for the damage which that crime or gross negligence causes,
5. must pay for the damage out of his own personal assets of real and personal property.
A citizen's recourse against official crimes is to file his claim in the form of a criminal complaint/U.S. First (so-called)Amendment petition for redress of grievances with a civil value noted on the complaint, but with the U.S. Seventh Amendment process on hold as not immediately answerable, and with the civil value pending the outcome of the U.S. Sixth (so-called) Amendment criminal prosecution.
The criminal claim puts payment of the bond on hold and pierces the veil of corporate limited liability, exposing the officer to unlimited attachment of personal property unless he is prosecuted and vindicated by prosecution. If the prosecutor does not agree to prosecute the case within thirty days, or such time as is reasonable for investigation of the charges (not to exceed sixty days without reasonable cause), then the matter reverts to a civil action standing half inside and half outside of the corporate veil with the bonding company, the corporation and the officer standing liable for the damages.
If the Bonding Company Compels the Prosecution
If the bonding company compels the prosecution and the acts of the officer are clearly criminal, then the bonding company can argue for release of the liability of the bonding company for the officer's actions, provided the bond was written to dissuade (discourage)_ criminal acts.
Since the prosecutor must have a bond in order to be a prosecutor in fulfillment of his job description, it follows that the bonding companies collectively have the power to compel the prosecutor to prosecute on the criminal charges to attempt to vindicate the officer and to protect the relevant (directly affected) bonding company from a claim, or to minimize the claim against the bonding company.
If the Bonding Company Does Not Compel Prosecution
If the bonding company does not compel prosecution, then the first claim of liability is against the bonding company up to the face value of the bond, and the remaining claim of liability is against the corporation and against the officer for the unpaid balance of the claim. The officer against whom the complaint and accusation has been made also has the right to defend his interests by demanding that he be prosecuted and vindicated. Both the complaining party and the prosecutor have the obligation to serve notice on the accused officer if the prosecutor will not prosecute, thereby giving the officer a chance to protect his interests by demanding a prosecution.
7.2 - Bonding of Attitude
1. The principles of economics are more and more being used to establish scientific bonding practices which eliminate the bonding, hence employment, of antisocial enforcement officers.
2. The bond on an enforcement officer is based on the officer's social attitude and past performance, that is, his "track record."
3. An antisocial officer is generally defined as a person who:
A. has a bad social attitude,
B. thinks he is bonded for any sort of social behavior whatsoever,
C. thinks he has to prove himself by being socially abusive or "macho" towards members of the general public.
4. Antisocial officers create bad enforcement situations which cause citizens to file malpractice claims with bonding companies.
5. Therefore, a credible bonding company will not bond a known antisocial enforcement officer.
7.3 - Bonding of Education
Principle--Ignorance of the law is not an allowable excuse for a law enforcement officer to use when exercising the power to enforce the law.
An officer must know and understand all of the processes which must be bonded before he can act on an execution of judgment.
An officer, although presumably acting in his official capacity, has no commercial escape or grace through a bonding company when the statute he enforces is not bonded against accidental misuse. When an officer commits an accidental misuse of his office or of a statute, or accidentally acts on an unbonded statute, the bonding company will pay on the bond only to the extent of a reasonable degree of error or accident; but nothing in the agreement between the bonding company and the bonded party shall be construed to free the official or officer from investigating and knowing whether or not his own actions or the statute acted upon or enforced were adequately bonded; and whatever portion of the damage claim remains after the bonding company has paid its reasonable obligation to the bonded party, shall be paid out of the assets of the municipal corporation and/or out of the real and personal property of the official or officer who misacted.
An enforcement officer of a municipal corporation (city, county, state), who operates without a bond or who enforces an unbonded statute, is acting outside of the public hazard licensing and bonding statutes governing municipal corporations. A bonding company has no financial responsibility for such an officer. Such an officer is regarded to be out of uniform, outside the shield or veil of his official capacity, and is a common citizen operating upon his own personal liability and risk.
If an officer was deceived by the government (municipal corporation) for which he works, into performing his "duties," namely, of accepting statutes, carrying out Judgments of execution, or exerting enforcement beyond limits of his bonding, then, the officer shall not have a claim on the bonding company, and his personal property shall become attachable for the satisfaction of claims of damages, and he will have to make his claim against his employer. In the case of an unbonded statute, the employer will have to make its claim against the state legislature and the state of these factors are:
1. the psychological stability and sociability of the officer (is he antisocial, does he have a good social attitude, is he reasonable?),
2. the "track record" of his daily performance (past performance),
3. how much legal education the officer has and what kind of legal education the officer has and what kind of legal education does he have relevant to the laws that he will be required to enforce,
4. the specific performance (job description) of the officer being bonded, generally for the construction and advertisement of an unbonded statute. If a citizen knows how to enforce his civil remedies under the laws of commerce, and if the claim of the citizen for civil damages exceeds the face value of the bond, then the officer who victimizes that citizen can easily be bankrupted.
7.4 - Bonding of Specific Performance
Modern scientific bonding is based on a number of factors which mathematically determine the price of the wager (premium) charged by the bonding company. Some
5. the types of unbonded statutes he will enforce,
6. the types of bonded statutes he will enforce,
7. the types of paper enforcement processes he will use, and,
8. the types of enforcement acts he will engage in (especially the violent ones).
An officer is acting without the protection of a municipal bond, is acting on the municipal corporate assets, or is acting "out of uniform" and on his own personal liability if he:
1. behaves in a clearly antisocial manner,
2. does not have an education in law adequate for his specific performance ia a law enforcement officer,
3. is not adequately bonded for law enforcement, i.e., to enforce the law,
4. does not have an adequate identification card or does not show his identification card when necessary,
5. acts on an unbonded statute, and/or
6. violates a citizen's U.S. or state constitutional rights or equal protection of the laws.
The identification card of a law enforcement officer declares the authority of the officer to act by:
1. stating the specific performance of his job for which he is bonded, such as the class of statutes he is bonded to enforce.
2. stating that he is licensed and bonded,
3. stating the name of the bonding company which is bonding the executive acts of the officer, and
4. stating the bond (policy) number of the officer's bond (insurance).
An officer who cannot or does not display his official identification card is deemed out of uniform and acting as an ordinary citizen on his own personal liability. His personal property is then the true pledge underwriting his authority.
Liability by Association
An officer can be sued for the injury caused by the act(s) of another officer, if the act(s) was committed and the injury was caused while the two officers worked together. The assessment of the transfer of liability rests upon such concepts as reasonable diligence, accident, neglect and conspiracy.
7.5 - Authority
1. A statute has no social authority or the capacity to be enforced without an author, and has no author without the assumption of social, liability or financial responsibility for the statute authored.
2. Any attempt to exercise social authority by enforcing a statute without assuming a corresponding measure of social liability for the enforcement of the statute constitutes fraud.
The only authority which an official, officer or clerk of a government (e.g., municipal corporation) has to use, act upon, or enforce a statute resides in or arises out of the financial responsibility for the acts and actors as follows:
1. the legislation-construction of the statute,
2. the content of the statute itself,
3. the judication--the exercise of the judicative power,
4. the judicative process itself,
5. the execution-the enforcement paper process which is used as a reason to enforce the statute,
6. the enforcement act of the enforcement officer, and
7. the enforcement officer.
This financial responsibility for the acts and actors will usually be provided from one or more the following three sources:
1. the bonds on the acts and the actors (insurance on an official act or person),
2. the sacrifice, forfeiture or pledge of the personal property, real or movable, of the government corporate property, real or movable, or,
3. the sacrifice, forfeiture or pledge of the personal property, real or movable, of the official, officer or clerk who is using, acting upon or enforcing the statute.
The total value in property or money extractable from these three sources must be sufficient to sustain a suit at law and pay for the damages caused as a consequence of using, acting upon or enforcing the statutes; that is, in defense of each specific performance of the jobs or of the persons, the said performance of said jobs being the product of the government known as public service.
A government official, officer or clerk who is not bonded or who loses his bond, shall be held financially responsible for his own actions. He shall have, as the only support for his own authority, the pledge of his own personal property, real and movable, to satisfy the damages which he causes to citizens by the exercise of that authority.
7.6 - Bonding Municipal Corporations
Many municipal corporations (city, county, state) have quietly chosen to operate without malpractice bonding in violation of state corporate public hazard bonding laws because their bonding is expensive. Often municipal corporations claim to be "self bonded," but because civil rights suit claims are often, and properly, astronomically large, such in-house bonding is actually fraud, and passes liability on to the officials, officers and clerks of the municipal corporation. Municipal corporations have had to resort to lies and deceptions concerning the bonding of their officers in order to get their officers to put on a uniform and go out to fight for the corporation. The officers are not told that their public hazard bond is not adequate, and they are not told that if their on¬the-job activities involve them in a situation where the face value of the bond is not sufficient to cover an injury (physical, mental, emotional, legal, etc.) to a public citizen, that then the citizen will have the right to sue the officer for a sufficient amount of the officer's personal property (real and/or movable) in order to be paid the difference between the amount of the damage claim and the face value of the bond.
A municipal corporation will lose its executive enforcement bond or be rendered unbondable:
1. if it hires an enforcement officer and sends him out into the public to do official enforcement duties without bonding his enforcement processes and actions. The officer must be provided with a written notarized declaration of his job description;
2. if it fails to tell an officer or clerk that he is not adequately bonded, the officer must be provided with a written notarized declaration of his bonding status;
3. if it fails to issue an identification card to an enforcement officer declaring:
A. that the officer is bonded,
B. the name of the officer,
C. the officer's enforcement classification,
D. the name of the municipal corporation for which he works,
E. the name of the bonding company which is bonding his enforcement,
F. the bond (policy) number of the officer,
G. the address and/or telephone number of the bonding company (bonding companies may want to know who is cheating them. Many municipal corporations are not adequately bonded and never tell their employees about it),
H. a picture of the officer.
4. if it does not provide a law enforcement officer with a sufficient education in law and process so that the officer can properly carry out his law enforcement duties as agreed to in his job description,
5. if it engages an enforcement officer to enforce an unbonded "statute" which by its hazardous nature must be bonded, or
6. if it engages an enforcement officer to violate a citizen's U.S. constitutional rights or equal protection of the laws.
8.0 - EXECUTIVE CONTROL
The control/enforcement process of an executive/enforcement officer will be bonded only if the bonding company finds that:
1. before executing an order of execution the officer had in his possession:
A. a faithful recap (recapitulation) of the case representing both sides of the argument, hand-signed by the author of the recap (who is liable for his recap),
B. an original hand-signed verified bonding check list of the complete court process,
C. an original hand-signed copy of the judgment and the order of execution of judgment,
D. a proper personal identification card including:
i. that the officer is bonded,
ii. the name of the officer,
iii. the officer's enforcement classification,
iv. the name of the municipal corporation for which he works,
v. the name of the bonding company which is bonding his enforcement,
vi. the bond (policy) number of the officer,
vii. the address and/or telephone number of the bonding company, and
viii. a picture of the officer,
E. a proper personal business card which the officer could hand out to the public and to the person(s) arrested, containing all of the same information as given in Part (1) (D) except for the picture, because of the expense of picture cards.
9.0 - EXECUTIVE OUTPUT
The output/enforcement act of an executive/enforcement officer will be bonded only if the bonding company finds to its satisfaction that, taking into consideration the urgency and hazard of the situation, the officer while enforcing the paper process acted in a reasonable manner as regards:
1. the reading and understanding of the recap,
2. the reading and understanding of the verified bonding list,
3. the reading and understanding of the judgement, and
4. the reading and understanding of the order of execution of judgment, And when enforcing¬
5. properly identifying himself,
6. properly serving necessary papers, and
7. properly notifying people of their rights.
9.1 - Bonding Jail. Procedure
A government, or an official, officer or clerk of a government, will lose its/his bond, will not be bonded and will not be bondable if a person, hereinafter referred to as the "prisoner," which it/he handles, who has been charged and arrested but who has not been convicted:
1. has been denied or delayed anything, or any right, or the equal protection of the law necessary for the prisoner's defense which an uncharged and unarrested citizen would have at his use, service and disposal,
2. has been denied or delayed legal paperwork in the prisoner's case, including but not limited to affidavits of accusation, police reports, arrest warrants, mailing addresses for the delivery of all leg paperwork, etc.,
3. has been denied or delayed. the assistant counsel of, or communication with any lawyer, attorney, spouse, relative, friend, non-union paralegal, non-union lawyer, etc., needed for his personal safety and legal defense,
4. has been denied or delayed necessary appearances and opportunity to speak before a judge in court and on the court record ("necessary" as defined by the prisoner, not as defined by the jail. Ear, the judge or the court), and/or consideration from the jailer, the judge of the court, and/or a hand-signed record of the proceedings before the judge and the court,
5. has been denied or delayed a copy of anything:
1. (A) the prisoner has signed while enteringor dwelling in the jail, or
2. (B) the prisoner has been required to sign while entering or dwelling in the jail ("It is best not to sign anything."),
6. has been denied or delayed the physical basics; namely, light, heat, simple comforts, rest, writing materials or any other obvious physical means necessary to compose, write and perfect the prisoner's defense, said basics to be provided at no cost to the prisoner,
7. has been denied or delayed the opportunity to effectively file counter complaints against the prisoner's accusers, and those who have handled and processed the prisoner's case (see also 4.0 Judicative Input,_specifically),
8. has been denied or delayed a readable copy of the Holy Bible printed in a language in which the prisoner is educated or fluent,
9. has been denied or delayed access to law books of the prisoner's choice,
10. has been denied or delayed medical needs. NOTE: The county shall provide all of the above services immediately to the unconvicted prisoner at no cost to the prisoner. Any county which fails to meet the above criteria will itself be totally liable for its own acts. It is not inconceivable that a county violating the above criteria could accumulate over one hundred million dollars worth of civil damages in one day's time involving only one prisoner, and no credible bonding company wants anything to do with that kind of obligation.
- In Conclusion -
According to the equitable authorities at law in regard to state-created marriages, any property sought after belongs to both parties/spousal, therefore, both are responsible for their spouse's action(s). Thereby, criminal complaints jointly affect in regard to liens. In short, bring the civil rights violators, wife/husband, into the court action also. Remember, all liens cannot be removed until the declaration is adjudicated and/or the claimant is satisfied.
In the wording of the published rules of the Ninth Circuit Court, "Go for the jugular vein."
9.2 - Escalation
A law enforcement officer will lose his bond if he oppresses a citizen to the point of civil. rebellion when that citizen attempts to obtain redress of grievances (U.S. constitutional 1st so-called amendment).
When a state, by and through its officials and
agents, deprives a citizen of all of his remedies by the due process of law and deprives the citizen of the equal protection of the law, the state commits an act of mixed war against the citizen, and, by its behavior, the state declares war on the citizen. The citizen has the right to recognize this act by the publication of a solemn recognition of mixed war. This writing has the same force as the Declaration of Independence. It invokes the citizen's U.S. constitutional 9th and 10th so-called amend guarantees of the right to create an effective remedy where otherwise none exists.
"I found this insight on the UBC to be very perspicuous and most useful to the Patriot movement, but like all laws, it is useful only to the one(s) who use it and enforce it."
Remember the etymon at the tine of law's creation and The Federalist Papers. (Read and discern until it's perspicuous.)
"Prior law governs always." "Prior etymons govern always."
"To act in pro se fashion in a court of law or equity is to profess in law, thus, casting yourself to drift away from logic and into the arms of a fool."
Study the UBC, file your "criminal complaints" in timely fashion, take their money or their hides for future parchment.
MAXIM; (Universal Axiom of Law)
All persons know that the foundation of law and the legal system exists in the telling of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, generally by testimony, deposition, and/or by affidavit. Therefore, every honorable judge requires those who appear before him to be sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and is compelled by the high principles of his profession to protect that truth and do nothing to tamper with that truth, either directly or indirectly, either in person or by proxy, or by subornation of the affiant or other person (subornation/extortion of perjury).
This instrument is an Affidavit of Obligation, also known as a Claim of Lien. This affidavit of obligation is a commercial instrument arising from a private or public contract, either express, constructive, and/or implied, which exists by the express, constructive, and/or implied consent of the Lien Debtor. Therefore, this Affidavit of obligation is a consensual commercial lien. This lien arises from the necessity to guarantee specific performance (oath) of the Lien Debtor. Therefore, this Affidavit of obligation is also a z-just compensation commercial lien.
The Lien Claimant's Claim of Lien is expressed as this Affidavit. A mere unsworn declaration is not sufficient grounds for a Claim of Lien because it does not attach commercial liability to the person making the claim of obligation upon a debtor. The person making the claim (the Lien Claimant) must assume the commercial liability for making a claim against the debtor (the Lien debtor) by issuing a sworn statement known as an Affidavit of Obligation which is given to the best of the claimant's knowledge and belief to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, for which the claimant stands personally commercially responsible.
A declaration of obligation does not become a lien unless it is sworn to, in which case it is known by the stronger term, "Affidavit of Obligation." A mere declaration of obligation is not a lien.
A "distress," which essentially compels instant specific performance, being severe because of its instant effect, must be bonded. On the other hand, a lien, having a traditional three month grace period, allows ample time for a response, hence is regarded as commercially moderate, and, therefore, does not have to be bonded beyond the personal liability which it automatically imposes upon the Lien Claimant/Affiant. (The three day, three week, three month, and three year grace periods in American Law arise from the traditional numerology of ancient Hebrew and Jewish law. See Holy Bible, Old Testament.)
As would be the case with any other affidavit, deposition, or testimony, an Affidavit of Obligation (commercial/contract lien) may not be tampered with by any judge, other public official, or other person, and generally may be removed by only one or more of four means:
1. A satisfaction of the lien by the Lien Debtor.
2. A categorical point-for-point rebuttal (affirmation, denial, or explanation) of every element of the Lien Claimant's claim, said rebuttal being also in the form of a commercial affidavit for which the Lien Debtor accepts full personal. commercial responsibility. If the lien claimant can rebut the lien debtor's rebuttal, the lien stays in force.
3. A voluntary (unextorted) removal of the lien by the Lien Claimant (or his heirs and assigns, if such has been provided for).
4. A decision by an impartial jury duly convened and properly conducted (not tampered with by a judge, other public official, or other person).
The suspension of an Affidavit of Obligation is the suspension of the right to give testimony in one's own behalf and is, therefore, in the nature of a suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, a thing done only under the conditions of martial law, civil war, or mixed war.
A judge cannot interfere with, tamper with, or in any way modify testimony without rendering incredible the truth seeking process in his sacred profession and destroying the fabric of his own occupation, thereby committing professional suicide. Any judge who tampers with testimony, deposition, or affidavit, is a threat to the commercial peace and dignity of the State and of the United States, is in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, is acting in the nature of a foreign enemy, and is justifiably subject to the penalties of treason; God's speed.
A lien implies impoundment of property. A breach of the said impoundment, also known as poundbreach, is a felony.
A bill in commerce is a private declaration of obligation. A lien in commerce is the same bill made public with a commercial affidavit attached in support of the bill. When a lien instrument is composed and made public, either by filing in the Office of the County Recorder or by any other method of open and wide publicity, a copy of the Claim of Lien must be provided for the Lien Debtor so that the Lien Debtor will thus be enabled to defend against the lien. To guarantee that the Lien Debtor has an ample grace period of three months to defend against the lien, the grace period does not begin until a copy of the Claim of Lien or a Notice of Lien is in the possession of the Lien Debtor. If only a Notice of Lien is supplied to the Lien Debtor then the Claim of Lien must be filed in a place of public access such as the County Recorder's Office, or other such public place clearly specified in the Notice of Lien/Affidavit of Obligation, and therefore cannot be lawfully entered by the County Recorder on a County, State or Federal Lien Index.
A Claim of Lien exists upon the property of a Lien Debtor even if a copy of that lien is only witnessed and in the possession of the Lien Debtor. However, if the Lien Debtor commits poundbreach by a sale, transfer, or assignment of the liened property to some third party, the Claim of Lien does not travel along with that property and attach commercial liability to the said third party, unless the Claim of Lien has been filed in the County Recorder's Office of the county affected by the lien, or said Claim of Lien has otherwise been satisfactorily publicized. If any attempt is made by any public official to impair the lien process by compelling the county recorder to refuse to file the Lien Claimant's Claim of Lien, then any alternate publicity of the Claim of Lien with reasonable diligence is to be considered adequate publication of the lien for the purpose of passing the obligation of lien forward to the new third party owner of the property, the property seized by the original Claim of Lien against the original Lien Debtor.
Note: From the author of the Quill and the Sword, in closing. "An affidavit unrebutted stands as the truth." Also: "Ignorance of the Law excuses, not, any person." (sic) "Seek the etymon and ye shall find the truth." Amen
By a Freeman held captive in dawn's early light.
Accreted Value Zero Coupon Bonds are issued at a discount and mature at Par ($1,000). The value of the bond increases mathematically by a slight amount every day during the life of the bond. The mathematical value of the bond on a given day is its accreted value (or accumulated value to date). Note that the accreted value may be higher or lower than the market value of the bond.
Accrued Interest Accrued interest is the amount of interest that has been earned since the last interest payment date. When a bond trades, the buyer pays the seller the accrued interest - a pro rata portion of the next interest payment, which will be paid to the buyer of the bond.
Agency Bonds Agency bonds are issued by United States agencies, and are generally thought to be very safe investments in terms of default risk. Examples of well known agencies that issue bonds are Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac"), Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or "Fannie Mae"), and the Federal Home Loan Bank.
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) In addition to calculating regular income tax, taxpayers are also required to calculate tax liability using the AMT method. The taxpayer then pays the higher of the tax calculated by the two methods. Some municipal bonds are subject to AMT, meaning that if you pay AMT, the interest earned on these bonds is taxable under the AMT calculation. Other municipal bonds are not subject to AMT, meaning that even if you pay taxes using the AMT method, interest from non-AMT municipals will not be taxable. Please consult your tax advisor for complete details, and how you might be affected by buying municipal bonds that are subject to AMT.
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Bank Qualified Refer to Investment Grade
Basis Point A basis point is simply 1/100th of one percent.
Bearer Bonds Bearer bonds are unregistered bonds which are payable to the bearer. Bonds are no longer issued in bearer form, but there are some older bearer bonds that are still in circulation.
Bond A bond is a debt instrument in which the issuer promises to pay to the bondholder principal and interest according to the terms and conditions of the bond.
Bond Ladder (Laddered Portfolio) A bond ladder is a portfolio of bonds that have staggered maturities. For example, rather than invest $100,000 in a 5 year bond, an investor might choose to invest in 4 blocks of $25,000 maturing in 2, 4, 6, and 8 years. This enables the investor to diversify in terms of default risk and reinvestment risk.
Book Entry Most bonds are issued in book entry form, which means that there is no physical bond certificate. Bond ownership is evidenced by a trade confirmation issued by the broker/dealer, and by the monthly statements that the brokerage firm provides.
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Call Date When a bond is issued, the issuer may have the option to call (redeem) the bond on specified dates and prices prior to maturity. The list of dates on which a specified bond can be called is shown in a call schedule.
Call Protection Call protection refers to the amount of time from the current date until a bond can be called. For example, if the first call on a bond is in 3 years from now, a buyer will have 3 years of call protection, and they are assured that they can own the bond for at least 3 years.
Call Risk Call risk refers to the risk that a bond may be called when the investor does not want it to be called. Bond are often called when interest rates decline, so investors in the bond get their cash back and have to reinvest it at the lower rates. Call risk can be eliminated by buying non-callable bonds.
Call Schedule A call schedule is a list of the dates that a bond can be called, together with the corresponding price for each call date.
Callable If a bond can be called (redeemed) prior to maturity, the bond is said to be callable. If a bond can not be called prior to maturity, it is said to be non-callable.
Certificates of Participation Certificates of Participation (COPs) are a type of municipal bond that are often used to finance capital improvement projects or equipment. The COPs represent participation in lease payments made by the municipality for the project or equipment.
Corporate Bond Corporate bonds represent debt of corporations. The bonds are fully taxable, and they are issued in maturities ranging from less than one year to about 30 years (although there are a few corporate bonds that mature in more than 30 years). They typically pay interest twice a year. Corporate bonds can be quite safe when they are issued by strong companies, or they can have significant risk of default when issued by weak companies. Two rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poors rate bonds as to the risk of default. Please see the BondFinder section on safety for a complete discussion on ratings and default risk.
Coupon A coupon is the stated interest rate for a bond. Most bonds have a fixed coupon that does not change during the life of the bond. Most bonds have two coupon payments per year. For example, a bond with a 5.0% coupon will pay $25 twice per year, for total interest of $50 which is 5.0% of the face value of the bond (almost all bonds have a face value of $1,000).
Credit Ratings In order to help us assess the credit worthiness of a bond issuer, there are agencies that study the financial strength of bond issuers, and assign credit ratings to them. The two major rating agencies are Moody and Standard & Poors. These agencies assign ratings to bond issues so that investors can determine the credit worthiness of an issue without having to do the financial analysis on their own. For a more detailed list of ratings and their meanings, please see the section on safety.
Current Yield Current yield is the rate of return an investor will get, without taking into account the value of the premium or discount of the purchase price. It is calculated by dividing the coupon by the price. The current yield is not a good indication of your return on investment. Yield to maturity and yield to call take into account the value of the discount or premium paid for the bond, and as such they offer a much better indication of the value of the bond.
CUSIP A CUSIP is a unique identifier assigned to a bond at the time it is issued.
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Dated Date The dated date is the date the bond is issued and starts to accrue interest.
Default A bond that ceases to pay interest (because the issuer has financial problems) is in default of the terms of the bond agreement, and is said to be in default. Clearly, purchasing a bond in default is an extremely risky investment.
Delivery Bonds are issued in several different delivery forms. The most popular forms of delivery are Book Entry and Registered. There are also some older bonds in circulation that were issued in bearer form.
Discount Bond Bonds mature at a par value, which is almost always $1,000. A premium bond is any bond that is currently trading at a price above par. A discount bond is a bond trading at a price lower than par.
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Escrowed to Maturity (ETM) Sometimes an issuer desires to pay off a bond in order to remove the debt from its books. However, the bond may not be callable, and the issuer can not redeem the bonds at its discretion. In this case the issuer may deposit sufficient funds with a trustee into an escrow account so that the trustee can use the funds to pay all interest and principal as they come due.
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First Coupon Date Bonds typically pay interest twice per year on coupon payment dates. The first coupon date is the date on which the very first interest payment will be made for a bond. It is relevant because bonds often have a longer or shorter than normal first payment period. Once the first coupon payment has been made, the bond will likely pay every 6 months after that.
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General Obligation Bonds The interest and principal payments for a municipal bond are typically either guaranteed by the issuer or by the revenue from a specific project. If they are guaranteed by a specific project, the bondholder is relying on revenue from the project to pay principal and interest, and the bonds are known as revenue bonds. If the issuer guarantees the repayment of principal and interest, the bonds are known as a general obligation (often referred to as G.O.) of the issuer.
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High Yield Bonds (See Junk Bonds) High Yield Bonds are typically corporate bonds that are rated below investment grade by the major rating services. These bonds pay much higher interest than investment grade bonds, but there is usually a substantial risk of default, which is why they are often referred to as "junk" bonds.
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Industry Group Corporations are often grouped by the industry to which they belong. A few industry groups are Financial Services, Industrials and Transportation.
Insured Bonds Some municipal bonds are insured as to principal and interest by large bond insurance firms. The insurance firms are generally large with considerable financial strength. Therefore, any bond that is insured by one of the major insurers will carry a top credit rating from the major rating services, regardless of the issuer's credit strength.
Interest Interest is the money the issuer pays to the bondholder at specified times throughout the life of the bond. The stated interest rate of a bond is usually referred to as the coupon rate. Most bonds pay interest semi-annually (twice per year).
Interest Payment Dates Most bonds pay interest twice per year. The interest payment dates are usually the same month and day as the maturity date of the bond, and the six month anniversary. For example, a bond with a stated interest rate (coupon) of 5.0% and a maturity of 02/15/2005 will pay $25 every February 15 (the same month and day as the maturity date) and $25 every August 15 (the 6 month anniversary). Note that each payment is half of the stated interest rate of 5% ($50) per year per $1,000 bond.
Investment Grade The two major credit rating services rate bonds as to their credit worthiness. Bonds that are rated at or above "Baa" by Moody's, or "BBB" by S&P are said to be investment grade bonds. Bonds rated lower than these ratings are said to be high yield (junk) bonds.
Issue Description This is the name of the issuer of the bond, and sometimes a brief description of the purpose of the bond. Think of this as the bond's name.
Issuer The issuer is the entity that issues a bond. It could be the name of a company in the case of a corporate bond, or the name of the state, city, or county in the case of a municipal bond. The U.S. government is the issuer of Treasury bonds.
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Junk Bonds The two major credit rating services rate bonds as to their credit worthiness. Bonds that are rated at or above "Baa" by Moody, or "BBB" by S&P are said to be investment grade bonds. Bonds rated lower than these ratings are said to be high yield (junk) bonds.
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Listed Most corporate bonds trade over-the-counter - that is to say that they do not trade on an exchange. There are a small number of bonds that do trade on the NYSE, and these bonds are said to be "listed" on the exchange.
Long Bond The U.S. government currently issues new Treasury notes and bonds with maturities in 2, 3, 5, 10, and 30 years. The 30 year bond is called the long bond, and it is considered one of the benchmark indicators of interest rates.
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Maturity Date The maturity date of a bond is the date on which the bond will be repaid. Note that many bonds have features such as puts and calls which may cause the principal to be repaid on an earlier date.
Minimum See quantity.
Moody's Investors Service One of the major bond credit rating services.
Municipal Bonds Municipal bonds are issued by state, county, or city governments. They are generally exempt from federal tax, and are generally state tax-free for residents of the state in which they are issued. (This is not true for all states. Please see the discussion on states below for more information.) It should also be noted that though interest is tax-exempt, any capital gains are taxed at the appropriate levels.
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Non-Callable Bond If a bond can be called (redeemed) prior to maturity, the bond is said to be callable. If a bond can not be called prior to maturity, it is said to be non-callable.
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Original-Issue Discount (OID) Some bonds are issued at a discount to the Par value. In the case of a municipal bond, the accretion of the value from the original issue discount price to Par is considered tax-free income. Throughout the life of the bond, the cost basis of the bond will increase based on a formula known as constant yield to maturity (CYM). This means that if you buy a bond with an OID priced at 96, and sell it 5 years later at 98, you will not incur a capital gain as long as the accreted value of the bond based on CYM is 98 or greater
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Par Value Par value, also known as Face value, is the value of the bond at maturity. Almost all bonds have a $1,000 par value. Bond prices are almost always quoted as a percentage of par, so you will hear prices such as 99 or 101.5. These refer to the percentage of $1,000, and mean $990 and $1,015 per bond respectively.
Pay Frequency The pay frequency refers to the frequency that the bond pays interest. The most common pay frequency is semi-annually (twice per year), but bonds can also pay interest monthly, quarterly, annually, or at maturity.
Physical Bonds are issued in several different delivery forms. The most popular forms of delivery are Book Entry and Registered. There are also some older bonds in circulation that were issued in bearer form. In the case of book entry bonds, there is no physical bond certificate created. Bearer bonds and registered bonds are both issued with physical bond certificates that can be delivered to the bondholder, so they are said to be physical bonds.
Premium Bond Bonds mature at a par value, which is almost always $1,000. A premium bond is any bond that is currently trading at a price above par. A discount bond is a bond trading at a price lower than par.
Pre-Refunded Sometimes an issuer desires to pay off a bond in order to remove the debt from its books. However, the bond may not be immediately callable, and the issuer can not redeem the bonds at its discretion. In this case the issuer may deposit sufficient funds with a trustee into an escrow account so that the trustee can use the funds to pay all interest and principal on a specified call date in the future. In this case, the bond is said to be pre-refunded, and the pre-refunded date should be viewed as the date that the bond will be redeemed.
Price Almost all bonds have a $1,000 par value. Bond prices are almost always quoted as a percentage of par, so you will hear prices such as 99 or 101.5. These refer to the percentage of $1,000, and mean $990 and $1,015 per bond respectively. The price of a bond moves higher and lower throughout the life of a bond based on movements in general market rates, the maturity of the bond, changes to credit ratings, and other factors.
Principal The principal is the cost per bond multiplied by the number of bonds in a transaction. Note that the price of a bond is quoted as a percentage of $1,000 (Par). So if you purchase 10 bonds that are priced at 99.0, the price is 10 x (99% of 1,000) = $9,900. (To convert a bond price to principal, simply move the decimal one place to the right.)
Purpose Most municipal bonds are issued for a specific purpose. Some common purposes of issuing bonds are to pay for housing, education, healthcare, and transportation.
Put Bonds Put bonds are issued with an option that entitles bondholders to force the issuer to buy back the bonds on specific dates (put the bonds back to the issuer).
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Quantity The quantity refers to the number of bonds being offered. Note that bonds typically have a $1,000 par value, so 50 bonds means $50,000 of par value. The current actual price may be more or less than par. In some cases the bond offering may be for a minimum number of bonds as well. This means that you can not buy fewer bonds than the minimum designated in the offering.
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Ratings (See Credit Rating)
Redemption When the principal of the bond is paid off, the bond is said to be redeemed. Bonds can be redeemed at maturity, or on a call date or put date.
Registered Bonds Registered bonds are bonds that are issued as a physical certificate, and the owner is registered with the bond trustee. If the bond is lost, the registered owner can get the certificate replaced by paying a small fee.
Revenue Bonds The interest and principal payments for a municipal bond are typically either guaranteed by the issuer or by the revenue from a specific project. If they are guaranteed by a specific project, the bondholder is relying on revenue from the project to pay principal and interest, and the bonds are known as revenue bonds. If the issuer guarantees the repayment of principal and interest, the bonds are known as a general obligation (often referred to as G.O.) of the issuer.
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Secondary Market Bonds which have been issued and then trade subsequent to the original issue are said to be trading in the secondary market.
Settlement Date When a bond trade takes place, the buyer and seller agree on a date when the buyer will pay for the bonds and the seller will deliver the bonds. For municipal bonds and corporate bonds, the settlement date is typically 3 business days after the trade date. For Treasury and zero coupon bonds the settlement date is typically the next business day after the trade.
Sinking Fund Some municipal or corporate bonds are issued with a sinking fund provision, which could be optional or mandatory. In the case of a sinking fund the issuer pays off the principal of the bond over time, for example 10% of the principal in each of the last 10 years of the life of the bond. If the sinking fund is mandatory the issuer must make these payments each year.
Spread The spread of a bond refers to the difference between the yield of the bond and the yield of a Treasury bond with a comparable maturity. Since the Treasury yield is considered risk-free, the spread reflects the risk premium of the bond. The spread is expressed in basis points (1/100th of 1 percent.).
Standard & Poors One of the major credit rating companies.
State This is the state in which the bond was issued. This is important for tax purposes since in some states interest earned from municipal bonds is exempt from state tax for investors who live in the state where the bond was issued. State will only appear on queries for municipal bonds. Click here for more information about states.
STRIPS A Zero Coupon Treasury Security which stands for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (Refer to Zero Coupon Bonds).
Subject to Extraordinary Redemption Some municipal bonds are issued with an extraordinary redemption provision which gives the issuer the right to call the bonds under certain circumstances. The circumstances could range from natural disasters to cancelled projects to almost anything else.
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Tax Status Municipal bonds are generally free of federal tax, and are generally not subject to alternative minimum tax (AMT). However, some municipal bonds are subject to federal income tax (tax status = "taxable"), and some are subject to AMT (tax status = "Subject to Alt min tax").
Taxable See tax status.
Taxable Equivalent Yield The taxable equivalent yield (TEY) is a calculated value that calculates the pre-tax yield an investor would need to get so that after paying tax, the after tax yield would be equal to the tax-free yield on a municipal bond.
Treasury Bills The U.S. government issues Treasury Bills, Treasury notes, and Treasury bonds. Treasury bills are issued in 3 month, 6 month and 1 year maturities, and they are sold at a discount to par. The bonds do not pay period interest, and the return an investor receives is based on the amount that the purchase price is discounted from par.
Treasury Bonds and Notes Treasury notes and bonds are issued by the U.S. government in maturities of 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years and 30 years. They all pay interest semi-annually. The issues that mature in 10 years or less are called notes, and the 30 year issue is called a bond. The most recently issued 30 year bond is called "the long bond".
Type (Rev or G.O) The interest and principal payments for a municipal bond are typically either guaranteed by the issuer or by the revenue from a specific project. If they are guaranteed by a specific project, the bondholder is relying on revenue from the project to pay principal and interest, and the bonds are known as revenue bonds. If the issuer guarantees the repayment of principal and interest, the bonds are known as a general obligation (often referred to as G.O.) of the issuer.
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Yield See Yield to maturity, yield to call and current yield.
Yield to Call Some bonds can be called (redeemed) by the issuer on specified dates throughout the life of the bond. Based on the current price of a bond, the yield to all calls should be calculated, and the investor should note the lowest yield to call and the yield to maturity. This will give the investor their worst case scenario.
Yield to Maturity Yield to maturity is the calculated return on investment that an investor will get if they hold the bond to maturity. It takes into account the present value of all future cash flows, as well as any premium or discount to par that the investor pays.
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Zero Coupon Bonds Zero Coupon Bonds are bonds that do not pay interest during the life of the bond. They are bought at a discount to the maturity value. For example, you might pay $700 today to get back $1,000 in 5 years. The difference between what you pay now and what you receive in the future is your return. Zero Coupon Bonds are similar in concept to savings bonds.
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City University of New York Law Review Volume 9 | Issue 1 Winter 2005 Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial Decision-Making Sanja Zgonjanin CUNY School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact email@example.com. Recommended Citation Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial Decision-Making, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 31 (2005). Available at: 10.31641/clr090102 Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial Decision- Making Acknowledgements The author thanks Professor Ruthann Robson for her invaluable comments and suggestions. This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol9/iss1/3 QUOTING THE BIBLE: THE USE OF RELIGIOUS REFERENCES IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING Sanja Zgonjanin* INTRODUCTION The use of religion in judicial decision-making is the subject of an ongoing debate.1 Whether and to what extent a decision is based on religious argument or influenced by religious convictions is a difficult question to answer. While scholars disagree on the appropriateness of religious arguments or influences in judicial decision- making,2 they commonly recognize that explicit reference to religious authority in a written opinion is problematic.3 Many * J.D. Candidate, City University of New York School of Law, May 2006; M.A., Columbia University, 2000; M.L.S., Queens College, 1999. The author thanks Professor Ruthann Robson for her invaluable comments and suggestions. 1 See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005). 2 Scholars differ on the issue of the appropriateness of religion in judicial decision- making. However, most legal literature on the issue is written from the perspective advocating the use of religion in judicial decision-making. That viewpoint is shared by moderates and conservatives alike. See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 102-04 (1999); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239-41 (1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; Scott C. Idleman, The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 91 VA. L. REV. 515 (2005) [hereinafter Idleman, Concealment]; Teresa S. Collett, “The King’s Good Servant, but God’s First”: The Role of Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000); Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2000); Daniel G. Ashburn, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American Judicial Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 295 (1994). 3 GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 2, at 239 (“Judicial opinions are formalized justifications for decisions. Opinions are supposed to refer only to what is legally relevant . . . . What is legally relevant is generally conceived to be the same for all judges, so neither personal religious convictions nor any other idiosyncratic convictions are legally relevant. Given this understanding about judicial opinions, it follows that opinions should not contain direct references to the religious premises of judges.”); Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 814 (2004) (“In addition, judges are not insincere by leaving their religious or comprehensive justifications out of their opinions but consistent with the Establishment Clause (i.e., the ‘rule of law’) and a proper understanding of religious pluralism. Leaving out religious justifications also facilities [sic] consensus on legal results and lower-level legal rules and principles without raising the thorny philosophical, theological, and hermenuetical [sic] questions implicated by religious justifications.”); Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1998) (“In fact, given that religious bases may be less than universal in their acceptance among the relevant audiences to the opinion, it is quite sensible that the judge would not necessarily 31 32 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 judges are religiously active and outspoken about the impact of religion on their work.4 Some well-known Supreme Court justices were, and are, deeply religious.5 Unlike the past, today’s Supreme Court Justices, such as Antonin Scalia, speak publicly about their religious faith.6 Some judges have explicitly stated in their opinions that “[c]ourts must recognize that the state is but one of several spheres of government, each with its distinct jurisdiction and make reference to them in the act of justification.”); Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 35 (1997) (“One would expect that a savvy judge who bases his or her decision on personal morality will not do so explicitly, but will cite only legally relevant grounds for the decision.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square—The Building Blocks for an Intermediate Position, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (1996); see generally David Barringer, Higher Authorities, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 68. 4 See, for example, Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success—My Spiritual Journey, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1139, 1157 (1996), in which Texas Supreme Court Justice Gonzalez describes his religious re-awakening and the impact his faith had on his decisions, including Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984); In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988); Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1992), Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home, 847 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1993); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996); and Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995). He concludes: In each of the above cases, my relationship with God impacted the way I considered and wrote about the issues presented. How we experience God and our level of religious commitment (or lack of commitment) impacts our work. One’s views on how the world began, sin, forgiveness, and redemption influences our attitudes, behavior, and everything that we do. Gonzalez, supra, at 1157. 5 See generally James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in Late Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317 (2001); Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices: Historical Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383 (1998); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989). Some judges believe that they have a right to use religious references in justifying their decisions. Judge Griffen, who is also a Baptist pastor, explains why he thinks he has that right: Finally, devout judges must remain sensitive to the important role that religious values and their proper expression serve within a pluralistic society. If the devout judge does not remind society that certain conduct is condemned as offensive to domestic tranquility, contrary to the laws of nature, or inconsistent with truth, then society is denied the value of that information and judgment in its pursuit of justice. The give-and-take of competing moral, behavioral, intellectual, and cultural philosophies is how a pluralistic society operates. The devout judge, as a citizen of two societies, helps society remain pluralist by thinking and acting in a holistic way, not by trivializing religious conviction. Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 520 (1998). 6 See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Makes The Case for Christianity; Justice Proclaims Belief in Miracles, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1996, at A1; see also, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 33 limited authority granted by God,”7 and “that God, not the state or any government established by man, is the source of all our rights.”8 Some judges use religion as an alternative to traditional sentencing such as jail or rehabilitation for drug and alcohol offenders. 9 Other judges go as far as prohibiting the parents in a divorce decree from exposing their child to “non-mainstream” religious beliefs and rituals.10 Despite the unprecedented presence of religion in the lives of ordinary American citizens,11 some scholars12 continue to maintain “a modern myth that religion is somehow persecuted in American life.”13 Responding to the argument that explicit religious references are rare or absent from judicial opinions,14 this Article will demonstrate that judges’ personal religious beliefs and religious education very often find a place in decisions they write.15 A quick 7 Ex parte G.C., No. 1040001, 2005 WL 1793345, at *22 (Ala. July 29, 2005) (Parker, J., dissenting). 8 Id. at *14 (Bolin, J., concurring specially). 9 See Alan Maimon, Judge Lets Some Defendants Attend Worship as Sentencing Option, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KY), May 31, 2005, at A1. Michael Caperton, a Laurel district judge since 1994 and a devout Christian, offered the option of attending worship for ten services “about 50 times to repeat drug and alcohol offenders.” Id. 10 See Kevin Corcoran, Father Appeals Anti-Wicca, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 26, 2005, at A1. 11 See generally Faith Based and Community Initiatives, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). In the field of legal theory, one author suggested it is time to develop a Christian jurisprudence. Jonathan Edward Maire, The Possibility of a Christian Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 101, 101-02 (1995). 12 Paulsen & Johnson, supra note 6, at 867 (commenting that Justice Scalia’s speech at a prayer breakfast at the First Baptist Church in Jackson, Mississippi, on April 9, 1996, was “about the clash of world views between Christianity and today’s dominant culture. It was about the difficulties of being a Christian in a secular world—our culture and, especially, our legal culture.”). 13 Biskupic, supra note 6, at A7 (quoting James Dunn, executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs). 14 Idleman, Concealment, supra note 2, at 520 (“To most observers of the American legal system, including its participants, the absence of overt religious language or reasoning in judicial decisionmaking is unremarkable. In all likelihood, it is not even noticed.”); Modak-Truran, supra note 3, at 786-87 (“[e]xplicit religious references rarely appear in judicial opinions.”); Berg & Ross, supra note 5, at 387 (“Note, however, the limits on the importance of religious arguments. First, such arguments do not appear as often as one might expect in an age of pervasive Christianity: one can basically count them on two hands.”); Richard H. Hiers, The Death Penalty and Due Process in Biblical Law, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 751, 752 (2004) (“Biblical texts occasionally are even cited as authority in judicial opinions.”). 15 See generally J. Michael Medina, The Bible Annotated: Use of the Bible in Reported American Decisions, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 187 (1991). This annotation collects cases where a court directly cites a biblical passage, and the author lists the following doctrines for which the Bible is cited as the foundation: “the sequestration rule, punitive damages, forgiveness of debts, due process, forfeiture, alien rights, statutory construc34 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Westlaw online survey of federal and state cases for the use of biblical books, such as Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, produces a high number of results.16 Interestingly, courts of the nineteenth century rarely quoted the Bible, despite the fact that many judges were devoutly religious and active in their local congregations. 17 Quoting the Bible is much more characteristic of twentieth-century American courts and is a matter of great concern to anyone who believes that judicial decision-making should not be based on comprehensive doctrines such as religion.18 The first part of this Article discusses the judicial use of the Bible in criminal sentencing by trial courts. The second part examines some of the ways in which courts undermine the religious character of biblical quotations. The third part examines the variety of purposes for which courts use biblical quotations. The fourth part is a case study of judicial use of two specific biblical tion, basic agency doctrine, tenancy by the entirety, the two-witness rule, the right of confrontation, judicial impartiality, criminalization of sodomy, the necessity defense to criminal charges, the right of free travel, usury, eminent domain, impeachment of witnesses, the law of apportionment, property tax exemptions, double jeopardy, and various elements of past and present domestic relations law.” Id. at 189-91. 16 For example, a Westlaw search performed on February 10, 2006 resulted in the following: Genesis 1 is quoted in 10 state and 11 federal cases; Exodus 21 is quoted in 59 state and 27 federal cases; Leviticus 24 is quoted in 5 state and 8 federal cases; Deuteronomy 19 is quoted in 16 state and 7 federal cases. In the same search, the word Leviticus appeared in 126 state, 89 federal, and 4 Supreme Court cases; the word Deuteronomy appeared in 173 state, 100 federal, and 5 Supreme Court cases. This author’s review of search results showed that only a small number of quotations are part of the facts of a case. Due to the lack of more precise search methods in Westlaw and Lexis databases that would allow comprehensive inquiries of biblical quotations, this Article was limited to a discussion of a very narrow scope of biblical quotations in judicial opinions. 17 See infra Appendix. 18 John Rawls based his theory of justice on the concept of public reason shared by all citizens, “independent of opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines,” and “an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.” He said: The religious doctrines that in previous centuries were the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of constitutional government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse. Comprehensive political and moral doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by citizens generally, and they also no longer can, if they ever could, serve as the professed basis of society. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 9-10 (1993). Rawls viewed the Supreme Court as the best exemplar of public reason in a society of constitutional regime with judicial review and argued that public reason is “well suited to be the court’s reason in exercising its role . . . .” Id. at 231. But see generally GREENAWALT, Publicly Accessible Grounds of Decision and Religious Convictions, in RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 2, at 49-84; and Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 35 passages, Matthew 6:24 and Luke 16:13. The fifth part considers the judicial use of religious references other than the Bible. The Article concludes that the use of religious references in judicial decision- making should be prohibited.19 “The Christian state knows only privileges.”20 Christian faith is privileged in the United States.21 Because a privilege is not a right, the government is under no obligation to confront the injustice and discrimination created by it.22 On the contrary, since the religious beliefs of a majority of Americans are associated with Christianity, 23 such privilege is largely invisible and sustained by the power it creates.24 As is often the case, the characteristics of the majority become so internalized that they are considered the social norm.25 In a way, they “domesticate” the minority.26 Additionally, 19 “The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally. Those they must view as irrelevant. Equally, they cannot invoke their or other people’s religious or philosophical views.” RAWLS, supra note 18, at 236. 20 KARL MARX, On The Jewish Question, in 3 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 1843-44, at 146, 146 (Jack Cohen et al. trans., 1975). 21 Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege that Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617, 626 (2003). See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (upholding a New York City program permitting public schools to release students to attend religious instruction and stating, “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (holding that a statute prohibiting the contracting of foreigners to perform labor and services did not apply to clergy, and stating that “this is a Christian nation”). 22 See Duncan, supra note 21, at 621. 23 See BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., THE GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 12 (2001), http:// www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_studies/aris.pdf (on file with the author). According to the most comprehensive study of religious identification of American adults, done by the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 76.5% of the U.S. population self-identifies as Christians. Id. See also Largest Religious Groups in the United States of America, http://www.adherents.com/rel_USA.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2006). 24 Duncan, supra note 21, at 622. See also Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005). Applying Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the court held that the county board’s invocation policy excluding a county resident’s Wiccan religion was constitutionally sound and that the Wiccan religion was not monotheistic, did not “fit broadly within ‘the Judeo-Christian tradition,’” and lacked “the unifying aspects of our heritage.” Id. 25 See Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 890 (1995). See also STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 141 (1996). [O]ur social system is not supposed to privilege organized religion or religious belief over the secular realm. But this protection of the secular creates a peculiar vacuum, in which religion is supposed to be invisible, yet Christmas is a national holiday. Even the phrasing ‘church [but 36 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 religious practices and expressions are widely accepted and sanctioned by courts based on their context27 or tradition.28 It is now accepted that religious practices and expressions that are deeply embedded in the nation’s history and tradition do not violate the Constitution.29 They include, among others, opening the Supreme Court session with “God save the United States and this honorable not synagogue or mosque] and state’ privileges Christianity as the defining religion for constitutional drafting. Systems of privilege and the religious/ secular dichotomy intertwine with the rule of law to contribute to the undermining of justice. Systemic privileging and oppression remain invisible and undiscussed, in accordance with the unwritten rules of our society. The rule of law does nothing to end this invisibility and may even contribute to its continuation. Thus the very act of seeing that the rule of law and systems of privilege undermine justice is itself problematic. A full attack on privileging and oppression can begin in earnest only when the legal profession recognizes this privileging dynamic. But this reality—privilege—that we must see has not even found articulation in legal vocabulary. Id. 26 The term “domestication” is borrowed from lesbian legal theory. “Domestication also describes a process of substituting one way of thinking for another. Domestication has occurred when the views of the dominant culture, in this case legal culture, are so internalized they are considered common sense.” Ruthann Robson, Mother: The Legal Domestication of Lesbian Existence, 7 HYPATIA 172, 172 (1992). 27 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a display of the cr`eche in a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause while the display of a menorah in front of a county building, in a particular setting next to a Christmas tree, does not); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that “notwithstanding the religious significance of the cr`eche,” its display by the city did not violate the Establishment Clause). Justice Burger stated: It would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so “taint” the city’s exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol— the cr`eche—at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would be a stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to our holdings. Id. at 686. 28 See Freethought Soc’y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 269 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a Ten Commandments plaque affixed to a courthouse is not a real threat to the Establishment Clause). The court noted that “the age and history of the plaque provide a context which changes the effect of an otherwise religious plaque.” Id. at 264 (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 29 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788-89. Justice Burger held that a century-old practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid with public funds does not pose a real threat to the Establishment Clause. Id. at 795. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 37 Court;”30 opening a legislative session with a prayer;31 recognizing the nation in the pledge of allegiance as “one Nation under God;”32 and printing “In God We Trust” on our money,33 and posting it in court rooms, Congressional chambers, and other places of government business. After all, “In God we trust” is our national motto,34 and Thanksgiving and Christmas are national holidays.35 President Reagan even once proclaimed 1983 the year of the Bible.36 The privilege of Christian religion is also affirmed and supported by Congress. For example in 2005, members of Congress introduced a House resolution directing the Speaker of the House to display the Ten Commandments in the House Chamber in case the Supreme Court was to rule that the government display of the Ten Commandments in public places is unconstitutional.37 Advanced by Representatives King, Chabot, Bartlett, Norwood, Pitts, Westmoreland, Blackburn, Fox, Gingrey, Hostettler, Goode, and Alexander, the resolution was introduced in anticipation of the Supreme Court ruling on two Ten Commandment cases argued during the April 2005 term: Van Orden v. Perry38 and McCreary County v. ACLU.39 The resolution states, among other things, that the House “recognizes that posting the Ten Commandments in the House Chamber is a constitutionally protected expression of our Nation’s heritage and the foundation of our laws.”40 The statement that biblical commands are the foundation of our laws may come as a surprise to law school students who, upon entering law school, first 30 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reaffirming the secular purpose of “ceremonial deism” of the phrase, “God save the United States and this honorable Court,” which, despite its religious roots, does not convey endorsement of a particular religious belief). 31 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. See also Simpson, 404 F.3d at 282 (applying Marsh, which “teaches[ ] legislative invocations perform the venerable function of seeking divine guidance for the legislature”). But see Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005) (holding that the Town Council’s invoking of Jesus Christ while excluding deities associated with other faiths was “not constitutionally accepted legislative prayer like that approved in Marsh”). 32 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 33 31 U.S.C. § 5112 (2000). 34 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 35 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1990). 36 S.J. Res. 165, 97th Cong., 96 Stat. 1211 (1982). 37 H.R. Res. 214, 109th Cong. (2005). 38 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (holding that the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas state capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause). 39 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005) (holding that displaying the Ten Commandments at a Kentucky county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause). 40 H.R. Res. 214, 109th Cong. (2005). 38 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 learn about the history and sources of American law. One of the most popular law school books on this topic is the Historical Introduction to Anglo-American Law in a Nutshell.41 In tracing American legal history, this book starts by pointing out that most of the concepts of Anglo-American law were developed in the last eight hundred years,42 thus excluding the Bible as a direct source of our laws. The book also lays out two main sources of law upon which the American legal system relies: cases and statutes.43 The Bible is not mentioned as a source of American law. The privilege of Christianity as the predominant religion in the United States is vigorously supported by the media. While the author was working on this Article, Pope John Paul II died on April 2, 2005.44 Shortly thereafter, on April 11, 2005, Maurice Hilleman, one of the greatest scientists of modern times, died.45 While Pope John Paul II was considered by many to be one of the most important “spiritual leaders and moral teachers of the Modern Era”46 and probably one of the most famous people in the world, microbiologist Maurice Hilleman remained “the world’s best kept secret.” 47 The discrepancy in the print media coverage of the deaths of these two important persons speaks for itself and is stunning. A search of the term “Pope John” in the “Major Newspapers” section of the Lexis News & Business online database produced 1086 entries for the period between April 2, 2005, when the Pope died, and April 3, 2005, when the news was announced. In contrast, a search for “Maurice Hilleman” in the same database for the period between April 11, 2005, when the scientist died, and April 12, 2005, when the news was released, produced only four results: the Balti- 41 FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR., HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (3d. ed. 1990). 42 Id. at 2. 43 See id. at 95-125. For a detailed explanation of sources of Anglo-American law, see generally CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1927); and SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1923). 44 See After 26-Year Reign, Pontiff Dies at 84, CNN, Apr. 2, 2005, http:// www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/02/pope.dies/index.html; Ian Fisher, Pope John Paul II Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at A1. 45 Lawrence K. Altman, Maurice Hilleman, Master in Creating Vaccines, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A1. 46 S. Res. 95, 109th Cong. (2005). See also S. Res. 94, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 186, 109th Cong. (2005). 47 Patricia Sullivan, Maurice R. Hilleman Dies; Created Vaccines, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at B6. Maurice Hilleman “invented over 40 vaccines, including those for mumps, chickenpox, measles, rubella, hepatitis A and B, meningitis, and countless variants of the flu virus.” Caroline Richmond, Obituary, Maurice Hilleman; Inventor of More than 40 Vaccines, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 20, 2005, at 35. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 39 more Sun, the New York Times, the Orlando Sentinel, and the Seattle Times. While religious expression is recognized as part of American tradition and history, no court has yet provided a reasonable explanation of how the passage of time makes religious expression less religious and more secular so that it becomes a primary source of constitutional legitimacy.48 The proposition that religious practices and expressions do not violate the Constitution because they are accepted by a majority of society or are somehow “secularized” is a dangerous one.49 The government’s endorsement and use of religion encourages the oppression of minorities because it makes religious privilege invisible, allowing the majority in power to use the law according to its own beliefs.50 Congress is the biggest threat today to both judicial independence from religion and the court’s traditional role as the interpreter of the law. Members of Congress introduced the Constitution Restoration Act of 2005: Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any matter to the extent that relief is sought against an entity of Federal, State, or local government, or against an officer or agent of Federal, State, or local government (whether or not acting in official or personal capacity), concerning that entity’s, officer’s, or agent’s acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.51 48 Charles Gregory Warren, No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1691-92 (2003). See also State v. Ceballos, 832 A.2d 14, 55 (Conn. 2003) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [N]ot all religious references, including allusions to the Bible, God or other biblical characters, are impermissible. This is because many words and phrases traditionally viewed as religious in nature or derived from religious sources have become, over time, an integral part of the English language, and no longer may be recognized by either prosecutors or jurors as having purely religious connotations or derivations. Consider, for example, the phrases “raising Cain” and “for whatever a man sows, that he will also reap.” Both phrases are common expressions derived from the Bible. Still other expressions, such as “an eye for an eye,” have both religious and secular origins. Id. (citation omitted). 49 Warren, supra note 48, at 1692-93. 50 See generally Duncan, supra note 21. 51 S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); see also H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005). The Constitution Restoration Act was first introduced during the 108th Congress. See S. 2082, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004). During the 108th Congress, many other bills and resolutions were introduced recog40 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 By imposing its own religious values, the conservative religious right movement is destroying two of the most important values of American society: tolerance and pluralism.52 Attempts by conservative members of Congress to deprive the Supreme Court and the federal courts of their jurisdiction in solving disputes with religious subject matter are without precedent in our history. These attempts undermine the long-standing principle of judicial review articulated in Marbury v. Madison.53 At the same time, courts’ use of religious references and religious convictions in their decisionmaking is on the rise.54 It is hardly worth noting that, in a society with a Christian majority, the majority of judges are Christians.55 The power of the nizing the privilege of Christianity. See also H.R.J. Res. 39, 108th Cong. (2004) (constitutional amendment proposing “[a] law that prescribes the Pledge of Allegiance or provides for United States coins or currency is not a law respecting an establishment of religion because it refers to God in the Pledge or includes a reference to God on coins or currency.”); S. 1558, 108th Cong. (2003) (Religious Liberties Restoration Act proposing: the power to display the Ten Commandments on government property; the power to recite the Pledge of Allegiance on government property; the power to recite the national motto “In God We Trust” on government property; and the power to except this subject matter from the jurisdiction of federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court); S. Con. Res. 91, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing to designate April 2005 as American Religious History Month and requesting that “the President issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe the year with appropriate ceremonies and activities”). 52 Abraham H. Foxman, Foreword to ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: THE ASSAULT ON TOLERANCE AND PLURALISM IN AMERICA, at iii-iv (1994). This book provides an insight into the grassroots organizing and political commitment of the religious right that led to its enormous power and influence over all three branches of the government in the 1990s. The author defines the religious right as an: array of politically conservative religious groups and individuals who are attempting to influence public policy based on shared cultural philosophy that is antagonistic to pluralism and church/state separation. The movement consists mainly of Protestants, most of them evangelical or fundamentalist, a far smaller number of Catholics, and a smattering of Jews. Id. at 7. 53 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. 54 See infra Appendix. 55 The first Jewish Justice of the Supreme Court, Louis D. Brandeis, was appointed in 1916 by President Wilson. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From Benjamin to Brandeis to Breyer: Is There a Jewish Seat?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 229, 233 (2002). See also Religious Affiliation of the U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.adherents.com/adh_sc.html (last modified Jan. 31, 2006) (noting that with the confirmation of Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court consists of seven Christian (Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas) and two Jewish (Breyer and Ginsburg) justices). Statistics show that the Supreme Court is 78% Christian, with a Catholic majority of 56%; while 76.5% of the total U.S. population is affiliated with Christianity. Id. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 41 courts to use religious references as they see fit should not be underestimated. Speaking about the power of judicial review, Alexander Bickel once said, “[t]he least dangerous branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”56 Judges should be mindful of the power they are vested with and the public trust in their impartiality and refrain entirely from using religious references in their decision-making. Judges are bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct, which, in addition to its canons requiring that judges uphold the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary,57 clearly states: A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.58 The arbitrariness, inconsistency, and lack of law on the use of religious references in decision-making are some of the main reasons why such use should be proscribed. I. RELYING ON THE BIBLE IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING While the use of religious references in judicial decision-making is generally unjustified and inappropriate, the most disturbing and harmful invocation of the Bible takes place in criminal sentencing decisions. The Bible is regularly quoted during the criminal sentencing phase of trials by prosecutors and defense attorneys. In their closing arguments, both sides often invoke the Bible in order to convince juries that defendants deserve or do not deserve punishment. Even those defendants who do not wish to use biblical passages in their closing arguments, or for whom such use may be inappropriate, are coerced into doing so in response to prosecutorial use of religion. Such biblical invocation poses a great threat to a defendant’s constitutional rights.59 However, attorneys 56 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (2d. ed. 1986). 57 ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1 & 3 (2004). 58 Id. at Canon 3 (B)(5). 59 See generally Marcus S. Henson, Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make Direct Religious References in Closing Argument, 52 MERCER L. REV. 731 (2001). But see Elizabeth A. Brooks, Thou Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and Themes in Oral Arguments, 33 GA. L. REV. 1113 (1999). 42 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 are not alone in quoting the Bible. They are increasingly joined by trial judges, who use religious references in their decision-making process and their written opinions.60 While no court has yet specifically addressed whether judicial reliance on religious convictions in written opinions violates the Establishment Clause,61 some courts have considered the issue of whether a defendant’s due process rights are violated when judges rely on religious convictions or religious texts during the sentencing phase. In one well-publicized case, televangelist James O. Bakker, convicted of fraud and conspiracy, challenged his forty-fiveyear sentence claiming a due process violation because the trial judge made personal religious remarks during sentencing.62 The Fourth Circuit held that the trial judge’s comment, “[h]e had no thought whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests,” made during sentencing, violated Bakker’s due process.63 The Bakker court recognized that the Constitution does not require judges to relinquish their religious beliefs when they assume the office, but it stated that “[c]ourts, however, cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create the perception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it. Whether or not the trial judge has a religion is irrelevant for purposes of sentencing.”64 While Bakker does not involve explicit religious reference by a judge, it serves as a good example of a decision validating the utmost importance of judicial impartiality. However, judges differ on their approach to the use of religious references by their colleagues. The Ohio case of James Arnett is illustrative of the opposing views that judges hold about the use of religious references in judicial decision-making. James Arnett was sentenced to fifty-one years in prison after pleading guilty to ten counts of rape and one count of pandering obscenity to the minor daughter of his live-in girl- 60 See Lis Wiehl, Judges and Lawyers Are Not Singing from the Same Hymnal When It Comes to Allowing the Bible in the Courtroom, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 273, 274 (2000). 61 Modak-Truran, supra note 3, at 783. For a discussion about the lack of Establishment Clause violation challenges in capital cases involving religion during the penalty phase, closing arguments, and jury deliberations, see Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1090, 1104-30 (2001). 62 United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir. 1991). 63 Id. at 740-41. 64 Id. at 740. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 43 friend.65 On appeal, the court remanded for resentencing, holding that the trial judge acted outside the state’s sentencing guidelines and that she violated the defendant’s due process when she used a specific text from the Bible as a determining factor in sentencing.66 The trial judge explained to the defendant that when she had recently imposed a twenty-year sentence for a murder, at least the victim was gone and there was no pain to suffer, but in his case the victim would hurt for the rest of her life.67 The judge proceeded by describing her struggle the night before the sentencing decision about what sentence to impose when she found the answer in a biblical passage.68 The judge then quoted a passage from Matthew 18:5-6: “And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, [sic] receiveth me. But, [sic] whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that [sic] he were drowned in the depth of the sea.”69 It is interesting to note that Judge Painter, who wrote the Ohio Court of Appeals opinion, added a footnote after the above quotation, in which he noted: We must quote from the trial transcript, which is not entirely consistent with the Bible, King James Version. The notation “sic” indicates instances where words should have been italicized and where commas should not have been added. We assume that the court reporter added these errors and that the judge read the passage correctly.70 The apologetic tone of this footnote about quoting from a nonauthoritative version of the Bible and the care taken to achieve compliance with the King James Version is most striking. The authoritativeness of the King James Version71 appears to be self-evident for readers familiar with Christian religious texts, but this is most peculiar for someone who does not belong to that majority. It is not entirely clear why the judge took such care to correct the 65 State v. Arnett, Nos. C-980172, C-980173, 1999 WL 65632, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1999), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 207 (2005). 66 Id. at *2. 67 Id. at *1. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Id. at *1 n.1. 71 More than fifty English translations were printed before the King James Bible was published in 1611. DAVID CRYSTAL, THE STORIES OF ENGLISH 271-75 (2004). The King James Version, popularly known as the “Authorized Version,” was selected to be read in churches. Id. Most of its vocabulary and phrasing derived from the first English translation by William Tyndale, printed in 1525-1526. Id. 44 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 errors, namely italics and misplacement of commas, or why there was a concern with whether the judge read the passage correctly. It seems almost as if there was a legal requirement that when a court cites the Bible, the King James Version must be used. After the state appealed, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the sentence, holding that a sentencing judge’s quotation of a religious text and the acknowledgement of its use during the deliberation process is not impermissible per se and does not violate a defendant’s due process.72 The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus claiming a violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause and his due process rights.73 The district court held that the First Amendment claim was waived due to failure to include it in a brief and argument before the state appellate court, but that the judge’s reliance on a biblical passage as the final source for determining the sentence warranted conditional habeas relief until resentencing by a different judge.74 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the habeas petition, holding that the trial judge’s quotation of Matthew 18:5-675 in determining the sentence did not violate the defendant’s due process right because the biblical passage relied upon was just an “additional” source, rather than the “final” source of the decision.76 However, the dissent noted that the trial judge’s reliance on the New Testament provision to determine the sentence was dispositive because, according to the record, the judge admitted that her struggle over the final sentence was answered by this biblical passage. 77 Relying on Bakker, the dissent concluded that the use of a religious text as an authoritative source for reaching a legal result violated the defendant’s fundamental expectation of due process and expressed this related concern: If the Constitution sanctions such direct reliance on religious sources when imposing criminal sentences, then there is nothing to stop prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers from regularly citing religious sources like the Bible, the Talmud, or the Koran to justify their respective positions on punishment. The 72 State v. Arnett, 724 N.E.2d 793, 804 (Ohio 2000), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 207 (2005). 73 Arnett v. Jackson, 290 F. Supp. 2d 874, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2003). The court found that the Magistrate Judge correctly applied the standard of review set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Id. at 877-78. 74 Id. at 878. 75 Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 207 (2005). 76 Id. at 688. 77 Id. at 689 (Clay, J., dissenting). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 45 judge would be placed in the position of not only considering statutory sentencing factors, but also deciding which religious texts best justify a particular sentence. Under this approach, the judgments of trial courts could begin to resemble the fatwas of religious clerics, and the opinions of appellate courts echo the proclamations of the Sanhedrin.78 The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that “[t]here is nothing in the totality of the circumstances of Arnett’s sentencing to indicate that the trial judge used the Bible as her ‘final source of authority,’ as found by the district court,”79 is contrary to the trial judge’s own words: Because I was looking for a source, what do I turn to, to make, to make that determination, what sentence you should get . . . . And in looking at the final part of my struggle with you, I finally answered my question late at night when I turned to one additional source to help me.80 Although the trial judge said she turned to “one additional source,” she used the words “make that determination” when she referred to the sentence to impose.81 More importantly, she used the words “final part” and “finally answered” which clearly emphasized that the finality of her sentencing decision was solved by that one additional source.82 The plain meaning of the language “final” and “finally” was simply dismissed by the Sixth Circuit. The court justified its conclusion by reasoning that, “The [b]iblical principle of not harming children is fully consistent with Ohio’s sentencing consideration to the same effect.”83 The fact that the judge did not impose the maximum sentence commanded by the Bible proved that she did not actually sentence the defendant based upon her religious belief.84 As is obvious from the Arnett case, courts often justify the use of religious references on the grounds of consistency with the statutory law applied in the case. That is an unnecessary and disturbing practice. In considering the defendant’s due process 78 Id. at 691 (Clay, J., dissenting). 79 Id. at 688. 80 Id. at 684. 81 Id. In discussing what constitutes reliance on religious convictions, Kent Greenawalt states, “[t]he clearest instances of reliance on religious convictions occur when the person is certain that he would make a different choice if he disregarded those convictions. . . . A person is clearly not relying on religious convictions when his choice rests firmly on independent grounds.” GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 2, at 36. 82 Arnett, 393 F.3d at 684. 83 Id. at 688. 84 Id. 46 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 violation claim in Arnett, the Sixth Circuit used the Supreme Court rule that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when the death sentence is based on “factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion or political affiliation of the defendant.” 85 The Sixth Circuit then said, without any additional explanation, that the trial judge in Arnett did not base her decision on an impermissible factor, and that the factor used was not “totally irrelevant” because it was consistent with the sentencing statute.86 Nevertheless, before it reversed and remanded the case, the Sixth Circuit recognized the following: “We reach this conclusion despite the fact that reasonable minds could certainly question the propriety of the trial judge making mention of the Bible at all in her sentencing decision.”87 Whether the biblical passage quoted in an opinion is consistent or inconsistent with the statutory provision governing the case is irrelevant and, as such, should not be considered or included in a written opinion justifying a decision. Another example of the judicial use of biblical passages in criminal sentencing is the Nebraska case State v. Pattno.88 In Pattno, the defendant pled guilty to the sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to a minimum of twenty months and a maximum of five years in prison by the trial court judge.89 Before he imposed the sentence, the trial judge recited an extensive biblical scripture against homosexuality90 followed by the comment that he also con- 85 Id. at 686 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)). 86 Id. at 686-87. 87 Id. at 688. 88 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998). 89 Id. at 506. 90 Id. at 505-06. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his external power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him as God, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever [sic]. Amen. For this reason God gave them up to dishonorable passions. Their women exchanged natural relations for unnatural, and the men likewise gave up natural relations with women and were consumed with passion for one another, men committing shameless acts with men and receiving in their own persons the due penalty for their error. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 47 sidered the “nature . . . of the defendant.”91 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a reasonable person could have questioned the trial judge’s impartiality because he relied upon his personal religious beliefs in deciding the sentence.92 The court also pointed out that the defendant was convicted of having sexual contact with a minor, which is a crime, and not of having sexual contact with a person of the same gender, which is not a crime in the state of Nebraska.93 It is not unusual for judges to inject biblical passages in their opinions as justification for supporting the harsh punishment of certain crimes such as child sexual abuse. In People v. Jagnjic, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to no less than five and no more than fifteen years in prison.94 However, the New York Appellate Division found that, absent a professional psychiatric evaluation, the sentence was excessive. 95 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Lupiano pointed to the heinous nature of the crime, arguing that the sentencing decision should not be disturbed and quoted a biblical passage to support that view: The condemnation of crimes against the young is deeply ingrained in the ethical and moral history of western civilization. Indeed, the bible is replete with references to this universal condemnation as, for example, the following scriptural passage concerning children—“Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones . . . it were better than a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea” (Matthew 18:6).96 Quoting the Bible in support of a judicial decision is in clear violation of the judicial code, and it prejudices defendants not only by the content of the religious reference, but by the very fact that an irrelevant, extralegal source is used in the decision-making process. Id. (quoting the Bible). 91 Id. at 506. 92 Id. at 509. 93 Id. at 508. No statute in this state criminalizes sexual contact between consenting adults of the same gender. Thus, Pattno’s crime is that he had sexual contact with a minor; not that he had sexual contact with another male. Therefore, the biblical scripture which the judge read was not relevant to the crime to which Pattno pled guilty, and it should not have been considered by the judge in determining an appropriate sentence. Id. 94 447 N.Y.S.2d 439, 439 (App. Div. 1982). 95 See id. at 439-40. 96 Id. at 443 (Lupiano, J., dissenting). 48 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 As the Arnett, Pattno, and Jagnjic cases illustrate, any reliance on the Bible as a direct or supporting source of authority in the decisionmaking process jeopardizes the integrity of the criminal justice system and, if not proscribed, encourages further use of the Bible by judges and other officers of the court. II. UNDERMINING THE RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS REFERENCES There are many cases where judicial reference to a biblical passage is justified by the use of language that undermines the religious character of the text or its authority.97 This type of qualifying statement is in direct contradiction to the actual meaning of the text and to courts’ use of the Bible to support their arguments in countless cases in which the biblical references are used in their proper meaning. It is only logical to conclude that any use of biblical references in judicial decision-making, especially in written opinions, must be entirely arbitrary. On one hand, judges invoke the Bible as serious support for their propositions, and, on the other, their use of the Bible is trivialized. Judge Hildebrandt, who dissented in the State v. Arnett Ohio Court of Appeals decision finding a violation of due process, used the “mere”98 language justifica- 97 By qualifying a statement with “mere” or “merely,” courts undermine the religious value of the source from which the quotation is taken, despite the fact that the Bible is cited as the authority. This trend is consistent with the Supreme Court’s “secularization” of religious expressions. See generally Ashley M. Bell, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2001). Bell criticizes the Supreme Court’s secularization approach to religious expression: In addition to being an inconsistent solution, secularization does a great disservice to both religion and society. . . . Moreover, the Court seems more apt to secularize practices derived from Christianity, thus preferring Christianity over other religions. This consequence results in ‘religious divisiveness, violating the fundamental principles behind the religion clauses.’ Thus, the entire purpose of secularization backfires in its process. While attempting to neutralize religious influence, the Court in actuality prefers some religions, namely Christianity, over others. Id. at 1305-07. This critique is consistent with the famous quote of the Supreme Court that, “The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.” Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 98 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “mere” and “merely” as follows: “mere- Having no greater extent, range, value, power, or importance that the designation implies; that is barely or only what it is said to be;[ ] insignificant, ordinary, foolish, inept” and “merely-Without any other quality, reason, purpose, view, etc.; only (what is referred to) and nothing more.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1750 (5th ed. 2002). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 49 tion twice in a very short opinion. Hildebrandt stated that “[t]he language quoted from the Bible merely reflects society’s interests in protecting its most vulnerable citizens, a laudable goal that is incorporated into the sentencing guidelines enacted by the General Assembly.”99 The dissent concluded, “[t]he mere citation of scriptural material in pronouncing the sentence should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the trial judge based her decision on the proper statutory considerations and that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from the judge’s statements.”100 In reinstating the sentence, Supreme Court of Ohio Judge Cook used the “mere” language to distinguish general principles from personal beliefs: “Several state supreme courts, though they cite Bakker with approval, have declined to vacate sentences where the judge’s religious comments merely acknowledge generally accepted principles, as opposed to highly personal religious beliefs that become the basis for the sentence imposed.”101 In conclusion, the court found that “Arnett’s sentencing judge cited a religious text merely to acknowledge one of several reasons—‘one additional source’—for assigning significant weight to a legitimate statutory sentencing factor.”102 The court’s distinguishing of Bakker from Arnett is unpersuasive when it states that “Bakker merely prohibits a judge’s personal religious principles from being ‘the basis of a sentencing decision.’”103 There is no explanation of how the trial judge’s personal religious principles in Arnett were not implicated within the general principles when she turned to the book of Matthew for final help in determining the sentence. A judge’s personal perception of the meaning of biblical passages seems to be crucial in determining whether the use of the Bible is authoritative or symbolic. A judge’s use of the word “mere” often determines whether a defendant’s due process challenge succeeds. For example, in State v. Cribbs, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence of a defendant convicted of premeditated first degree murder.104 On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution’s use of biblical references to justify the death sentence violated his due process rights.105 The state argued 99 Arnett, 1999 WL 65632, at *3 (Hildebrandt, J., dissenting). 100 Id. 101 Arnett, 724 N.E.2d at 803. 102 Id. 103 Id. at 804. 104 967 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tenn. 1998). 105 Id. at 783. 50 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 that although biblical quotations were impermissible, the prosecutor’s use of the language “‘whatever a man sows, so shall he reap’ was merely a metaphor for individual accountability, rather than a justification for imposition of the death penalty.”106 Noting that a biblical reference in this case was inappropriate, the court nevertheless accepted the state’s argument finding that it did not prejudice the defendant.107 The court justified its finding by calling attention to the consistency of the biblical principle with the statute: “[W]e view the comments by the prosecutor which implied that Tennessee law embraced the principle of ‘reap what you sow’ as merely an extension of that metaphor.”108 Similarly, the dissent in People v. Harlan used the “merely” phraseology to point out the trial court’s misquoting of biblical passages in the trial record. Harlan was sentenced to death for first-degree murder, but his sentence was vacated because the jury was permitted to bring “the Bible into the jury room to share with others the written Leviticus and Romans texts during the deliberation.” 109 According to the dissent, the trial court concluded that one of the jurors used Romans 13:1, “which requires that one look at government authorities as God’s representative on earth and follow their lead as agents of ‘wrath to bring punishment to the wrongdoer.’”110 The dissent did not contest that the juror used Romans 13:1, but it explained that the passage “merely states ‘Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and the authorities that exist are appointed by God.’”111 The judge said that the trial court actually imported the language “wrath to bring punishment to the wrongdoer” from Romans 13:4 and criticized the majority for not correcting “these overstatements.”112 The thrust of the Romans passage is an absolute submission to the authorities—and only those established by God. The trial court’s use of language from 106 Id. 107 Id. at 784. 108 Id. 109 109 P.3d 616, 632 (Colo. 2005). This case immediately caught the attention of the media. See Kirk Johnson, Colorado Court Bars Execution Because Jurors Consulted Bible, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1; Thane Rosenbaum, Is Court a Place for Morals?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at B11; Eric Gorski, Book, Not Faith, Broke Court Rules, DENV. POST, Mar. 30, 2005, at 1A; Suzanne Goldenberg, US Jury’s Bible Death Sentence Quashed, GUARDIAN, Mar. 30, 2005, at 11; Bible-Influenced Death Penalty Ruling Rejected, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at 10. 110 Harlan, 109 P.3d at 635 (Rice, J., dissenting). 111 Id. 112 Id. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 51 Romans 13:4 about the consequences of wrongdoing that would be imposed by God’s appointees neither changed the nature of the command from Romans 13:1 nor undermined the main idea of divine authority this biblical passage conveyed. The juror’s reference to Romans 13:1 alone was sufficient as an improper invocation of an extra-legal authority and cannot be undermined by the dissent’s language “merely states.” This case exemplifies how a judge’s personal view and interpretation of the Bible may affect the outcome of a case. There are many other ways courts qualify the use of religious references in order to find it justifiable or to undermine the impact of such references. One example of the characterization of the use of a biblical passage is found in Bussard v. Lockhart.113 In that case, the court denied a habeas petition for a defendant who escaped from arrest after committing murder, remaining at-large for four years.114 The prosecutor in Bussard used a biblical passage to support the inference of guilt from the escape: “Proverbs 28:1 fits it just as clear as it can be. ‘The guilty flee when no man pursueth while the righteous stand bold as a lion.’ He fled to avoid coming to trial. That shows guilt.”115 In addressing the use of the biblical passage, the court stated: The prosecutor did not use the Bible to invoke the wrath of God against Bussard or to suggest that the jury apply divine law as an alternative to the law of Arkansas. Instead, the prosecutor simply resorted to Proverbs for a more poetic version of a commonsense connection expressly recognized by Arkansas law: flight suggests consciousness of guilt.116 The court cited two cases Killcrease v. State117 and Ward v. State118 in support of the proclamation that Arkansas law expressly recognizes that flight suggests consciousness of guilt.119 A careful reader will notice, however, that only in the Killcrease case was there an issue of flight from arrest.120 Although in Ward the court discussed the fact that the defendant fled the scene upon the arrival of the police, nowhere did the court indicate that the flight was an issue in the case, nor did it state a particular rule related to flight other than “it 113 32 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 1994). 114 Id. at 323. 115 Id. at 324. 116 Id. 117 836 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ark. 1992) (flight from arrest corroborates other evidence of guilt). 118 816 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (flight from scene of crime). 119 Bussard, 32 F.3d at 324. 120 Killcrease, 836 S.W.2d at 381. 52 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 may be considered with other evidence in determining guilt.”121 In Killcrease, the defendant was convicted of raping his minor daughter and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal he contended that the evidence of his arrest in Louisiana was irrelevant because no warrant was issued or any charges filed when he left Arkansas.122 The court held that it was up to a jury to determine whether the defendant fled to avoid arrest and that “[f]light to avoid arrest may be considered by the jury as corroboration of evidence tending to establish guilt.”123 In support of this rule, the Killcrease court cited two opinions, Riddle v. State and Ferguson v. State.124 The long line of cases using this rule leads to Stevens v. State, the first case that formulated it as follows: “Flight of the accused is admissible as a circumstance in corroboration of evidence tending to establish guilt.”125 Although many courts followed the rule as articulated in Stevens,126 the court in Ferguson changed the language by omitting the word “circumstance” from its holding that flight may “be considered as corroboration of evidence tending to establish guilt.”127 The difference between the biblical proverb used by the prosecutor in Bussard to support the demonstration of guilt and the rule as originally formulated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas is evident. The language in the proverb sends the message that fleeing is evidence of guilt, while the language of the court’s rule states that fleeing may be considered as a circumstance in corroboration of evidence tending to prove guilt. Even if one compares the modified language of the rule that fleeing suggests consciousness of guilt, the difference is still insufficient for the court to conclude that the biblical passage was a “poetic version” of the rule. The Bussard case is an illustration of the judicial slippage from biblical text to legal rules without realizing the impact such conflation actually has on the life of a human being. Concerned with the confounding of morality and law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in his famous essay The Path of the Law, “[t]he law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the 121 See Ward, 816 S.W.2d at 175. 122 Killcrease, 836 S.W.2d at 382. 123 Id. 124 Id. (citing Riddle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 708 (Ark. 1990), and Ferguson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 418 (Ark. 1989)). 125 221 S.W. 186, 188 (Ark. 1920). 126 See Smith v. State, 238 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Ark. 1951); Mason v. State, 688 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ark. 1985); Yedrysek v. State, 739 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ark. 1987). 127 Ferguson, 769 S.W.2d at 419. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 53 boundary constantly before our minds.”128 However, there are a variety of ways in which religious references are used in the decision-making process and in reasoning justifying decisions. Courts quote the Bible in order to support their propositions and to show that they are consistent with traditional morality. They sometimes use biblical passages as metaphors or to illuminate a particular common law principle. The Bible often becomes part of the historical explanation of a particular law or practice. In some instances, a biblical passage appears as a rule upon which a decision is based or accompanies a common law or statutory rule as a confirmation of the consistency of our law. The next part will show different ways in which the Bible is used in judicial opinions. III. QUOTING THE BIBLE FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES In some instances, judges use the Bible to express their personal religious and moral beliefs, and former Chief Justice Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama may be the best example of this practice. In Ex parte H.H., a lesbian ex-wife was denied custody of her children despite the fact that there was evidence of her exhusband’s excessive disciplinary punishment of children.129 Justice Moore’s special concurring opinion is an illustration of inappropriate judicial decision-making using the Bible as law. He starts his opinion with a strong statement: [T]he homosexual conduct of a parent—conduct involving a sexual relationship between two persons of the same gender— creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of others.130 Justice Moore’s perspective that a parent’s homosexual conduct is unfit per se is founded entirely on religious teachings against samesex sexual relationships.131 Unlike the gender-based tender years presumption that the Supreme Court of Alabama found unconstitutional, 132 the sexual orientation-based presumption is still valid in some states.133 The main justification for the per se rule is ex- 128 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1897). 129 830 So. 2d 21, 25-26 (Ala. 2002). 130 Id. at 26. 131 See Romans 1:18-32 (New International). 132 See Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981). 133 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). Some courts require that a 54 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 plained by Justice Moore: “Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated.”134 Justice Moore finds support for his proposition in Blackstone’s Commentaries135 and proceeds to quote from the Bible and various other sources condemning homosexuality.136 He concludes his opinion with the following words: “The common law adopted in this State and upon which our laws are premised likewise declares homosexuality to be detestable and an abominable sin. Homosexual conduct by its very nature is immoral, and its consequences are inherently destructive to the natural order of society.”137 By quoting biblical passages in support of their decisions, judges like Justice Moore perpetuate homophobia and the legitimacy of laws based on religious morality138 without any concern for the parties involved and the actual legal standards governing our society. One of those standards directly disregarded by Justice Moore in the Ex parte H.H. case is the best-interest-of-the-child standard. This case demonstrates the judicial misconduct present in invoking personal religious beliefs and morality as a basis of judgment. It is most interesting that Justice Moore was never disciplined for basing his decisions on his personal religious beliefs, but was actually removed when he refused to comply with a court order to remove the Ten Commandments monument he displayed in the rotunda of the state judicial building.139 In commenting on the controversy around Justice Moore, one author contrasted the invisibility of the judicial use of religious references to the physical appearance of impropriety, making the following point: parent involved in a same-sex relationship prove absence of harm. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Ark. 1987). Other courts use a “nexus test” requiring only proof that a parent’s sexual conduct will have or has had an adverse impact. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 134 Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 26. 135 Id. at 32, 34, 37. 136 Id. at 33-37 (quoting biblical passages Genesis 1:27, 2:24; Leviticus 20:13). 137 Id. at 38. 138 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Upholding a Georgia sodomy statute, the Court stated that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots,” referring to Judeo-Christian moral standards. Id. at 192. Concurring Justice Burger reiterated that, “Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical standards,” id. at 196, validating the state’s invocation of the biblical books of Leviticus and Romans to justify the sodomy statute, id. at 211 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 139 See Glassroth v. Moore, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2003), aff’d 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1000 (2003). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 55 While the plaintiffs, media, and judicial ethicists were earnestly setting their sights on this highly conspicuous jurist, they were devoting little if any attention to the question of the proper relationship between religion and the decisions judges actually render, including religiously devout judges like Chief Justice Moore. To be sure, the Chief Justice’s fundamental mistake, at least from a job retention perspective, appears not to have been his firm and guiding belief that God’s law ought to inform human law, or even his clear expression of that belief in judicial opinions, which is to say that he was not and would not obviously have been removed from office for actually implementing and manifesting his religious beliefs in his judicial capacity. His apparent mistake, instead, was to manifest them by erecting a granite monument in his administrative, and in many respects less important or less influential, role.140 Often courts use biblical references to explain the historical background of a legal concept. For example, tracing the origin of an in rem forfeiture proceeding by the government against the property involved in or acquired by crime, the Supreme Court cited Exodus 21:28: “[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten.”141 After locating the original source of this legal concept in the Bible, the Court traced the development of the forfeiture further to the common law concept of “deodand,” citing to Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and Holmes’s The Common Law.142 While it is a fact that Blackstone cited Exodus in his Commentaries,143 Holmes and other authors did not go that far.144 Other federal and state courts have also used the biblical passage Exodus 21:28 to explain not only the origin of the law of forfeiture, but also other tort actions, despite the availability of other sources of legal history upon which American law is actually founded.145 140 Idleman, Concealment, supra note 2, at 517-18. 141 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974). See also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998). 142 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 (citing to “O. Holmes, the Common Law, c. 1 (1881)” and “1. W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300”). See also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330 (citing to “1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 290-292 (1765); O. Holmes, The Common Law 10-13, 23-27 (M. Howe ed. 1963)”). 143 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *291. 144 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (45th printing 1923, 1909, 1881); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 473-74 (2d ed. 1923). 145 Federal courts citing or quoting Exodus 21:28: United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 918 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. One Parcel Prop., 74 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 401 (2d 56 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 The controversial Justice Moore of Alabama provides another example of biblical invocation in support of a historical analysis of a particular concept. Dissenting in Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, he engaged in a historical discussion of the concept of separation between the church and state, quoting from numerous biblical passages.146 Other judges also turn to the Bible in order to solidify the idea that a particular law is rooted in history. In a case involving a defamation suit, the West Virginia Supreme Court used Exodus 20:16, Deuteronomy 19:16-21, and Ecclesiastes 7:1 as historical evidence that slander was prohibited since the beginning of time.147 After quoting the Bible as its first source, the court proceeded by listing numerous legal sources on defamation, libel, and slander. The historical concept of subjecting “illegitimate” children to legal discrimination is also explained using Deuteronomy 23:2: “Throughout history, illegitimate children were precluded from, among other legal rights, entering certain professions. The Book of Deuteronomy states: a bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to this tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation of the Lord. Deut. 23:2.”148 Supreme Court justices join lower court judges in quoting the Bible when they resort to providing a historical review of certain Cir. 1993); United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 454 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Funds from Prudential Sec., 362 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States. v. Croce, 334 F. Supp. 2d 781, 786 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2004); United States v. Funds From Prudential Sec., 300 F. Supp. 2d 99, 100 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Haro, 685 F. Supp. 1468, 1473 (E.D. Wis. 1988). State courts citing or quoting Exodus 21:28: Allen v. State, 605 A.2d 994, 998 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Prop. Clerk of N.Y. City Police Dep’t v. Molomo, 583 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (App. Div. 1992); Duren v. Kunkel, 814 S.W.2d 935, 937 n.3 (Mo. 1991); Commonwealth v. One 1988 Ford Coupe, 574 A.2d 631, 636 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Holtzman v. Samuel, 495 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Dist. Attorney of Queens County v. McAuliffe, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Dir. of Fin. v. Cole, 465 A.2d 450, 456 n.2 (Md. 1983); New Jersey v. One 1977 Dodge Van, 397 A.2d 733, 734 n.1 (Middlesex County Ct. 1979); Prince George’s County. v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 284 A.2d 203, 205 (Md. 1971); Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637, 639 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Robidoux v. Busch, 400 S.W.2d 631, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Johnson v. Olson, 67 P.2d 422, 425 (Kan. 1937). 146 847 So. 2d 331, 350-53 (Ala. 2002) (quoting the following chapters from King James: 2 Chronicles 26:16-21, 2 Chronicles 26:18, 1 Samuel 13:13-14, Ezra 7:21-24, Matthew 22:21, Matthew 18:15-20, Matthew 16:19, 1 Corinthians 6). 147 Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 76 (W. Va. 1984). 148 Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 728 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). See also Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569, 572 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 57 legal principles. While such biblical references are usually placed in footnotes, occasionally they are prominently displayed in the main body of the opinion. For example, in Payne v. Tennessee, holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the admission of victim impact evidence in jury sentencing,149 Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Exodus 21:22-23, proscribing “[a]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” to demonstrate how the guiding principles in criminal sentencing varied over time.150 In his review of the historical principles guiding criminal sentencing, Justice Rehnquist started with the Bible before he moved on to the English law and legislative enactments.151 Sometimes, a court quotes the Bible as support for a proposition using a “cf.” as a citation signal. “Cf.” is an abbreviation for the Latin word “confer,” which means “compare.”152 Black’s Law Dictionary states, “As a citation signal, cf. directs the reader’s attention to another authority or section of the work in which contrasting, analogous, or explanatory statements may be found.”153 Such support was used in the United States v. Ryan case by a dissenting judge to interpret the statutory meaning of “the building used . . . in . . . any activity affecting interstate . . . commerce.”154 The dissenting judge argued that the statutory requirement of “activity” was missing in respect to the building in question.155 The dissent cited the Bible, stating, “The building here was just cumbering the ground. Cf. Luke 13:7 (King James). It was not being ‘used’ in any ‘activity.’” 156 The biblical passage cited states: “So he said to the man who took care of the vineyard, ‘For three years now I’ve been coming to look for fruit on this fig tree and haven’t found any. Cut it down! Why should it use up the soil?’”157 The judge used this citation assuming the reader’s familiarity with a biblical passage of this length and on this particular topic, which was listed under the chapter “Repent or Perish” in Luke. This assumption seems to be a long stretch if the extralegal authority was used as an analogy to show that there was no use for the building in question. Another example of the use of a biblical citation with a cf. citation signal is in the Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. 149 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 150 Id. at 819. 151 Id. 152 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (8th ed. 2004). 153 Id. 154 41 F.3d 361, 369 (8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). 155 Id. 156 Id. 157 Luke 13:7 (New International). 58 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 case.158 Parents of a dyslexic child challenged the county’s program as not being in compliance with the Education of the Handicapped Act.159 In a footnote, discussing the fact that the board took advantage of the child’s temporary progress (which was actually due to private tutoring) to show its compliance with the statute, the court quoted this passage from the Bible when it said: “Annual grade promotion may, as a result, be a reasonable barometer for measuring the progress that this handicapped child can achieve in the coming years. . . . Cf. Matthew 26:52 (King James) (‘[A]ll they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.’).”160 The court took the board’s argument and created a standard to which the board should adhere in the future, consisting of annual grade promotion and additional tutoring provided by the board.161 The court assumed that the reader was familiar with the biblical passage it partially quoted. The passage is part of the chapter on Jesus’s arrest and its idea only becomes clear if one knows its entire context: Then the men stepped forward, seized Jesus and arrested him. With that, one of Jesus’ companions reached for his sword, drew it out and struck the servant of the high priest, cutting off his ear. “Put your sword back in its place,” Jesus said to him, “for all who draw the sword will die by the sword.”162 The fact that judges resort to citing the Bible in support of their arguments shows the privilege that Christianity enjoys in our society. The invisibility of that privilege is enhanced by the judges’ assumptions of their audience’s familiarity with the Bible and by their disregard of the need for a full explanation of a cited source and its relation to the proposition at hand. Courts also use the Bible to explain the origins of a word. For example, in Bok v. McCaughn, the court explained that “[c]harity, derived from the Latin caritas, originally meant love. In the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians the revised version uses the word ‘love’ in defining the third of the three cardinal virtues, which, in King James’ version read ‘Faith, Hope and Charity.’”163 The term “sodomy” also finds its origin in the Bible, as the court noted in Stone v. Wainwright, citing Genesis 13:13 and 18:20 and quoting Leviticus 18:22: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: 158 946 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991). 159 Id. at 309. 160 Id. at 315 n.6. 161 Id. 162 Matthew 26:50-52 (New International). 163 42 F.2d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1930). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 59 it is abomination.”164 Similarly, Justice Breyer quoted the Bible to explain the origin of the word “carries” in a drug trafficking case where the statute included the phrase “carries a firearm.”165 Arguing that the word includes “conveyance in a vehicle,” he said, “[t]he greatest of writers have used the word with this meaning. See, e.g., The King James Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 (‘[H]is servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem’); id., Isaiah 30:6 (‘[T]hey will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses’).”166 The Bible has also been called upon to determine the meaning of seemingly simple words such as “daytime.” In a criminal prosecution, a defendant moved to quash a search warrant because it was not served during daytime as required by law.167 He claimed that the warrant was served at 7:15 p.m. and that the sun set at 6:53 p.m. on that day.168 Before citing Shakespeare, Webster’s Dictionary, and finally federal and state courts, the court resorted to the Bible as its first source of interpretation: “In the Bible, Genesis 1:5, we find ‘And God called the light day and the darkness he called night.’”169 The court dismissed the motion to quash the warrant, concluding that it had no merit because of the general rule that daytime is determined by the presence of light.170 While today’s courts are comfortable using biblical passage as a rule, the courts in the past refrained from actually quoting the Bible. For example, in a famous 1872 case, the Supreme Court held constitutional Illinois’s refusal to admit a woman to practice law, stating, “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”171 The Court did not specify what exact legal source it was referring to when it invoked “the law of the Creator.” 172 Modern courts, however, are more explicit in the invoca- 164 478 F.2d 390, 393 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1973). The text of the cited passages state, “Now the men of Sodom were wicked and were sinning greatly against the LORD,” Genesis 13:13 (New International), and “Then the LORD said, ‘The outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah is so great and their sin so grievous,’” Genesis 18:20 (New International). 165 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1998). 166 Id. 167 United States v. Liebrich, 55 F.2d 341, 342 (M.D. Pa. 1932). 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Id. at 343 (stating “it is reasonable to hold that it is daytime for at least thirty minutes after the time when the sun sets, and it is nighttime from then until thirty minutes before the time when the sun rises”). 171 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). 172 Id. 60 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 tion of biblical passages when formulating rules upon which they decide cases. The Second Circuit, in a suit for a securities violation, discussed the doctrine of “offensive collateral estoppel (more recently called offensive issue preclusion),” pointing to judicial efficiency as a primary “virtue” of the doctrine.173 It then indicated its disadvantage: Its virtues do not come without a price, however. Just as occasionally ‘the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong . . . but time and chance happeneth to them all,’ Ecclesiastes 9:11 (King James ed.), so too the results of an earlier resolution of an issue may simply be wrong.174 Some courts, when formulating standards, go directly to the Bible for support. In a dual adultery divorce suit, the husband filed a counterclaim alleging that the wife’s lesbian relationship constituted adultery.175 The court started its inquiry this way: To better understand the underlying issue it is helpful to briefly review both the legal and social standards and to distinguish between adultery as a crime as opposed to a private civil wrong. The [S]eventh [C]ommandment states that “Thou shall not commit adultery” Exodus 20:14. A biblical definition of “Adultery” is “the lying with a woman married to a husband.” See Deuteronomy 22:22 and Leviticus, 20:10. . . . If a married man be “lying with a woman not betrothed” the biblical crime was fornication and punishment by a fine of 50 shekels of silver. Deuteronomy 22:29 (The commentators generally opine that even the thought of adultery was an offense under the biblical code, an issue which we need not deal with today.)176 After the court quoted the above biblical passages, it proceeded with common law and New Jersey statutory treatment of adultery. Despite announcing that it would review “legal and social standards,” the court started with religious moral authorities on the issue, assuming that religious morality is a synonym for a social standard. These are just some of the various ways in which courts use biblical references in written opinions. The next part of this Article will demonstrate the many different forms in which a particular biblical passage enters judicial opinions. 173 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 1999). 174 Id. at 303-04. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fag Bearings Corp., 335 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting the same biblical passage from Monarch Funding, 192 F.3d at 303-04). 175 S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1992). 176 Id. at 125. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 61 IV. REFERENCING “NO MAN CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS”177 While the Supreme Court has never cited either Matthew or Luke, federal and state courts prominently do so when using the phrase “no man can serve two masters” to express the rule against an attorney’s dual representation.178 In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Foster, a state court invoked the following sources of authority: “The [b]iblical mandate that ‘No man can serve two masters’ has its modern-day application in cases of this nature. See Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics, 31 F.S.A.”179 Canon 6 of Professional Ethics, entitled Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests, imposes a duty on a lawyer to disclose to a client any potential interest that might adversely affect the client.180 Contrary to biblical mandate, Canon 6 does not prohibit a lawyer from representing two clients, but instead permits such representation by express consent of all parties after full disclosure of the facts.181 The invocation of a biblical mandate in this case is unclear because the court held that the insured who was represented by the insurer’s attorney was not harmed by any breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide information about settlement offers.182 Thus it follows that not only can a man serve two masters, but even when such servitude constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the attorney will only be liable when the plaintiff who is suing suffered harm. Some judges are willing to disregard existing legal standards, instead quoting biblical teaching as a primary source of the authority for their decision. In People v. Williams, a case charging a husband and wife for sex offenses upon their minor adopted child, a court held that there was no conflict of interest that would make joint representation of the defendant and codefendant improper. 183 Dissenting in an extensive opinion, Justice Pincham stated: Civilization’s most sacred, learned, dedicated and staunchest advocate of all times, centuries ago, admonished: “No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other.” The advocate was the Christ Jesus; the admonition was to his disci- 177 See infra Appendix. 178 See infra Appendix. 179 528 So. 2d 255, 277 (Miss. 1988) (citing Spadaro v. Palmisano, 109 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1959)). 180 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (2004). 181 Id. 182 Foster, 528 So. 2d at 276. 183 538 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 62 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 ples and the multitude during His Sermon on the Mount; the admonition is cited in the most dynamic, accurate and prestigious of all law books, The Holy Bible, at Matthews the 6th Chapter and the 24th Verse.184 After citing the highest authority to support his argument, the dissenting judge then proceeded to cite Canon 5 (5-1, 5-14, 5-15, 5- 17) of The Model Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association.185 A significant number of cases state that the biblical mandate “no person can serve two masters” is consistent with the Restatement of the Law on Agency and reflects the current legal framework within which courts operate. Contrary to what many judges state in their opinions, however, the Restatement of the Law of Agency does not prohibit dual servitude. The rules regulating the relation of agency explicitly provide that “[a] person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.”186 The comments for this section further elaborate on this issue, allowing for a servant to be employed by joint masters.187 The most important issue in the servant’s relationship with a master is the master’s consent to service188 and not, as the courts suggest, whether there is one or multiple masters. The same is true for the law governing lawyers. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers clearly establishes that a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation involves a conflict of interest189 unless the client consents to such representation.190 Consent, and not the number of clients or masters, is the key element in a lawyer’s representation of a single or multiple clients in civil and criminal litigation.191 Similarly, the ABA Model of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 allows an attorney to represent an organization and “its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.”192 It is also worth noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include one of the most important rules allowing for 184 Id. at 569 (Pincham, J., dissenting). 185 Id. at 569-570. 186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958). 187 Id. § 226(b). 188 Id. § 221. 189 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2001). 190 Id. § 122. 191 See id. §§ 128, 129. 192 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) (2004). 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 63 multiple representation: Rule 23 governing class action.193 The Restatement of the Law of Agency and the Law Governing Lawyers, together with the ABA Rules of Conduct, represent legal authorities upon which judges should rely. Any extralegal authorities, especially those that conflict with legal standards established by the accepted authoritative legal sources of statutory or common law, are constitutionally suspect and their invocation in judicial opinions is unsound. V. USING OTHER RELIGIOUS REFERENCES While citations to the King James version of the Bible are numerous, courts rarely use other religious authorities. A search for the word “Talmud,” a collection of Jewish civil and canonical laws,194 returns only three results in the Supreme Court cases database in Westlaw: County of Allegheny v. ACLU,195 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania. v. Schempp,196 and Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans.197 The word “Torah,” the first five books of the Old Testament, appears only five times in Supreme Court opinions: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,198 Lee v. Weisman,199 County of Allegheny v. ACLU,200 Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,201 and Miranda v. Arizona. 202 The word “Halakhah,” a Jewish law book consisting of the 193 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 194 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1494 (8th ed. 2004). 195 492 U.S. at 583-84 (using the Talmud in describing certain Jewish practices). 196 374 U.S. 203, 273 (1963). “There was ample precedent, too, for Theodore Roosevelt’s declaration that in the interest of ‘absolutely nonsectarian public schools’ it was ‘not our business to have the Protestant Bible or the Catholic Vulgate or the Talmud read in those schools.’” Id. (citation omitted). 197 44 U.S. 589, 604-05 (1845). “In the case of The Commonwealth v. Abram Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle, 48, Chief Justice Tilghman affirmed the validity of an ordinance of Philadelphia, imposing a fine for working on a Sunday, against a Jew; though under the teachings of the Jewish Talmud and the Rabbinical Constitutions, the Jew deemed Saturday as the Jewish Sabbath, and felt it both as a privilege and a duty to labour for six days, and to rest on the seventh, or Saturday.” Id. 198 512 U.S. 687, 691 (1994) (part of the facts). 199 505 U.S. 577, 639 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 200 492 U.S. at 584 n.24. “A Torah scroll—which contains the five Books of Moses—must be buried in a special manner when it is no longer usable. App. 237- 238.” Id. 201 490 U.S. 680, 701 (1989). “We also assume for purposes of argument that the IRS also allows taxpayers to deduct ‘specified payments for attendance at High Holy Day services, for tithes, for torah readings and for memorial plaques.’” Id. (quoting Foley v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 844 F.2d 94, 96 (1988)). 202 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966). “Thirteenth century commentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible. ‘To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.’ 64 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Torah and the law instituted by the rabbi, appears in only one opinion: Garrity v. New Jersey.203 The Supreme Court used the words “Koran,” “Kuran,” “Qur’an,” or “Qor’an,” a Muslim book of revelations, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,204 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,205 Clay v. United States,206 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.207 The Book of Mormon, a Mormon scripture, is cited in two decisions: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris208 and Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.209 Statistical evidence demonstrates that the appearance of references from Jewish or Muslim religious authorities is rare. Federal and U.S. Supreme Court case law mentions “Talmud” in 63 cases, “Torah” in 155 and “Halakhah” in 4 cases.210 The same search in the state case law database produces “Talmud” in 151 cases, “Torah” in 306 cases, and “Halakhah” in 2 cases, a pale comparison with the words “King James,” which produce 599 cases in state case law, and the word “Bible,” which is not possible to search due to an extremely high number of cases in which it appears.211 The various versions of the word “Koran” produce 499 cases in federal law and 349 cases in state law, but in most of those cases the word actually appears as a personal name.212 One needs go no farther than statistical data to conclude that the Bible is by far the most bellowed religious authority that judges use in their decision-making process and their written opinions. The apparent disparity in the use of different religious sources re- Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), Book of Judges, Laws of the Sanhedrin, c. 18, ¶ 6, III Yale Judaica Series 52-53.” Id. 203 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967) (comparing Jewish law with the Fifth Amendment). 204 536 U.S. 639, 713 n.24 (2002) (quoting the New Testament, the Book of Mormon, the Pentateuch, and the Koran). 205 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987). “Jumu’ah is commanded by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer. See Koran 62:9-10; Brief for Imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin et al. as Amici Curiae 18-31.” Id. 206 403 U.S. 698, 708 n.2, 709 (1971) (quoting the Koran 61:10-13 to define “jihad as an injunction to the believers to war against non-believers”). 207 403 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). “The advantages of sectarian education relate solely to religious or doctrinal matters. They give the church the opportunity to indoctrinate its creed delicately and indirectly, or massively through doctrinal courses. Many nations follow that course: Moslem nations teach the Koran in their schools . . . .” Id. 208 Zelman, 536 U.S at 713 n.24. 209 490 U.S. at 709. 210 Westlaw search performed on February 10, 2006. 211 Westlaw search performed on February 10, 2006. 212 Westlaw search performed on February 10, 2006. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 65 affirms the privileged status that Christianity enjoys in the United States. It is a constant reminder of the composition of the judiciary and the lack of diversity that contributes to the ongoing proliferation of the use of biblical references by the courts. CONCLUSION Language analysts recognize that the Bible had a substantial impact on standard English language.213 Many biblical passages, having been read at home and in church for generations, entered the popular linguistic milieu of the majority of Americans. However, not all of them became independent lexical units: A usage has to have achieved some degree of linguistic autonomy; it must be capable of being meaningful outside of its original biblical context, usable by English speakers who do not read (or even know) the Bible as well as those who do. (The same point applies to expressions derived from Shakespeare or any other author.) . . . A usage that does not meet this criterion is really only a quotation.214 One of the standard English expressions derived from the King James version of St. Matthew’s Gospel is, “No man can serve two masters.”215 However, courts continue to quote the Bible when referring to this expression. The variety of ways in which courts use biblical passages from Matthew and Luke is impressive.216 If the biblical passage that “no man can serve two masters” is part of folk wisdom, there would seem to be no need to quote the Bible. If, on the other hand, it is important to cite the ultimate source of this proverb, referencing the Bible seems logical. While this biblical quotation and citation to Matthew or Luke by courts may be trivial, the continuous use of the Bible by judges to support their arguments in written opinions is unjustified and should be barred. The Bible contains many passages as simple as the one above, but the scope of their impact on decision-making is impermissibly broad, including such decisions as life or death in capital cases. The arbitrariness of judicial choice to use some biblical passages as traditional folk expressions and to quote others as authoritative sources 213 CRYSTAL, supra note 71, at 274. See also Ashburn, supra note 2, at 343-47 (citing examples of courts using aphorisms from Jewish law). 214 CRYSTAL, supra note 71, at 276. “The King James Bible . . . has contributed far more to English in the way of idiomatic or quasi-proverbial expressions than any other literary source. . . . Matthew’s Gospel alone, for example, yields over forty locutions which, directly or indirectly, are part of Modern English.” Id. 215 Id. at 277. 216 See infra Appendix. 66 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 is analogous to the arbitrariness in which some biblical passages entered the everyday speech.217 Additionally, the use of the same biblical passage as a folk expression by some courts and as a biblical quote by the others creates a sense of arbitrariness and subjectivity, bringing into question judicial impartiality. The use of religious references in judicial decision-making is not rare and cannot be underestimated. The numerous ways in which the Bible finds its way into judicial opinions are a direct result of judges’ willingness to disregard the rules of judicial conduct and apparent constitutional violations stemming from such misuse. Since there is no bright line between a common expression such as “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”218 and the biblical mandate “[i]f anyone takes the life of a human being, he must be put to death,”219 courts should never use either text, especially not during a sentencing phase. Courts should be prohibited from using religious references in judicial decision-making because any reliance on extralegal sources of authority is contrary to the basic principles of the American justice system. Using religious references in judicial opinions is an impermissible exercise of a privilege that coerces the minority to accept the norms of the majority. Whether disguised as morals, proverbs, principles, tradition, or history, religious references undermine judicial integrity and impartiality. Long ago, Justice Holmes expressed one of the most creative ideas in respect to delineating morality and law. Although his idea may sound radical today to moderate and conservative proponents of the use of religion in decision-making, it is one that should resonate with any person who is genuinely concerned with the American justice system: For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.220 217 See CRYSTAL, supra note 71, at 278. What is really intriguing, of course, is why some expressions entered English in this way, and others did not. Why did such similes as wise as serpents or harmless as doves ([Matthew] 10:16) not become everyday phrases? As always, when we consider lexical innovation, the bigger puzzle is to explain why so many apparently vivid or useful items did not appeal. Id. See also BARTH D. EHRMAN, MISQUOTING JESUS: THE STORY BEHIND WHO CHANGED THE BIBLE AND WHY (2005) (discussing intentional and accidental alterations of the Bible made by translators throughout history). 218 Leviticus 24:20 (New International). 219 Leviticus 24:17 (New International). 220 Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 128, at 464. 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 67 APPENDIX CASES USING “NO MAN CAN SERVE TWO MASTERS”221 “No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and Money.” Matthew 6:24 (New International). “No servant can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and Money.” Luke 16:13 (New International). Terms Used by Courts to Refer to “No Man Can Serve Two Masters” Admonition Familiar scriptural quotation Ancient admonition Fundamental law Ancient axiom Fundamental rule Ancient injunction Fundamental truth Ancient maxim Fundamental proposition Ancient principle General rule Ancient truth General principle Authority of Holy Writ Good Authority Authoritative declaration Gospel Axiom Hallowed petition Biblical admonition High authority Biblical advice Highest Authority has said Biblical expression Infallible declaration Biblical doctrine Biblical mandate Infallible truth Biblical quote Injunction Biblical teaching Jesus said Christ said Law for two thousand years Christian morality Legal maxim Centuries-old scriptural passage Maxim Common experience Moral maxim Declaration Moral rule Divine declaration Old adage Divine injunction Old as Holy Writ Divine precept Old principle Doctrine of the Holy Writ Old proverb Divine saying Philosophy Eternal truth Philosophy of the Galilean Expression Phrase from the Bible Fact Principle 221 Westlaw search performed on February 10, 2006 using a sesarch phrase “can serve two masters.” 68 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Proposition of the Highest and best Scriptural references authority Scriptural teaching Proverb Statement Public policy rule Theory Quoted from the Bible Truth Rule Truth of the biblical admonition Rule of the moral law Truth of the Scriptural injunction Rule of law Unanimous verdict of mankind Saying Universal moral rule Scriptural maxim Utterance of the divine Nazarene Scriptural pronouncement Very high authority has said Scriptural quotation Wisdom of the ages SUPREME COURT CASES NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 595 n.14 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“No man can serve two masters. If you are negotiating a contract, a lawyer does not represent both clients. That is all that is involved here.”) Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197 n.50 (1963) (Justice Goldberg quoting from United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 550 n.14 (1961)) United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 550 n.14 (1961) (Warren, J.) (“The reason of the rule inhibiting a party who occupies confidential and fiduciary relations toward another from assuming antagonistic positions to his principal in matters involving the subject matter of the trust is sometimes said to rest in a sound public policy, but it also is justified in a recognition of the authoritative declaration that no man can serve two masters; and considering that human nature must be dealt with, the rule does not stop with actual violations of such trust relations, but includes within its purpose the removal of any temptation to violate them.” (quoting Mich. Steel Box Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 421, 439 (1914))) Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177 U.S. 260, 269 (1900) (Brown, J.) (“But if the insured is to be now bound as having thus contracted, there must be mutuality in the contract. No man can serve two masters.”) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 69 CITING TO MATTHEW Federal Court Cases Freund v. Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1543, 1572 n.67 (11th Cir. 1997) United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1995) Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1995) Chapman v. Klemick, 3 F.3d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1993) Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1993) United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 1989) United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1074-1075 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988) U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 619 (2d Cir. 1955) Armstrong Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 364 F.Supp. 2d 797, 815 (S.D. Ind. 2005) Rocchigiani v. World Boxing Counsel, 82 F.Supp. 2d 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 902 F. Supp. 877, 881 (W.D. Ark. 1995) ESM Gov’t. Sec., Inc. v. ESM Group, Inc. 66 B.R. 82, 84 (S.D. Fla. 1986) United States v. Bergmann, 47 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D. Cal. 1942) In re BH & P, Inc., 103 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) In re Tampa Chain Co., 35 B.R. 568, 579 n.10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) United States v. Short, 50 M.J. 370, 374 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (phrase from the Bible) 70 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 United States v. Nabisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 40, 44-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) Kamean v. Local 363, 109 F.R.D. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) United States v. Agosto, 528 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 (D. Minn. 1981) United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 621 (D.N.J. 1977) (Biblical teaching) Vance Trucking Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 249 F. Supp. 33, 38 n.2 (D.S.C. 1966) United States v. Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 836 (S.D. Cal. 1950) State Court Cases Office of Consumer Counsel v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, No. CV020513718S, 2002 WL 31319517, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2002) Wis. Patients Comp. Fund v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 620 N.W.2d 457, 461-62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 998 P.2d 856, 877 (Wash. 2000) State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 634 (Tex. 1998) In re Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 993 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) Geauga County Bar Ass’n. v. Psenicka, 577 N.E.2d 1074, 1074 (Ohio 1991) Friends of La Vina v. County of L.A., 284 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 n.1 (Ct. App. 1991) (Gates, Acting P.J., dissenting) Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 682 (Ala. 1990) J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v. Morris, 776 S.W.2d 271, 284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) People v. Williams, 538 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (admonition) Collins v. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 373 S.E.2d 612, 617 (Ga. 1988) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 71 Swartz v. State, 429 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1988) SHV Coal, Inc. v. Cont’l Grain Co., 545 A.2d 917, 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) Brickner v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 746 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) Jim Royer Realty, Inc. v. Moreira, 363 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Hinds County, 445 So.2d 1330, 1356 n.25 (Miss.1984) In re Conduct of Samuels and Weiner, 674 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Or. 1983) Webb v. State, 433 So.2d 496, 499 (Fla. 1983) Ellis v. Flink, 374 So.2d 4, 5 n.4 (Fla. 1979) Conn. Comm’n on Special Revenue v. Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 387 A.2d 533, 537 (Conn. 1978) Harford County v. Tatar, Lininger, Clark & Wood, Inc., 363 A.2d 501, 505 (Md. 1976) In re Runals’ Estate, 328 N.Y.S.2d 966, 978 (Sur. Ct. 1972) Onorato v. Wissahickon Park, Inc., 244 A.2d 22, 25 (Pa. 1968) Spratlin, Harrington & Thomas, Inc. v. Hawn, 156 S.E.2d 402, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (Biblical expression) State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, More or Less, in New Castle, 193 A.2d 799, 806 n.7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963) State v. Brewer, 129 S.E.2d 262, 277 (N.C. 1963) Martin v. Hieken, 340 S.W.2d 161,165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) Hughes v. Robbins, 164 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1959) (“It has been well written that ‘no servant can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.’”) 72 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Powers v. Johnson, 306 S.W.2d 616, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) Fruchtl v. Foley, 84 So.2d 906, 909 (Fla. 1956) (admonition) Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County, 90 S.E.2d 496, 498 (N.C. 1955) City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916, 920 (Fla. 1953) Ridgway v. Super. Ct. of Yavapai, 245 P.2d 268, 271 (Ariz. 1952) Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 234 P.2d 678, 682 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) State ex rel. Young v. Niblack, 99 N.E.2d 839, 845 (Ind. 1951) Bossler v. Wilson, 65 Pa. D. & C. 164, 171 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1949) City of Jackson v. McLeod, 24 So.2d 319, 325 (Miss. 1946) (“The public interest requires the undivided loyalty of police officers to the public service and we were told long ago by One whose judgment was infallible that ‘no man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.’”) Barr v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 200 So. 240, 244 (Fla. 1941) Century Indem. Co. v. Carnes, 138 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) Moffett Bros. P’ship Estate v. Moffett, 137 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1939) Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 182 So. 461, 464 (Ala. 1938) Whitlow v. Patterson, 112 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Ark. 1937) (“No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.”) Hood ex rel. N.C. Bank & Trust v. N.C. Bank & Trust, 184 S.E. 51, 62 (N.C. 1936) Olson v. Gaddis Inv. Co., 39 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah 1935) City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89 (Fla. 1934) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 73 State ex rel. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 62 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo. 1933) Harris v. United Serv. Co., 32 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ark. 1930) (general principle) Robson v. Hahn, 277 P. 507, 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) Schwartzman v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. of Liverpool, Eng., 2 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Mo. 1927) Castellanos v. Castro, 289 S.W. 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (“It was said by the Great Teacher that ‘no man can serve two masters . . . .’”) Rezos v. Zahm & Nagel Co., 246 P. 564, 565 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1926) Carolina Bagging Co. v. Byrd, 116 S.E. 90, 92 (N.C. 1923) Hume v. Baggett & Baggett, 221 S.W. 1002, 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (“This rule of law not only rests on an understanding of human nature but on the utterance of the Divine Nazarene, when he said: ‘No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.’”) Murray v. Lizotte, 77 A. 231, 238 (R.I. 1910) (“No matter how high his motives or how honorable his intention, ‘no man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or he will hold to the one, and despise the other.’”) Shamokin Mfg. Co. v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 39 Pa. Super. 553, 556 (Super. Ct. 1908) (“It involves a question whether the same person may be an agent in a private transaction for both parties, without the consent of both, so as to entitle him to compensation from both or either. We have the authority of Holy Writ for saying that ‘no man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.’ All human experience sanctions the undoubted truth and purity of this philosophy, and it is received as a cardinal principle in every system of enlightened jurisprudence.“) U.S. Tel. Co. v. Middlepoint Home Tel. Co., 19 Ohio Dec. 202, 208 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1908) (“It is as true today as when first spoken in the 74 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 parable, and has become a fundamental rule that ‘No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.’”) Gann v. Zettler, 60 S.E. 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (Powell, J.) (“It is recorded of Him ‘who spake as never man spoke’ that, ‘seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain, and when he was set his disciples came unto him; and he opened his mouth and taught them; saying: “No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.”’ So, also, is our law. Whoso, having undertaken the service of his master, counsels with another and agrees also to serve him in those same things wherewith he has been trusted, cannot claim the reward promised by his master unless he makes it plain that he has not acted privily, but that his master was consenting thereto.” (internal citations omitted)) City of Philadelphia v. Durham, No. 1, 1907 WL 3343, at *13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 30, 1907) (“We have the authority of Holy Writ for saying that ‘no man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.’ All human experience sanctions the undoubted truth and purity of this philosophy, and it is received as a cardinal principle in every system of enlightened jurisprudence.”) McDowell v. First Nat’l Bank of Sutton, 102 N.W. 615, 617 (Neb. 1905) Nat’l Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 13 Ohio Cir. Dec. 468 (Cir. Ct. 1902) Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Evans, 53 S.W. 1104, 1105 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1899) Moore v. Grow, 1 Pa. Super. 125, 127 (Super. Ct. 1896) Northrup v. Phillips, 99 Ill. 449, 454 (1881) Dickson v. People ex rel. Brown, 17 Ill. 191, 193 (1855) CITING TO LUKE State Court Cases Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 617 S.E.2d 40, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 75 Barefield v. DPIC Cos., 600 S.E.2d 256, 281 (W. Va. 2004) Rose ex rel. Rose v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 599 S.E.2d 673, 688 (W. Va. 2004) People v. Graham, 794 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ill. 2003) Myer v. Preferred Credit, Inc., 117 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 24 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) State v. Reddick, 534 S.E.2d 473, 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200 (Wyo. 1990) Watkins v. Floyd, 492 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 156, 160 (Ct. App. 1969) Pac. Indem. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 81 P.2d 572, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) Smith v. Harvey-Given Co., 185 S.E. 793, 796 (Ga. 1936) Jordan v. Austin Sec. Co., 51 P.2d 38, 58 (Kan. 1935) State v. Gautier, 147 So. 240, 246 (Fla. 1933) Never Fail Land Co. v. Cole, 149 S.E. 585, 588 (N.C. 1929) Patterson v. De Haven, 263 P. 568, 572 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) Chippewa Power Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Wis., 205 N.W. 900, 902 (Wis. 1925) Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 119 S.E. 315, 317 (Ga. 1923) Pagel v. Creasy, 6 Ohio App. 199, 206 (Ct. App. 1916) McCudden v. Brockmeyer, 26 Ohio Dec. 432, 436 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1915) Carr v. Ubsdell, 71 S.W. 112, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902) Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 399 (1881) 76 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 NO QUOTATION MARKS Federal Court Cases United States v. Freyer, 333 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (no lawyer can serve two masters) United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1205 (7th Cir. 1986) Ottawa Tribe v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 373, 379 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (gospel) Speeter v. United States, 42 F.2d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 1930) (old principle) Parkerson v. Borst, 264 F. 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1920) (scriptural maxim) United States v. Krafft, 249 F. 919, 928 (3d Cir. 1918) Curved Electrotype Plate Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 258, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1915) (authoritative declaration) Crites, Inc., v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 134 F.2d 925, 927 (6th Cir. 1943) (principle) Rankin v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 357, 367 (Ct. Cl. 1943) (authoritative declaration) Mich. Steel Box Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 421, 439 (Cl. Ct. 1914) (authoritative declaration) Bramhall v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 51, 59 (Cl. Ct. 1868) Klein v. Miller, No. Civ.A.SA-02-CA-687FB, 2004 WL 1118725, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2004) (biblical advice) Costa v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, 845 F. Supp. 64, 69 (D.R.I. 1994) (biblical advice) Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1941) In re Int’l Match Corp., 20 F. Supp. 420, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (truth of the biblical admonition) John Conlon Coal Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 16 F. Supp. 93, 95 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (principle) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 77 Marshall v. Lovell, 11 F.2d 632, 639 (D. Minn. 1926) Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of S.F., 281 F. 222, 228 (D. Or. 1922) Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of S.F., 277 F. 430, 432 (D. Or. 1921) Brown v. Pa. Canal Co, 229 F. 444, 452 (E.D. Pa. 1916) In re Va. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 139 F. 209, 218 (W.D. Ark. 1905) Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Winona & Sw. Ry. Co., 59 F. 957, 961 (C.C.D. Minn. 1893) Putnam v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 4 F. 753, 760 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1880) In re Tinley Plaza Assocs., 142 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.1992) In re Huddleston, 120 B.R. 399, 401 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.1990) United States v. Hubbard, 43 C.M.R. 322, 325 (C.M.A. 1971) (truth of the Scriptural injunction) Midwest Farmers v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 91, 102 (D. Minn. 1945) State Court Cases People v. Hardin, 840 N.E.2d 1205, 1212 (Ill. 2005) Coronado v. Schoenmann Produce Co., 99 S.W.3d 741, 753-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) State ex rel. S.G., 814 A.2d 612, 616 (N.J. 2003) Barrett v. Union Twp. Comm., 553 A.2d 62, 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (moral rule) Siegman v. Bd. of Educ., 477 N.E. 2d 241, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) Copple v. City of Lincoln, 274 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Neb. 1979) Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. E. Lancaster County Sch. Dist., 1973 WL 16227, at *3 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 18, 1973) (fundamental truth) 78 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 City of Montgomery v. Brendle Fire Equip., Inc., 279 So.2d 480, 486 (Ala. 1973) Procidano v. Mautner, 335 N.Y.S.2d 17, 24 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 278 A.2d 12, 25 (Md. 1971) Bd. of Educ. v. Wilton, 273 A.2d 44, 50 (N.J. 1971) Caddie v. Warden, Md. Correctional Inst., 238 A.2d 129, 129 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (theory) Hasbrouck v. Rymkevitch, 268 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 (App. Div. 1966) Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (Pa. 1962) Van Dyke v. White, 349 P.2d 430, 437 (Wash. 1960) Md. Credit Finance Corp. v. Hagerty, 139 A.2d 230, 233 (Md. 1958) Jedwabny v. Phila. Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1957) (scriptural references) Coble v. Econ. Forms Corp. 304 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 127 A.2d 190, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (moral rule) Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 1955) Henshie v. McPherson & Citizens State Bank, 280 P.2d 937, 947 (Kan. 1955) In re Ridgely, 106 A.2d 527, 530 (Del. 1954) (injunction) Cornale v. Stewart Stamping Corp., 129 N.Y.S.2d 808, 814 (Sup. Ct. 1954) Shernoff v. Schimel, 112 N.Y.S.2d 333, 347 (Sup. Ct. 1952) Klein v. Twentieth Century-Fox Int’l Corp., 108 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (fact) State ex inf. Taylor v. Cumpton, 240 S.W.2d 877, 884-85 (Mo. 1951) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 79 Petition of Topham, 58 Pa. D. & C. 649, 654 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1947) Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326, 328 (Md. 1946) City of Lincoln v. First Nat’l Bank of Lincoln, 19 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Neb. 1945) (moral rule) Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 18 So.2d 810, 829 (Ala. 1944) Phillips v. Phillips, 13 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943) Almon v. Am. Carloading Corp., 38 N.E.2d 362, 363-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (rule of law) Cowan v. Hamilton Nat’l Bank, 146 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1941) Jarrett v. French & Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 1938) (theory) Valley & Siletz R.R. Co. v. Thomas, 48 P.2d 358, 383 (Or. 1935) Beatty v. Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp., 168 A. 919, 924 (Vt. 1933) Greenfield v. Bausch, 263 N.Y.S. 19, 21 (App. Div. 1933) (fact) Elco Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 183 N.E. 191, 191-92 (N.Y. 1932) Kane v. McClenachan, 159 A. 61, 64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) Pac. Fin. Corp. v. City of Lynwood, 300 P. 50, 53 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (principle) New England Oil Ref. Co. v. Can. Mex. Oil Co., 174 N.E. 330, 337 (Mass. 1931) Terrell v. Town of Tempe, 274 P. 786, 788 (Ariz. 1929) Lucas Realty Co. v. Franks, 6 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ky. 1928) Eastham v. Stumbo, 279 S.W. 1109, 1110 (Ky. 1926) C.M. Condon & Co. v. Richardson, 232 P. 1070, 1071 (Kan. 1925) De Crette v. Mohler, 127 A. 639, 642 (Md. 1925) 80 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Smith v. Ward, 197 N.W. 684, 685 (S.D. 1924) Williams v. Bolling, 121 S.E. 270, 273 (Va. 1923) Grady v. Pink Hill Bank & Trust Co., 113 S.E. 667, 669 (N.C. 1922) In re Moses, 195 N.Y.S. 358, 360 (App. Div. 1922) (old as Holy Writ) Meeks v. Fink, 89 So. 543, 544 (Fla. 1921) Wilson v. S. Pac. Land Co., 46 Cal. App. 738, 745 (Ct. App. 1920) Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 100 S.E. 551, 555 (W. Va. 1919) State v. Nichols, 166 N.W. 813, 813 (N.D. 1918) Southampton Twp. v. Johnson, No. 3, 1916 WL 4261, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 17, 1916) Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 151 N.Y.S. 830, 831 (Sup. Ct. 1914) Hirsh v. Twyford, 139 P. 313, 316 (Okla. 1913) Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. State, 142 N.W. 847, 852 (S.D. 1913) (fundamental proposition) City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 814 (Minn. 1913) Hill v. Whiteside, 85 A. 425, 425 (Pa. 1912) Bell v. Riggs, 127 P. 427, 430 (Okla. 1912) (high authority) Langford v. Issenhuth, 134 N.W. 889, 894 (S.D. 1912) (fundamental law) Salene v. Queen City Fire Ins. Co. of Sioux Falls, 116 P. 1114, 1115 (Or. 1911) (principle) Cobe v. Coughlin Hardware Co., 112 P. 115, 117 (Kan. 1910) Mitchell v. Schreiner, 1910 WL 4143, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1910) (quoted from the Bible) Lightcap v. Nicola, 34 Pa. Super. 189, 202 (Super. Ct. 1907) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 81 Harper v. Fidler, 78 S.W. 1034, 1035 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (authoritative declaration) Hier v. Miller, 75 P. 77, 77 (Kan. 1904) Edwards v. Home Ins. Co., 73 S.W. 881, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902) In re Reifschneider, 69 N.Y.S. 1069, 1074 (App. Div. 1901) Murphy v. Indep. Order of Sons & Daughters of Jacob of Am., 27 So. 624, 625 (Miss. 1900) McFarland v. Gordon, 41 A. 507, 508 (Vt. 1898) Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Hardy, 34 A. 986, 987 (N.J. 1896) Shepard v. Hill, 34 P. 159, 160 (Wash. 1893) State v. Hastings, 55 N.W. 774, 789 (Neb. 1893) Huggins Cracker & Candy Co. v. People’s Ins. Co., 41 Mo. App. 530, 541 (1890) (authoritative declaration) Whited v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 415, 420 (1879) Roll v. Riddle, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint 232, 655 (Super. Ct. 1874) Ex rel. Dawson, 39 Ala. 367, 404 (1864) In re Miller, 30 Pa. 478, 494 (1858) Laight St. Baptist Church v. Noe, 12 How. Pr. 497, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) Buckles v. Lafferty’s Legatees, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 292, 302 (1843) Gayden v. Gayden, 1842 WL 2414, at *5 (S.C. Ct. App. Eq. 1842) (eternal truth) State v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1, 64 (Ct. App. 1834) Gallatian v. Cunningham, 8 Cow. 361, 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) Carter v. Harris, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 199, 204 (1826) (principle) McAllister v. Marshall, 6 Binn. 338, 350 (Pa. 1814) 82 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 QUOTATION MARKS WITHOUT CITATION Federal Court Cases United States v. Bowens, 108 F. App’x 945, 971 (5th Cir. 2004) Berwind Corp. v. Fyfe, No. 89-55880, 1990 WL 208794, at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977) Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Mitchell, 190 F.2d 308, 308 (5th Cir. 1951) (scriptural pronouncement) Va. Ferry Corp. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1939) (high authority) Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F.2d 590, 594 (10th Cir. 1931) (infallible truth and divine saying) Crawford v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1907) Olcott v. Rice, 69 F. 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1895) (truth) McGlothlin v. Connors, 142 F.R.D. 626, 635 (W.D. Va. 1992) (biblical admonition) Schwartz v. O’Grady, No. 86 CIV. 4243, 1990 WL 156274, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1990) SEC v. Commonwealth Sec. Investors, Inc., No. 2161, 1970 WL 202, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 1970) (Biblical quote) Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Keyes, 46 F. Supp. 181, 185 (W.D. Ky. 1933) (Jesus said) United States v. Walter, 291 F. 662, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1921) United States v. Del. & Hudson Co, 164 F. 215, 258 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908) United States v. Booth, 148 F. 112, 116 (C.C.D. Or. 1906) (principle) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 83 Symmes v. Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 60 F. 830, 864 (C.C.D. Nev. 1894) United States v. Sippel, 8 C.M.R. 698, 745 (C.M.R. 1953) (principle) In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 821 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (ancient axiom) Dobbins v. Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 451 n. 19 (S.D. Ohio 1968) In re W.T. Byrns, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Va. 1966) Shapiro v. Stahl, 195 F. Supp. 822, 825 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (infallible declaration) Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League Baseball Corp., 128 F. Supp. 191, 199 (W.D. La. 1955) (axiom) State Court Cases People v. Woidtke, 729 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) Winmark Ltd. P’ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 674 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) Friendship Heights Citizens Comm. v. Barlow, 329 A.2d 122, 125 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1996) Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978) In re Brown, 559 P.2d 884, 889 (Or. 1977) Drenning v. Kuebel, Inc., 327 So. 2d 571, 575 (La. Ct. App. 1976) In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (Or. 1975) Commonwealth v. Shank, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 602, 605 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1971) Elizabeth Fire Officers Ass’n v. City of Elizabeth, 274 A.2d 817, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) Warminster Twp. Appeal, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 99, 111 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1971) 84 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Claughton v. Bear Stearns & Co., 156 A.2d 314, 319-20 (Pa. 1959) (infallible declaration and public policy rule) McCall v. Johns, 294 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956) State v. Haesemeyer, 78 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 1956) (ancient truth) In re Bond & Mortg. Guar. Co., 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (N.Y. 1952) (centuries-old scriptural passage) Ky. State Fair Bd. v. Fowler, 221 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (philosophy) In re Buder, 217 S.W.2d 563, 574 (Mo. 1949) Kurtz v. Steinhart, 60 Pa. D. & C. 345, 360 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1947) (old adage) In re Laegen’s Estate, 43 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (Sur. Ct. 1943) Rotzin v. Miller, 277 N.W. 811, 817 (Neb. 1938) (hallowed petition) Int’l Serv. Union Co. v. People ex rel. Wettengel, 70 P.2d 431, 436 (Colo. 1937) Haines v. Biddle, 188 A. 843, 844 (Pa. 1937) (infallible declaration and public policy rule) Richter Jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 169 So. 750, 753 (Fla. 1936) (general rule) Whelan v. Bailey, 36 P.2d 709, 710 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (saying) Bland v. Smith, 33 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (rule) Clawans v. Ordway Bldg. & Loan Ass’n., 164 A. 267, 283 (N.J. 1933) (wisdom of the ages) Mees v. Grewer, 245 N.W. 813, 815 (N.D. 1932) Hall v. Williams, 50 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo. 1932) (ancient maxim) Neb. State Bank of Norfolk v. Sch. Dist. of Pierce, 240 N.W. 570, 571 (Neb. 1932) (good authority) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 85 Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 1930 WL 2386, at *5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 29, 1930) Cent. Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N.W. 894, 895 (Neb. 1928) (philosophy) McDaniel v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 240 Ill. App. 535, 549 (App. Ct. 1926) In re Water Rights in Silvies River, 237 P. 322, 358 (Or. 1925) Shealy v. S. Ry. Co., 120 S.E. 561, 568, 575 (S.C. 1924) Koons v. Richardson, 227 Ill. App. 477, 484 (App. Ct. 1923) (rule of the moral law and expression) Tex. Ref. Co. v. Alexander, 202 S.W. 131, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (very high authority has said) Tusant v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 163 N.W. 690, 693 (Iowa 1917) (law) Kirby-Sorge-Felske Co. v. Doty, 157 N.W. 273, 276 (Mich. 1916) (infallible declaration) Peterson v. Lewis, 154 P. 101, 106 (Or. 1915) In re E. Cameron Twp. Auditors’ Report, 1915 WL 3321, at *7 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 11, 1915) (statement) (general principle) In re Krauthoff, 177 S.W. 1112, 1125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) (Highest Authority has said) King v. Reed, 141 P. 41, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913) (infallible declaration and public policy rule) Clopton v. Meeves, 133 P. 907, 910 (Idaho 1913) (common experience and unanimous verdict of mankind) Jacobs v. Beyer, 125 N.Y.S. 597, 599 (App. Div. 1910) (rule) Biddle v. Cumberland County, No. 15, 1908 WL 2834, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 20, 1908) Commonwealth ex rel. Kutz v. Witman, 66 A. 986, 987 (Pa. 1907) (statement) 86 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Evans v. Rockett, 32 Pa. Super. 365, 369 (Super. Ct. 1907) (infallible declaration) Commonwealth v. Miller, 1906 WL 3769, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1906) (expression) Wilkinson v. McCullough, 46 A. 357, 358 (Pa. 1900) (infallible declaration) Leathers v. Canfield, 75 N.W. 612, 616 (Mich. 1898) (infallible declaration) Addison v. Wanamaker, 39 A. 1111, 1111 (Pa. 1898) (proposition of the highest and best authority) Deutsch v. Baxter, 47 P. 405, 405 (Colo. App. 1896) (fact) Wildberger v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 17 So. 282, 283 (Miss. 1895) Finch v. Redding, 26 A. 368, 369-70 (Pa. 1893) (infallible declaration and public policy rule) Caswell v. Jones, 26 A. 529, 530 (Vt. 1893) Harkness v. Briscoe, 47 Mo. App. 196, 198 (Ct. App. 1891) (principle) Pearson v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 537, 545 (1883) Memphis, Kan. & Colo. Ry. Co. v. Parsons Town Co., 26 Kan. 503, 509 (1881) Haxton v. Harris, 19 Kan. 511, 512 (1878) Draper v. Moore, 1872 WL 6072, at *4 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1872) BIBLICAL MANDATE State Court Cases Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255, 277 (Miss. 1988) (ancient principle) Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Christian morality) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 87 In re Hershberger, 606 P.2d 623, 627 (Or. 1980) (biblical admonition) Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 600 P.2d 1212, 1217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (centuries-old scriptural passage) Twp. Comm. of Hazlet Twp., Monmouth County v. Morales, 289 A.2d 563, 565 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (moral rule) State v. Goode, 171 N.W.2d 733, 733 (S.D. 1969) (ancient admonition) State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder, 430 P.2d 304, 314 (Kan. 1967) (ancient injunction) Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 264 N.Y.S.2d 624, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (centuries-old scriptural passage) Schear v. City of Elizabeth, 196 A.2d 774, 778 (N.J. 1964) (universal moral rule) Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 116 N.W.2d 91, 99 (Minn.1962) (truth of the biblical admonition) Dick & Reuteman Co. v. Doherty Realty Co., 114 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Wis. 1962) (centuries-old scriptural passage) Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So.2d 838, 841 (Fla. 1959) (familiar scriptural quotation) Spadaro v. Palmisano, 109 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (biblical mandate) Raymond v. Bartlett, 175 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (biblical doctrine) Higginbotham v. Pub. Belt R.R. Comm’n, 181 So. 65, 71 (La. Ct. App. 1938) (biblical doctrine) In re Flavin’s Guardianship, 18 N.E.2d 514, 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) (law for two thousand years) Adams v. Hearn, 178 A. 606, 611 (Md. 1935) (divine injunction) Stubbs v. Fla. State Finance Co., 159 So. 527, 528 (Fla. 1935) (familiar scriptural quotation) 88 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Mangels v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 173 A. 191, 197 (Md. 1934) (divine precept) State v. Williams, 68 S.E. 900, 902 (N.C. 1910) (scriptural teaching) Hamilton v. Allen, 125 N.W. 610, 612 (Neb. 1910) (philosophy of the Galilean and declaration) Beasley v. Swinton, 24 S.E. 313, 322 (S.C. 1896) (Christ said) Funk v. Washington Twp., No. 196, 1893 WL 2925, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 15, 1893) (authority of Holy Writ) Pa. R.R. Co. v. Flanigan, 4 A. 364, 367 (Pa. 1886) (authority of Holy Writ) Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256, 259 (1872) (authority of Holy Writ and principle) Scheible v. Bacho, 41 Ala. 423, 450 (1868) (Divine declaration) Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 151, 158 (1853) (doctrine of Holy Writ) PRINCIPLE OR PROPOSITION State Court Cases People v. Dobrino, 592 N.E.2d 391, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) People v. Arnold, 577 N.E.2d 1355, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) Fed’n of State Cultural & Educ. Prof’l v. Commonwealth, 546 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ill. 1988) State v. Basham, 170 N.W.2d 238, 255 (S.D. 1969) (principle) Batson v. Strehlow, 59 Cal. Rptr. 195, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 664 (Okla. 1963) In re Guardianship of Angell, 167 N.E.2d 711, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) Battle v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 168 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 89 Fred Tuke & Son v. Burkhardt, 156 N.E.2d 490, 491 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1958) State v. Hambrick, 196 P.2d 661, 667 (Wyo. 1948) Callahan v. Jones, 93 P.2d 326, 330 (Wash. 1939) Gallin v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 273 N.Y.S. 87, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1934) Rossi v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 165 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1932) Garibaldi Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of Atlantic City v. Garibaldi, 162 A. 419, 423 (N.J. Ch. 1932) Swearingen v. Moore, 280 P. 295, 299 (Okla. 1929) Johnson ex rel. McCarter v. Nippert, 144 A. 404, 406 (Pa. 1928) Adams v. Kennard, 253 P. 1048, 1049 (Or. 1927) Quell v. Boyajian, 90 Pa. Super. 386, 389 (Super. Ct. 1926) (ancient principle) Murray v. Stuart, 247 P. 187, 188 (Colo. 1926) (ancient principle) W.R. Pickering Lumber Co. v. Sherritt, 233 P. 179, 180 (Okla. 1924) Rowe v. Freeman, 172 P. 508, 511 (Or. 1918) Livermore Falls Trust & Banking Co. v. Riley, 78 A. 980, 981 (Me. 1911) Wolford v. Upper Salford Twp. Sch. Dist., 46 Pa. Super. 1, 4 (Super. Ct. 1910) Clark v. Hubbard, 44 Pa. Super. 37, 42 (Super. Ct. 1910) (public policy rule) Edwards v. Meyers, 76 A. 510, 511 (Pa. 1910) Marshall v. Reed, 32 Pa. Super. 60, 61 (Super. Ct. 1906) (declaration and general principle) Maxwell v. West, No. 603, 1900 WL 4333, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 3, 1900) 90 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:31 Cincinnati, H. & D. R.R. Co. v. Morris, 10 Ohio C.C. 502, 520 (Cir. Ct. 1895) Rice v. Davis, 20 A. 513, 514 (Pa. 1890) (infallible declaration and public policy rule) Bensley v. Moon, 7 Ill. App. 415, 421 (App. Ct. 1880) Bassett v. Monte Christo Gold & Silver Min. Co., 15 Nev. 293, 299 (1880) (general principle) Eur. & N. Am. Ry. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277, 277 (1871) Morrison v. Ogdensburgh & Lake Champlain R.R. Co., 52 Barb. 173, 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) PROVERB OR MAXIM State Court Cases In re Estate of Shano, 869 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) Plaquemines Parish Com’n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So.2d 1034, 1040 (La. 1987) Alexander v. Super. Ct., 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (Ariz. 1984) Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 1052 v. Pub. Employment Relations, 630 P.2d 470, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) In re Adkins’ Estate, 319 P.2d 512, 515 (Mont. 1957) (old proverb) Shell Oil Co. v. Bd. of County Com’rs, 231 P.2d 220, 224 (Kan. 1951) (maxim) Engle v. Dist. Ct., 85 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1938) In re Union Real Estate Inv. Co. First Mortgage 6% Gold Bonds Due July 1, 1941, 1 A.2d 662, 666 (Pa. 1938) Howard v. Potts, 233 N.W. 909, 912 (S.D. 1930) (moral maxim) Horan v. Varian, 265 P. 263, 267 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) Cameron v. White, 262 P. 664, 668 (Okla. 1927) Salata v. Dylewski, 207 N.W. 895, 896 (Mich. 1926) 2005] QUOTING THE BIBLE 91 Farnsworth v. Hatch, 151 P. 537, 541 (Utah 1915) In re Ramsey, 123 N.W. 726, 728 (S.D. 1909) (moral maxim) Casey v. Donovan, 65 Mo. App. 521, 529 (Ct. App. 1896) Burke v. Bours, 32 P. 980, 981 (Cal. 1893) Piatt v. Longworth’s Devisees, 27 Ohio St. 159, 195 (1875) (legal maxim)https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=clr City University of New York Law Review Volume 9 | Issue 1 ...
Translation It takes the average person about 90 days to ingest the full 60 gram treatment. I suggest that people start with three doses pe...